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Introduction 
 
The subject of this thesis is the meeting of the British Army and 
Native Americans on the colonial frontier in the aftermath of the Seven 
Years’ War.  More specifically, this is an examination of the policies and 
strategies adopted by the British Army when dealing with Native 
Americans.  Much has been written on this period, yet the unusual role 
played by the British Army has often been simplified, perhaps because it 
eventually failed in its allotted task.  Still, for a little over ten years, between 
1763 and 1774 the British Army was used not to expand empire but to 
restrain its growth, and this deserves examination. 
This study has several aims: firstly, to lay out the policies pursued 
with respect to Native Americans by both General Jeffrey Amherst, later 
Baron Amherst, the commander-in-chief of the British Army in North 
America at the end of the Seven Years’ War and General Thomas Gage, 
who replaced Amherst as commander-in-chief in North America in 1763.  
The second aim is to answer the question of why these two Generals chose 
the policies they did, and what their goals were in doing so.  The third aim 
will be to determine whether either Amherst or Gage changed their chosen 
strategies as the impact of their decisions became apparent.  Finally, this 
study will examine how senior British officers responded to their orders 
concerning Native Americans, and the difficulties the army faced in 
carrying out those orders. The chronological structure of this thesis has been 
chosen in order to best answer these questions. 
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Chapter One is focused on the Seven Years’ War, as it was the 
genesis of the Indian Department and the reason for the large-scale 
deployment of the British Army to America.  This chapter also examines the 
key role the Seven Years’ War played in shaping the attitude of the British 
Government towards the frontier and Native Americans.    One of the 
lessons that the British took from the war was that the Colonies could not be 
trusted to handle Native American diplomacy, with the result that they 
created the Indian Department to take over that role.  However, as a legacy 
of its wartime inception, the Indian Department was made subordinate to the 
commander-in-chief of the British Army in North America.  This meant that 
in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, Jeffery Amherst, the commander-
in-chief at that time, had the final say on the Indian policy adopted by both 
the Army and the Indian department.  The policies he chose to adopt and the 
opinions that gave birth to them are the subject of Chapter Two.  The 
foundation of all Amherst’s dealings with Native Americans was his 
conviction that with sufficiently rigorous treatment they could be turned into 
hard-working vassals of the empire.  Senior British officers on the frontier 
greeted this policy with a range of responses, and their varying reactions are 
detailed in Chapter Three.  Amongst some senior army officers on the 
frontier there was a recognition that their position was inherently weak, and 
so they attempted to secure Native American acquiescence for the army’s 
presence on the frontier rather than follow Amherst’s policy, which insisted 
on economy above all. 
Britain’s occupation of the frontier, in breach of promises made to 
Native Americans during the Seven Years’ War, eventually led to the 
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conflict known as Pontiac’s War.  Pontiac’s War began in the spring of 
1763, and was an almost successful attempt by a disparate group of Native 
Americans to remove the British from the frontier.  Chapter Four covers the 
run-up to Pontiac’s War, and details how a few senior officers tried 
engaging Native Americans with their traditional forms of diplomacy, while 
begging Amherst to change his stance on the treatment of Native 
Americans.  
 Amherst’s failure to change tack helped to bring about Pontiac’s 
War, and the differing strategies pursued by Amherst and his successor, 
General Thomas Gage, in the prosecution of the war are dealt with in 
Chapter Five.  The key change brought about by Pontiac’s War was the 
British Government’s decision to replace General Amherst with General 
Thomas Gage in August 1763.  Gage had managed to bring Pontiac’s War 
to a spluttering end by 1765, with the result that he was now faced with the 
same problem that had confronted Amherst at the end of the  Seven Years’ 
War: how best to keep the peace on the frontier. 
Gage’s policies were a radical departure from Amherst’s, and 
Chapter Six examines the new commander-in-chief’s conception of Native 
Americans, and how his ideas shaped the policies he adopted.  One of 
Gage’s key beliefs was that Native Americans could be brought to accept 
British domination of North America, provided their concerns were listened 
to and, where possible, addressed.   
 Chapter Seven is focused on the army’s attempts to carry out 
Gage’s orders to resolve frontier conflicts and provide satisfaction to Native 
Americans with the limited powers at their disposal.  Sadly, the powers 
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granted to the army by the Proclamation of 1763 and later the Mutiny Act 
proved to be insufficient for this task.  In light of the army’s failures and the 
growing Native American anger that resulted, Gage began urging his 
officers to permit Native Americans to revenge themselves on those who 
had wronged them.  Gage argued that this should not just be the case for 
individual settlers but also for entire colonies, and expressed the opinion 
that since any conflicts with Native Americans were likely to be caused by 
colonial provocation, then it should be left to the Colonies to sort it out, 
without assistance from the British Army.  This argument was the logical 
outcome of Gage’s belief that Native Americans were rational beings who 
would only go to war if they felt it was in their interest.  This change in 
policy, and Gage’s role in bringing it about, is the focus of Chapter Eight.  
As the army struggled to make peace on the frontier both Gage and 
Whitehall came to the conclusion that this matter might best be handled by 
the Colonies themselves, provided they were made aware that the army 
would not be available to bail them out if they failed.  Once adopted, this 
policy quickly proved a failure, resulting in Dunmore’s War when, in April 
1774, the colony of Virginia went to war with the Shawnee in an attempt to 
bolster its claim to the land that would become Kentucky.  The rest of the 
chapter details the British Government’s final attempt to take control of the 
frontier in 1774 with the Quebec Act, which was largely based on Gage’s 
ideas and assumptions. 
 All too often, the accounts of the British Army’s dealing with Native 
Americans consist of little more than the retelling of the same few events 
and personalities: Braddock’s arrogance, Amherst’s hatred, and the 
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infamous incident of the smallpox-infected blankets.  The purpose of this 
work is not to deny these events or their importance, but to place them in 
context.  The views held by Amherst, while shared by some in the British 
Army, were by no means universal and at times brought him into conflict 
with senior British officers.   
  This thesis is an examination of the methods adopted by the British 
Army to get Native Americans to accept the army’s peacetime occupation of 
the colonial frontier.  Obviously the conflict that would become known as 
Pontiac’s War is included, but as it has been examined in many works, it is 
not the main focus of this study.  Rather, it is the policies followed by the 
army during peacetime that are the focus of this thesis.  As such it builds on 
the new military histories that examine not just the army’s performance on 
the battlefield, but how it functioned as a society.   
There have been many studies of the British Army and its role in 
colonial America.  The archetype for most modern histories of the British 
Army is Fortescue’s A History of the British Army.
1
  This multi-volume 
book combines a history of the British Army in the field with a study of the 
British Army as an institution which spans over 200 years.  Though 
Fortescue’s conclusions now seem somewhat dated, its format of mixing 
military and social history has become standard in modern examinations of 
the British Army.   
The new military history examines not only tactics and strategy but 
those issues that would have shaped the day-to-day lives of soldiers, such as 
disobedience, discipline, desertion, disease, food and entertainment.  
                                                           
1
 J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London; New York: Macmillan and Co., 
1899). 
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Stephen Brumwell’s book Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the 
Americas 1755-1763 and Silvia R Frey’s The British Soldier in America are 
two of the best recent works.
2
  Both books provide detailed accounts of the 
types of men who made up the British Army, and the army rules and 
regulations that shaped their lives.  Michael McConnell’s Army and Empire: 
British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 1758-1775 also covers similar 
territory; while Frey and Brumwell concentrate on how the institutions of 
army life affected those who had signed up, McConnell focuses on the 
massive impact the environment of North America had on the British 
Army.
3
 
While these books all provide detailed accounts of life in the British 
Army, they for the most part only touch briefly on the policies adopted by 
the army regarding Native Americans in the years after Pontiac’s War.  
Even though McConnell’s book provides an excellent account of nearly all 
aspects of army life on the frontier, Native Americans only warrant a few 
mentions, which are mainly concerned with the material aspects of relations 
with the British. For instance, there are accounts of soldiers exchanging 
their rations with Native Americans for fresh meat, and the adoption of 
Native American clothing by soldiers to replace the remnants of their 
uniforms, which were often little more than rags after years of hard service 
on the frontier.
4
  Both these examples highlight the fact that interaction 
                                                           
2
 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 
(Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Sylvia R. Frey, The 
British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). 
3
 Michael N. McConnell, Army and Empire: British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 
1758-1775, Studies in War, Society and the Military (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2004). 
4
 Ibid. p. 107 for trading food with Native Americans and pp. 64-65 for the use of Native 
American clothes.  McConnell’s discussion of relations between soldiers and Native 
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between the army and Native Americans was two-way, with the army often 
adopting aspects of Native American material culture as necessary, just as 
Native Americans had been adopting aspects of European culture for 
centuries.   
The one historian in this group who does examine the relations 
between the British Army and Native Americans in any detail is Stephen 
Brumwell.  In Redcoats he devotes a chapter to contact between Native 
Americans and British soldiers on the frontier, making fresh use of captivity 
narratives.  Brumwell does well to point out that Amherst’s vitriolic reaction 
to Pontiac’s War, while important, should not be taken as typical of British 
responses to Native Americans, and that other officers displayed curiosity 
and fascination when confronted with the alien culture that Native 
Americans represented.  However, the majority of the chapter is devoted to 
the experiences of those soldiers who were taken captive by Native 
Americans, and while their experiences are important it should be 
remembered that they represent exceptions to the norm.  Though adopted 
captives played an important role as translators and cultural guides their 
experience was far removed from that of the ordinary soldier, and while a 
substantial number of soldiers may have attempted to desert by joining 
Native American communities, those who actually spent any length of time 
there always represented a minority.  There are also questions about the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Americans may be limited in this book because of his previous work: Michael N. 
McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), which goes into some detail in this area. 
However, as discussed below, this is mostly from the Native American point of view. 
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reliability of captivity narratives as many may have been embellished when 
published to make them more exciting for the reader.
 5
   
In addition to its impact on the frontier, the British Army’s presence 
in America also played an important role in helping spur the American 
colonists toward rebellion, and this is one of the themes of the work of 
Walter S. Dunn Junior.
6
  In a trilogy of books Dunn examines the economic 
impact of the decision to leave a large number of British troops in America 
after the end of the Seven Years’ War, with a particular concentration on the 
fur trade.  Dunn makes a very convincing case throughout all three books 
that imperial mismanagement of the fur trade created a great deal of 
resentment among colonial merchants, helping to discredit British rule and 
precipitate the revolution.
7
 Meanwhile, the British Army played an 
important role in the post-war colonial economy by providing a market for 
American traders.  Not only did the British Army have to supply the needs 
of its troops, it purchased large amounts of goods in order to supply Native 
Americans with presents.  The huge total value of British Army purchases 
went a long way to balancing the trade deficit between the Colonies and 
Britain during the 1760s.
8
  However, despite Dunn providing a 
comprehensive account of the role of the British Army in the fur trade, his 
books say little about the interaction between the army and Native 
Americans outside the economic sphere.  
                                                           
5
 Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763.p. 162 for 
reaction of British officers, pp. 168-179 for captives. 
6
Walter Scott Dunn, Frontier Profit and Loss: The British Army and the Fur Traders, 1760-
1764, Contributions in American History, 0084-9219 ; No.180 (Westport, Conn. ; London: 
Greenwood Press, 1998). Walter Scott Dunn, The New Imperial Economy: The British 
Army and the American Frontier, 1764-1768 (Westport, Conn. ; London: Praeger, 2001). 
Walter Scott Dunn, Opening New Markets: The British Army and the Old Northwest 
(Westport, Conn. ; London: Praeger, 2002).  
7
 Dunn, Opening New Markets: The British Army and the Old Northwest. p. 2. 
8
 Ibid. p. 148. 
11 
 
While there are few works concerned with relations between the 
army and Native Americans, the past 50 years have seen a rising trend in 
studies of the role of the British Army in American society, such as Shy’s 
Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the coming of the 
American Revolution. Like Dunn, Shy argues that the presence of the British 
Army in America was one of the main causes of the revolution.
9
  This 
argument is developed further in Leach’s Roots of Conflict: British Armed 
Forces and Colonial Americans 1677-1763, in which Leach argues that 
friction caused by the presence of British regular forces was a major 
contributing factor in bringing about the American Revolution.
10
  Whenever 
American militias were serving with British soldiers both sides certainly 
found plenty to criticise in the other.  The Redcoats were contemptuous of 
the colonial soldiers’ lack of discipline and shabby appearance.  The 
colonials on the other hand regarded the Redcoats as hidebound, obsessed 
with discipline and rank and unable to adapt to combat in the American 
woods.  This animosity only increased when British soldiers were used in 
attempts to restore order to colonial towns and cities in the years preceding 
the revolution.
11
     
The structure and society of the British Army affected not just its 
impact on colonial American society, but its conduct in wartime.  Newer 
books on warfare examine how the cultures of the participants shape their 
chosen tactics and strategy, and how in turn the conflicts affected those who 
                                                           
9
 John Willard Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the 
American Revolution (pp. x. 463. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1965). p.423. 
10
 Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial 
Americans, 1677-1763 (Chapel Hill ; London: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). 
p.166. 
11
 Ibid. p. 164. 
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participated.  This is important for this thesis, as the situation that the British 
Army confronted in America in the years that it occupied the frontier was 
very much a creation of the Seven Years’ War, and was further altered by 
Pontiac’s War; therefore it is impossible to understand the actions of the 
British Army at this time without understanding these conflicts. War is also 
important culturally, and while much has been made of the role of warfare 
in some Native American societies it was of even greater importance in the 
unique society of the British Army, which was after all founded and 
maintained with the express purpose of prevailing in war.  Any study that 
involves an examination of the army of a particular epoch must include 
some examination of the warfare of that period.    
One of the best of these is Ian K. Steele’s book Warpaths, a 
panoramic study of the evolution of warfare on the North American 
continent from 1510 until the end of the Seven Years’ War.
12
  While Steele 
provides a great deal of information on Native American culture and its 
impact on colonial warfare, his section on the British Army does not extend 
much beyond a discussion of Amherst’s role in bringing about Pontiac’s 
War and the tactics the British used against Native Americans.  The role of 
the British Army on the frontier after 1765 is hardly mentioned at all, which 
is easily understandable in a book whose focus is on conflict. 
Another good example of a book that examines how war is shaped 
by culture just as culture is shaped by war is Matthew Ward’s Breaking the 
Backcountry.  The book focuses on the impact that the Seven Years’ War 
had on the society and inhabitants of the backcountry.  Again, as in many 
                                                           
12
 Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York ; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). 
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other works, Ward sees the presence of the British Army as a major factor in 
bringing about the American Revolution.  At the start of the war in America 
the British Army suffered a series of reverses which left a lasting impression 
on the backcountry folk who witnessed them.  As events moved towards a 
break with the mother country many colonists remembered the feeble 
performance of the British Army, and concluded that if it came to war they 
had little to fear from them. 
 Breaking the Backcountry not only covers changes in backcountry 
society but also examines the tactics used by Native Americans in their fight 
against the British.  Native Americans learned of the vulnerability of the 
colonial frontier to raiding in the early years of the Seven Years’ War, and 
went on to repeat those tactics successfully in Pontiac’s Rebellion.
13
  Ward 
also reveals the important role psychological warfare played when the 
Indians confronted Braddock’s Army.  Native Americans proved highly 
adept at using psychological warfare to undermine the morale of British 
regulars: one of the tactics they used was to leave the mutilated bodies of 
soldiers in the path of the army, where they frequently terrified those 
soldiers who stumbled across them.
14
  While the book provides an excellent 
insight into the ever-changing world of the backcountry, it often has little to 
say about the role of the army post 1765, despite the fact that the army 
continued to occupy the frontier for nearly another decade. In part, this 
thesis is intended to fill that gap. 
                                                           
13
 Matthew C. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and 
Pennsylvania, 1754-1765 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press ; [London : 
Eurospan, distributor], 2003). p. 217.  
14
Ibid. p. 55.  
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The role of the British Army is also examined in Fred Anderson’s 
Crucible of War.  This book covers not only the Seven Years’ War but also 
Pontiac’s War and the Cherokee War, and the repercussions of both.  
Anderson argues very convincingly that the increasingly uncompromising 
attempts by the metropolitan government to exercise control over the 
Colonies, which began in the Seven Years’ War, and only increased 
afterwards, were responsible for bringing about the American Revolution.  
While his explanation of events up to 1765 is accurate, post 1765 Anderson 
comes a little adrift.  He argues that Thomas Gage only wished to keep a 
symbolic presence on the frontier, and that he never believed good relations 
with Native Americans could be maintained.  While Anderson is right to 
assert that Gage never saw the value in keeping large number of troops 
scattered on the frontier, he is completely wrong about Gage’s attitude to 
Native American policy.  As this work will show, even after Pontiac’s War 
Gage was an optimist, and believed that through carefully-managed 
diplomacy Native Americans and empire could coexist.
15
    
One of the most exciting recent developments in frontier literature 
has been the appearance of books which attempt to examine events from the 
point of view of Native Americans.  Previously books that detailed the lives 
and customs of Native Americans did so from a European perspective, but 
now books such as Gregory Evans Dowd’s War Under Heaven and Daniel 
Richter’s Looking East from Indian Country not only attempt to explain the 
                                                           
15
 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British 
North America, 1754-1766 (London: Faber, 2000). pp. 636-637. 
15 
 
structure of Native American society on its own terms, but examine 
European actions from a Native American perspective. 
16
 
In contrast to the often simplistic way in which the attitudes of the 
army have been portrayed, the attitudes of the Native Americans towards the 
army have been covered in some depth, particularly in works such as 
Gregory Evans Dowd’s A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian 
Struggle for Unity 1745-1815.  Indeed, the dislike and hatred many Native 
Americans felt for the British Army and the empire it represented have been 
well documented.  Yet throughout this period some Native Americans 
continued to travel to British forts to trade, and to obtain justice from the 
garrison commanders.  If we assume that all Indians regarded the British 
Army with nothing but contempt this behaviour is hard to explain.  Dowd’s 
book proves he has an excellent understanding of how Native American 
societies functioned, and how the arrival of British troops affected those 
societies.  It is the picture he paints of British soldiers as varying only in the 
degree to which they hated the Indians that lets him down. Dowd’s view is 
too simplistic: it is incorrect to assume that all officers were motivated by a 
hatred of the Indian way of life.    
  Dowd’s War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations and the 
British Empire paints the army (almost to a man) as Indian haters driven by 
a need to dominate or destroy Native American society.  Dowd believes that 
British commanders “embodied the drive for an empire of domination”.
17
  
While this may have been the case for some officers, it was definitely not 
                                                           
16
 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America 
(Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
17
Gregory Evans Dowd, War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British 
Empire (Baltimore, Md. ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). p. 64. 
16 
 
the case for all senior officers.  This thesis will show that amongst those 
British officers who commanded posts on the frontier there were those 
driven by pragmatism who looked for peaceful ways to coexist, as well as 
those who sought only to dominate and demean those Native Americans 
they encountered. 
Dowd’s book contains many fine observations, and he clearly has a 
very deep understanding of how the Native American community in the 
Ohio Valley operated, but he has misunderstood the society of the British 
Army.  In many places it seems that he has accepted the Native American 
view of the British Army’s intentions as being the army’s actual intentions.  
While it is important to understand how Native Americans regarded the 
British Army, their beliefs about them were often as wide of the mark as 
British speculations on the operation of Native American minds. 
Another good example of history from a Native American 
perspective is A Country Between the Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples 
1724-1774 by Michael McConnell.
18
 The transformation of historical 
representations of Native Americans from simple savages, who did little 
more than present an obstacle to European invasion, to autonomous actors 
with their own plans and aims has taken a long time, but is one of the 
greatest strengths of recent works.  McConnell outlines the methods used by 
the various tribes of Ohio Indians to resist colonial expansion and retain 
their autonomy during the eighteenth century. Initially, this meant playing 
the British and French off against each other in the competition for empire.  
After the Peace of Paris, and the French surrender at the end of the Seven 
                                                           
18
 McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774.  
17 
 
Years’ War, this became impossible.  Instead, various Native American 
headmen attempted to unite the Ohio Indians so that they might be strong 
enough to resist the British.  McConnell does a very good job of explaining 
how the Ohio Indians tried to shape their own fate.  Faced with the 
increasing encroachments of white settlers, inter-tribal diplomacy 
functioned to unite those who wished to use force to remove the squatters.  
Though the Ohio Indians never managed to bring about a pan-Indian 
alliance, they did almost succeed in removing the British from the Ohio 
Valley during Pontiac’s uprising. 
Richard White’s The Middle Ground manages to examine the events 
of this tumultuous period from both a white and a Native American 
perspective.
19
  White comprehensively rejects the old models of linear 
cultural collision where there were only two outcomes: either Native 
Americans would be conquered and assimilated by the Europeans or 
remnants of Native tribes could maintain some cultural autonomy by 
remaining apart from white society.
20
  In either case colonial American 
society was left unchanged by its interaction with Native Americans. 
White argues that this is a gross over-simplification, and that in the 
‘pays d’en haut’ region around the Great Lakes first French and then British 
colonial society was greatly changed by its interaction with native society.   
Eventually, accommodation and some understanding were reached between 
Europeans and Native Americans through a process of “constructive 
misunderstanding”.  Though neither side was perfectly able to comprehend 
                                                           
19
Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815, Cambridge Studies in North American Indian History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991).  
20
 Ibid. p. ix. 
18 
 
the language and rituals of the other, they found a middle ground in which a 
new language and new rituals arose to aid understanding.  The efforts of 
people who had crossed the bridge between the two differing societies, such 
as French fur traders or adopted captives, created a language that mixed 
native metaphor and ceremony with European diplomacy and trade.
21
   
The other important aspect of White’s book is his portrayal of the 
changing attitudes of colonists and settlers towards Native Americans.  
White demonstrates that the defining of the Indian as the ‘other’ that 
characterised American policy towards Native Americans only began to 
develop around the time of the revolution.
22
  At the same time White argues 
that British officials did actively seek to address Native American concerns 
in order to bring about a stable peace in the years following Pontiac’s War.  
This is correct, but White says little about the officers of the army, whose 
job it was it was to do this on a day-to-day basis.  He does discuss the 
attitudes of Gage and Amherst in some depth, but I believe his depiction of 
Gage is mistaken.  White portrays Gage as following Johnson’s lead when it 
came to Native American affairs, while in reality Gage had strong ideas of 
his own, and while working with the Superintendent for Indian Affairs 
played a large role in defining policy himself.
23
  Gage, like Amherst before 
him, had a veto over actions suggested by Johnson, and there were always 
far more soldiers than Indian Agents on the frontier.  At the same time as 
being in charge of these men on the ground Gage was also reporting to the 
ministers who had the final say on British frontier policy.  Therefore, to 
                                                           
21
 Ibid. p. x. 
22
 Ibid. p. xv. 
23
 Ibid. p. 290. 
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understand the evolution of Britain’s approach to Native Americans, it is 
vital to understand the attitudes of military men like Gage. 
Books by authors such as Dowd, McConnell and White do a great 
job of recreating the Native American viewpoint during the eighteenth 
century.  Yet they do not do the same for the British Army.  McConnell 
accurately describes the attitudes of Amherst, and mentions that Gage 
agreed more strongly with Johnson, but does not examine the opinions of 
other officers in any depth.  Dowd attempts this, but I believe his attempt is 
unsuccessful.  He brilliantly captures Native American ideas about the army, 
but his depiction of the army as driven by hatred and bent on domination is 
simplistic and inaccurate.  For a more accurate view of what motivated the 
British army at this time it is necessary to turn to the new imperial history. 
A recent development in the literature relating to Native Americans 
are books which attempt to relate Britain’s treatment of Native Americans to 
the developing British culture of the eighteenth century.  While books such 
as Sosin’s (see below) have successfully linked imperial policy to the 
situation on the frontier, it is only recently that books have appeared  that 
attempt to link eighteenth-century political and cultural theories with British 
frontier policy.  Troy Bickham’s Savages Within the Empire does a good job 
of linking policy with political theory and eighteenth-century ideas about 
Native Americans.  Rather than arising from a desire to dominate, Bickham 
argues that the British system was “based on a consistent pragmatism and 
the drive for efficiency” with a “naïve tendency toward humanitarianism”.
24
  
Bickham is right to argue that pragmatism and efficiency were at times the 
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defining characteristics of imperial policy, and, as this thesis will show, 
occasionally the reasons behind the actions of senior British officers on the 
frontier.  His assertion that “respect for American Indian power” as 
demonstrated during the Seven Years’ War was a foundation of imperial 
policy is true for many of those in Whitehall, but this thesis will show that 
respect for American Indian power was not shared by Amherst, and his view 
that Native Americans posed no threat to the British Army was decisive in 
determining his treatment of them.  Gage, in contrast, was well aware of 
Native American military potential, and his respect for their strength is key 
to understanding the importance he attached to dealing with Native 
American grievances.  Bickham’s claim of a tendency towards 
humanitarianism is less well-founded: while officers and politicians liked to 
talk of their desire to reduce suffering, when push came to shove they were 
prepared to sacrifice the lives of colonial Americans, Native Americans  
(and British soldiers, come to that) in order to preserve their vision of 
empire.
25
 
Patrick Griffin makes a similar attempt to join ideology and policy in 
his book American Leviathan.  Griffin argues that key to understanding the 
British frontier policy is the concept of subjecthood, and that the distinction 
between subjects and non-subjects was critical in terms of understanding 
how the British acted on the frontier.  Griffin is certainly right to argue that 
it was culture and not race which defined peoples like the Native Americans 
in the British imagination. However, his focus on the line between subjects 
and non-subjects and the empire’s mission to civilise is misplaced.  For a 
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start, it was Amherst who made the greatest efforts to “civilise” Native 
Americans, yet he was removed from power because his methods, and the 
war they created, were disapproved of.  Furthermore, while men like 
Johnson may have liked to see Native Americans progress toward 
“civilisation”, it was hardly the focus of their efforts; pragmatic attempts to 
secure peace on the frontier were far more important to men like him and 
Gage.  Furthermore, though the line between subjects and others was 
important, to focus exclusively on this is to ignore the huge role played by 
class in the British world-view.  Every man in the army was a subject of the 
Crown, but Sir Jeffery Amherst would hardly have regarded the common 
soldier as his equal.  Griffin’s theories are sound, but only go a little way in 
explaining the methods adopted by the British Army in the west, for while 
senior officers were no doubt aware of such theories as cultural progression, 
they were far more influenced by more immediate concerns.
26
  
Looking at the historiography for race in the eighteenth century, 
there is a strong consensus centred on several key suppositions.  The first of 
these is that the eighteenth-century understanding of race was very different 
from the way we understand it nowadays.  Even nineteenth-century views 
on race differ a great deal from those held in the eighteenth century.  The 
second supposition is that for most of the eighteenth century there was little 
consensus on what exactly race was, or what it meant.  As described by 
Dror Wahrman, “the late eighteenth-century picture for race is less of 
sweeping unified clarity, and more transitional, multiplicity, and confusion.” 
That is to say no one model of racial difference was universally accepted by 
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people in the eighteenth century.  In fact the opposite is true: in the 
eighteenth century many competing explanations of racial variation existed 
alongside one another, and so when examining the period people’s views on 
race should not be taken for granted.
27
 
 Though the concept of race was in flux, most authors agree 
that throughout the eighteenth century European ideas of civilisation gave 
Europeans a sense of superiority over indigenous peoples.  There were some 
exceptions, such as those who believed in the ideal of the “Noble Savage” 
uncorrupted by decadent European civilisation, but for the most part 
Europeans believed they were superior because they possessed a superior 
culture.  They felt that a civilisation based on settled agriculture and trade 
was infinitely more advanced than those they encountered made up of 
hunter-gatherers.
28
 
Still, amongst many eighteenth-century commentators on race there 
was the belief that this situation was not necessarily permanent, and that 
native peoples could be civilised by their European betters.  This theory 
existed for decades before it was codified by Scottish thinkers as the “four- 
stages” or “stadial” theory.  According to the theory, all societies went 
through four stages.  Stage one was hunter-gatherer, then pastoral, then 
agricultural and finally commerce.  As it passed through each stage a society 
would find the morality and manners of its members improving.  The way to 
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encourage a society along this path, eighteenth-century thinkers held, was 
through trade.  This idea is explored in some depth in Griffin’s American 
Leviathan. Griffin holds that cultural theories of development guided British 
treatment of Native Americans, and that many imperial policy makers, 
including Johnson, sought to “civilise” Native Americans using trade and 
Christianity.
 29
 
This thesis will show how the policies chosen by Gage and Amherst 
to deal with Native Americans are in line with these arguments.  Both 
Amherst and Gage took very different approaches to dealing with Native 
Americans, which is evidence that they thought of them in very different 
ways, thus supporting the idea that racial ideas were neither fixed nor 
universal during the eighteenth century.  Both Amherst and Gage, along 
with most British officers, were convinced of their superiority to Native 
Americans, and Amherst was determined to change Native American 
behaviour using trade when he was in charge of the frontier, all of which is 
consistent with the description of eighteenth-century ideas of race in the 
historiography.  
While theories of race no doubt influenced some British officials, it 
should always be borne in mind that, as P.J. Marshall argues in The Making 
and Unmaking of Empires, “most of those who concerned themselves with 
empire were likely, however, neither to be doctrinaire theorists nor 
especially on the make”.  This was certainly true of certain senior army 
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officers in the Colonies, Gage and Amherst included.
30
  Marshall 
emphasises both the importance of what came to be known as mercantile 
theory and the failure of the British Government to secure the co-operation 
of colonial elites in the clashes between Crown and Colonies that were the 
forerunners of the American Revolution.  As my studies will show, both 
these factors are necessary for understanding the actions taken by British 
officers as they struggled to control the frontier. 
In many ways these works build on the older imperial histories from 
historians like J. M. Sosin and Clarence Alvord, with Alvord, who argued 
for the role of theory in policy as the antecedent of Griffin’s and Bickham’s 
work, and Sosin, who emphasised the practical basis of many decisions, as 
the forerunner of Marshall.
31
  Alvord is one of the few authors to note that 
ignorance played a large role in determining frontier policy; after all, few 
British policy-makers had ever been to the Colonies, never mind the 
frontier, and what information they did have was received from 
correspondents who were often pursuing a vested interest.
32
  This thesis will 
show that ignorance and misconceptions about the frontier were not limited 
to those in Whitehall.  Sosin too acknowledges that correspondence from 
the Colonies was crucial in shaping perceptions of the frontier in Britain, 
arguing that Gage played an important role in the formation of policy 
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through his letters to the ministers in London, something that is borne out by 
my own research.
33
 
Another of the more recent works on empire is Eric Hinderaker’s 
Elusive Empires. Hinderaker proposes that there were three different 
empires competing for dominion of the Ohio Valley.  Each empire was 
associated in particular (though not exclusively) with a different power.  
There was the French Empire of trade (dealing mainly in furs); the British 
Empire of land; and finally the American Empire of liberty.
34
  Although this 
theory is somewhat flawed it does highlight two of the most important 
forces shaping the history of the Ohio Valley: the fur trade and the quest for 
land.  It was the money to be made from the fur trade and land speculation 
that helped draw both the French and the British into the Ohio Valley.  The 
problem with Hinderaker’s theory is that it is impossible to draw any clear 
line between the different types of empire.  It was not just the French who 
were interested in the fur trade, and it was not only the British who were 
interested in populating the Ohio Valley.  Still, Hinderaker does provide a 
great deal of information about the interactions between Crown and 
Colonies as they struggled with each other to dominate the Ohio valley, and 
this struggle will be one of the major themes of this work.  For while the 
British Government wanted a halt to colonial expansion, the speculators and 
squatters in the Colonies were desperate for as much Native American land 
as they could get their hands on.  Indeed, there were some senior officers of 
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the army, Gage included, who would come to regard uncontrollable 
colonials as a greater threat to the empire than Native Americans. 
The literature on the period between the end of the Seven Years’ 
War and the start of the American Revolution is clearly extensive.  
However, the many excellent studies of the army in North America only 
briefly touch on the policies adopted by Gage after he succeeded Amherst.  
Amherst was not representative of all British officers, and even those books 
that do attempt to delve a little deeper into the army’s treatment of Native 
Americans generally do not cover the period after 1765.  Dowd’s work, 
which does examine the attitudes of those in the army, does not paint an 
accurate picture, while the more recent series of works that attempt to place 
British frontier policy within an imperial context say little about the 
difficulties faced by those attempting to enact those policies, and instead 
focus their attention on the mindset of those within government.  Therefore 
there is still a gap to be filled: a study of how the policy of the British Army 
changed in the years after the Seven Years’ War and the obstacles facing the 
officers of the British Army as they struggled to carry out those policies. 
This study aims to examine relations between the British Army and 
their Native American neighbours, and so wherever possible letters and 
diaries from soldiers and officers serving on the frontier have been sought 
out. Unfortunately, these are few and far between, partly as a result of the 
inevitable destruction of much of the material in the intervening 200 years. 
However, such records were few to begin with, as in the eighteenth century 
most soldiers were not literate, and very few left diaries or letters.  With 
most of the soldiery illiterate, and the Native American society with which 
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they were mixing being non-literate, records of the feelings of the 
participants in the interaction between the army and the native inhabitants of 
the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region are rare, and records left by 
officers, such as the Gage Papers, provide the main source for this project.   
Of course, all these sources need to be regarded carefully, and the 
sources left by those who came into contact with the British Army while 
they were on the frontier have been consulted wherever possible in order to 
get the widest possible picture of events.  One large group of records comes 
from the Indian Department, who operated alongside, though not necessarily 
in step with, the army throughout their years at the edge of empire.  Still, 
both groups were servants of the Crown, and the papers of traders, 
missionaries, and anyone else who moved through the backcountry in the 
relevant period provide a counter to the imperial perspective. 
Just as there was a culture gap between the British Army and Native 
Americans, there was a similar, if slightly smaller, divide between the 
officers and men within the British Army.  It follows that just as those who 
use European sources to view the society of Native American tribes must be 
constantly aware of the distorting effect of European attitudes and 
prejudices, so those using the writings of British officers to try to divine the 
attitudes of their men must be aware that these sources come with another 
set of assumptions and distortions.   
One source that was considered for this project but eventually 
rejected was London newspapers and magazines.  After an initial 
examination it was found that the content was simply too vague and 
inaccurate concerning events on the frontier to be of use for this study.  
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While articles about America may contain a wealth of information on 
attitudes of the press and the British public to America, they contain little on 
the attitudes of those actually in the Colonies.   
It should be pointed out that some authors dislike the use of terms 
such as ‘tribe and ‘nation’ as they impose European concepts of culture and 
identity onto people who would have found them quite alien.  However, 
these terms are still the best conceptual tools for dealing with the various 
cultural groupings of Native Americans, though they remain far from 
perfect.  It is also worth noting that in the Ohio valley tribal affiliations were 
not as important as the village group.  The Native American residents of the 
valley were migrants who had travelled there in order to escape Europeans 
or disease, and the chaos of relocation had often split or destroyed what had 
been single tribe communities.  Consequently, when those that survived 
reached the valley they tended to settle in multi-tribal villages, with the 
result that the village often became the most important political unit.  This 
was, in part, the reason that those attempting to form Indian federations had 
the most success in the Ohio Valley. 
Throughout this study vague terms such as “Native American” and 
“the French” will be used.  Of course such monolithic blocks of people 
existed only in the minds of British officials, but as this is a study of how 
British officials thought, such terms are appropriate.  Indeed, the difference 
between perception and reality is one of the marked features of Britain’s 
drive to pacify the frontier, and it was the cause of many of their problems.  
In reality Native Americans were, and are, a hugely diverse set of peoples 
speaking many languages and with many cultures, who all followed separate 
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agendas; those called the “French” by the British were not quite so 
heterogeneous, but there was still a great deal of difference between the 
outlook of a Canadian voyageur and a military officer just off the boat from 
France. 
Pontiac’s War will still be referred to as such simply to avoid 
confusion, even though it has long been established that he was not the main 
driving force behind the war.  The term “Pontiac’s War” was made popular 
by Parkman’s The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War, wherein 
Parkman lays the blame for the conflict almost entirely at Pontiac’s feet.  
This view has now been discredited but though Pontiac was not the 
originator of the war he did play an important role in the siege of Detroit 
and the subsequent peace.
35
   
It was not Pontiac’s War but the Seven Years’ War that initially 
shaped Britain’s attempts to manage the frontier.  The Seven Years’ War 
left an indelible impression on all involved.  Colonists and Native 
Americans never forgot the redcoats’ initially disastrous forays into the 
backcountry, while the British never forgot the colonial intransigence that 
forced them to march into the backcountry in the first place.  Neither could 
the British understand the colonial insistence of doing all they could to 
antagonise the region’s Native Americans.  Both Parliament and the British 
Army became convinced that the only way to win the war and safeguard the 
empire’s frontier was to take control of it themselves.  The war that brought 
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them to this conclusion and the transfer of power from the Colonies to the 
Crown that resulted from it are the subject of the next chapter. 
  
 
31 
 
Chapter One  
Lessons of the Seven Years’ War 
 
 
The British Army had been sent to the American colonies by the British 
Government to fight the Seven Years’ War, but it would also play a crucial 
role in the British Empire’s relations with Native Americans in the years 
that followed.  Both the British Army’s role in Native American diplomacy 
and the factors which shaped it were the legacies of the Seven Years’ War.  
By the time the conflict ended the British Army would not only be deployed 
on the frontier in unprecedented numbers, but it would be totally enmeshed 
in the complex world of Native American diplomacy. 
The Seven Years’ War not only brought the problems of Native 
American relations to prominence, but drastically altered the relationship 
between the Colonies and the British Government.  Shortly after the war 
began the British Government became convinced that the Native Americans 
were too powerful to be ignored.  The government blamed the British 
Army’s failure to secure Native American allies on the Colonies’ poor 
treatment of Native Americans.  The main problems identified by the 
government were Amerindian land rights and the conduct of the fur trade.  
Certain that the Colonies could not be trusted to conduct successful relations 
with Amerindians, ministers decided that the Crown had to take direct 
control of Indian affairs.  The British Government created the Indian 
Department, but as a legacy of its wartime creation it was made subordinate 
to the army, with the chief Indian agents forced to answer to the 
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commander-in-chief of the army in America.  This meant that the senior 
army officer in America not only decided military strategy but controlled 
the conduct of relations with Native Americans.  Meanwhile, while William 
Pitt’s rise to power brought victory for the British, his strategies left the 
government with a mountain of debt.  Victory also brought other problems, 
including how to manage and defend the large new territories added to the 
British Empire.  It was decided that the British Army would occupy the area 
in a series of isolated garrisons, both to keep an eye on wary Native 
Americans and to protect the region from possible French counter-attack.  
The debt, the isolated garrisons and the subordination of the Indian 
Department to the army would all be critical in shaping events in the 
immediate post-war period, and were all a legacy of the Seven Years’ War.
1
 
By 1754 the French had been struggling to gain a foothold in the 
Ohio Valley for a number of years, but with only limited success.
2
  In June 
1752 the French had led 200 Ottawa and Chippewa in an attack on the town 
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of Pickawilany, a centre for British trade.  This force succeeded in killing 
many Native Americans and one trader and taking another six traders 
captive.  Terrified, most British traders fled the region, leaving the area’s 
Native Americans with a choice of joining the French or starving.
3
   In 
1753, in order to better assert sovereignty in the region and create alliances 
with the Native Americans there, the French began to construct two forts in 
the Ohio Valley, Fort Le Presqu’isle and Fort Le Boeuf.
 
 This greatly 
alarmed Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia, who sent the French an 
order to withdraw, which they refused.  Dinwiddie, who as well as being 
Governor of Virginia was involved in the Ohio Company, and knew that 
without a serious response the potentially profitable territory of the Ohio 
Valley could be lost to the French.   
The Ohio Company was heavily involved in land speculation in the 
Ohio Valley.  The company was keen for Virginian expansion to continue as 
they had acquired a grant of land of 200,000 acres near the "forks" of the 
Ohio.  It was stipulated in the grant that the company could only hold on to 
the land if it were settled with a town and a fort.
4
  Therefore, when 
Dinwiddie managed to persuade a reluctant Virginian assembly that the 
French should be stopped from taking control of the Ohio Valley, his 
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actions were not solely inspired by the interests of the colony.
5
  After some 
persuasion, the assembly voted money for a force to drive the French off, 
and to build and man several forts on the Ohio.  Three hundred men were 
deployed to the area to guard against any more French incursions, while 
another force of around 400 men under George Washington set up camp 
some distance south of the forks of the Ohio, where the French were 
constructing what would become Fort Duquesne.
6
 
Washington’s men were engaged in the construction of their own 
fort when they were surrounded by 500 French troops.  Washington knew 
that the ramshackle fort he was still constructing was not strong enough to 
protect his men, so he ordered them to take up positions outside it.  There 
followed a bloody battle in which Washington lost over 100 men, but he 
was eventually left with little choice but to surrender as he had constructed 
his fort and positioned his men in a location overlooked by good firing 
positions.
7
  The French returned him and his surviving men to Virginia, and 
then continued the construction of Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio.
8
 
With the failure of Washington’s expedition, French control of the 
region was uncontested and they moved to dismantle all the British trading 
posts, while the area’s Native Americans, with the exception of the Six 
Nations, who remained neutral, rallied round their new father.
9
  The 
Amerindian inhabitants of the Ohio Valley had little choice in the matter: 
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with no British traders left to supply them, they were entirely dependent on 
the French for the goods necessary for their survival, while those who 
refused to join the French ran the risk of attack from Canada’s Indian 
allies.
10
  Still, most Native Americans were heartily sick of attempts by 
Virginia, Pennsylvania and other colonies to cheat them out of their land, 
and were happy enough to tolerate the French presence, if it meant they 
could retain control of their hunting grounds.
11
  
The British Government was deeply concerned that so many Native 
Americans should side with the French in the struggle for the Ohio Valley, 
and made enquires as to the reason why.  Representatives of the Crown in 
the Colonies reported that letting the Colonies manage diplomacy with 
Native Americans themselves had been a failure.  Amid the chorus of voices 
expressing dissatisfaction with colonial Indian diplomacy were William 
Shirley Governor of Massachusetts, Robert Dinwiddie Governor of Virginia 
and Edmund Atkin, a Charleston Indian trader and a member of the 
governor’s council in South Carolina.
12
  These colonial notables no doubt 
hoped that if they could persuade the government that a new organisation 
was needed to manage Indian diplomacy, then they would be first in line for 
a post in whatever organisation the government created to take over the task.   
This was certainly the motivation of Governor Hardy of New York, who 
modestly suggested that rather than allowing all the Colonies to conduct 
relations with Native Americans separately the Governor of New York 
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should be in charge of Indian diplomacy, while other governors were 
prohibited from interfering.
13
 
While few other colonials would have agreed with Hardy’s proposal 
that he should be in charge of Amerindian relations, most did concede that 
colonial autonomy was a major obstacle to smooth relations with Native 
Americans.  Many amongst colonial elites argued that as a result of allowing 
the Colonies to conduct their own separate Indian diplomacy, they ended up 
competing with each other and so giving contradictory and conflicting 
messages to Native Americans, resulting in chaos and confusion.  Most of 
those who had dealt with Native Americans agreed that the only end to this 
was to have one unified imperial system of Indian diplomacy.
14
 
Initially, the government was reluctant to take responsibility for 
diplomacy with Native Americans and instead tried to force the Colonies 
into cooperating.  The result, the Albany Congress of 1754, was a disaster.  
The Board of Trade had ordered the Colonies to co-ordinate Indian policy, 
and to that end New York had organised a conference for colonial delegates.  
“Virginia refused to attend, and the other Colonies pursued conflicting local 
interests; the chief result of the ‘Albany Congress’ was a plan for provincial 
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confederation so inappropriate to the crisis that neither the Board of Trade 
nor any American government gave it serious consideration.”
15
 
After the failure of the Albany Congress the British Government was 
convinced that the only way to guarantee the successful conduct of relations 
with Native Americans was by taking direct control. In 1755 the Board of 
Trade ordered the appointment of two Indian superintendents, one for the 
northern half of the Colonies and one for the southern, with the boundary 
between their jurisdictions marked by the Ohio River.  Edmund Atkin 
received the appointment for the southern district and William Johnson 
received the commission for the north.
16
  In this Johnson was no doubt 
heavily indebted to Thomas Pownall, who acted as the “eyes and ears” of 
the Board of Trade in America, and who had recommended Johnson be 
given the role.
17
  This was a significant break with the past, when colonies 
such as Virginia and Pennsylvania had negotiated directly with Native 
Americans, and so was a direct transfer of power from the Colonies to the 
Crown.
18
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The superintendents’ immediate mission was to draw off those 
Native Americans allied with France, and if possible, persuade Native 
Americans to fight with the British.  These goals were designed to aid the 
British Army in their mission to remove the French from the Ohio Valley, 
so it is not surprising that the superintendents received their first 
commission from the army.  In 1756 Johnson received a new commission 
from the Crown to replace the one he had received from the army, but his 
salary and allowance were still paid by the senior army officer in the 
Colonies, and so despite his new commission Johnson still remained 
dependent on the military.  Indeed, as a legacy of the Indian Department’s 
wartime creation, the army would retain control over its finances for the 
next twenty years, giving the general in charge of North America a very 
effective veto over the actions of the Indian Department.
19
  As a result, the 
personality of those chosen to command the British Army in the Colonies 
would have as much, if not more, impact on relations between Britain and 
Native Americans as the ideas of those placed in charge of the Indian 
Department in the post-war years.  
The creation of two Indian superintendents was part of the British 
Government’s effort to take more direct control of the war.  In defence, as 
with Indian affairs, Whitehall had first hoped the Colonies would be able to 
solve their problems themselves, given a little prompting.  When news of 
Washington’s surrender and the construction of Fort Duquesne reached the 
Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Northern Department, he 
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feared that “All North America will be lost” if the government did not act.
20
  
Newcastle at first wanted the colonists themselves to take the offensive, as 
he believed that, with their knowledge of the backcountry, they would be 
more effective than British soldiers, and with the government sitting on a 
budget surplus of £100,000 colonial troops would also be affordable without 
any increase in tax, unlike an expensive expedition of British regulars.
21
  
The Colonies themselves were not as quick to see the benefits of such a 
strategy, and most proved reluctant to provide both the men and support 
necessary for any substantial military operations.  New England was an 
exception, and provided troops for a successful campaign that led to the 
capture of Nova Scotia.  Despite this success, the Colonies’ apathy left 
Newcastle with few options, and so with the help of the Captain General, 
the Duke of Cumberland, he persuaded the king to allow two regiments 
from the Irish establishment, under the command of Edward Braddock, to 
be dispatched to Virginia.
22
 
Braddock was not just sent out to command the two regiments that 
went out with him, he was also appointed to the new post of commander-in-
chief of North America.  This, like the appointment of two superintendents 
to manage Indian affairs, was part of the British Government’s attempt to 
take direct control of the war effort, which was now seen as the only 
solution to the Colonies’ inability to co-operate.
23
  Under the new system, 
the Colonies would still be able to raise troops, but they would be under the 
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control of the new commander-in-chief.
24
  Whitehall hoped that by 
centralising the chain of command for the military and Indian Department, 
damaging intercolonial conflict could be eliminated and colonial resources 
more easily mobilised.  While this strategy did bring some success in Indian 
affairs, it completely failed in its aim of speeding up the mobilisation of 
colonial martial potential.  
Attempts to requisition aid for the imperial war effort were not aided 
by Braddock himself, who upon arrival in America managed to alienate any 
potential allies he may have had among the Colonies or Native Americans 
with his arrogance.  In order to pay for his expedition, Braddock ordered the 
Colonies to contribute to a fund for the war effort that he would control. The 
Colonies refused, and to exacerbate the situation they suggested that the 
British Government should pay the costs of the adventure.  Not only did 
Braddock find it impossible to secure funding from the Colonies, but 
material help was not forthcoming either.  Braddock’s plan was first to take 
Fort Duquesne and then move on to Fort Niagara, which required cutting a 
path through the dense American woods to enable the army’s heavy guns to 
be brought to bear on the French forts.  This was a monumental task, for 
which Braddock needed the Colonies to supply labour, wagons and 
supplies, all of which they initially refused.  It was only through the heroic 
efforts of Benjamin Franklin that Braddock was able to secure enough 
assistance to set out.
25
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 Braddock fared little better in his meetings with Native Americans.  
When he confronted potential Amerindian allies at Fort Cumberland in the 
spring, he treated them rudely and ordered that their families be sent home, 
as he felt Native American women were distracting his troops.  As soon as 
their families left, many Native American warriors joined them in order, 
they claimed, to safeguard them, though no doubt many were simply 
appalled by the general’s arrogance.  At this time the primary concern of 
those Native Americans who met with Braddock was the future of their 
hunting grounds in the Ohio Valley.  There were some Native Americans 
who would have been happy to assist the British to drive the French away, 
had they been assured that once the dust settled they would remain in 
control of the valley.
26
  When asked by Shingas, a Delaware headman, about 
British intentions, Braddock told him twice that the British would “Inhabit 
& Inherit the Land”.  With such an incentive, it is unsurprising that only 
eight Native Americans agreed to act as scouts for Braddock’s march.
27
 
  Braddock’s column planned to march to the forks of the Ohio and 
remove the French they found there, but they were instead routed and 
destroyed when they stumbled into a combined force of French and Native 
Americans.  The battle took place only a few miles from Fort Duquesne, 
after Braddock had crossed Turtle Creek, a spot which would have made an 
ideal spot for an ambush. It was perhaps the successful crossing of the creek 
that caused the British to lower their guard, for prior to this every effort had 
been made by the army to avoid surprise.  Whatever the reason, the British 
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were clearly not prepared when they blundered head on into a combined 
force of French and Native Americans.  It was not an ambush; the French 
had hoped to take the British by surprise, but the two forces had collided 
before the French could get into position.  While regular French troops 
blocked the road, the confused and disorientated British were surrounded by 
Native Americans and Canadians who took cover in the woods, from where 
they were able to fire on the column with near impunity.  Thomas Gage 
bears some share of responsibility for the catastrophe, for it was his duty to 
scout the high ground to the right of the army, and had he done so, first 
contact with the French might not have come as such a shock.  Panic 
quickly overtook the regulars, who had never fought Indians before, and 
who seemed to completely lose their wits upon hearing Native American 
war cries.  Officers and colonial Americans seem to have fared better, and 
the high proportion of officers killed at the battle has often been cited as 
proof of their bravery, but may have simply been evidence of their high 
visibility, as mounted on horseback they made easy targets.  For all their 
efforts, there was little the officers could do to regain control of their men.  
Indeed, the men at the front of the column suffered many casualties from 
fire emanating from their comrades behind them.  This was the bitter fruit of 
the British Army’s stringent training, for once one soldier of a platoon fired, 
his comrades could not help but follow their training and do the same, even 
when it was fellow redcoats standing in front of them.
28
  Under fire from 
within and without, the demoralised regulars soon decided that if they 
wanted to survive fleeing was their only option, and so the rout began.   
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Braddock, who acted bravely during the battle, was fatally wounded, a third 
of the men were killed, and almost all their equipment was lost.
29
 
 Disaster on land was compounded by disaster at sea, when the 
Royal Navy failed to stop large numbers of French reinforcements arriving 
in Canada.  The arrival of more French troops and the destruction of 
Braddock’s regulars made it clear that a much larger force would be needed 
if the British were to achieve any kind of victory in this war.  Despite the 
fact that it was the redcoats who had given the worst showing during the 
Braddock debacle, the British Government felt that the reinforcements 
should be composed mainly of regular soldiers. “The Redcoats were coming 
to North America.”
30
  The dispatch of a large number of British troops to the 
Colonies was a pivotal moment in North American history, and the redcoats 
would come to play a vital role in subsequent events both on the frontier and 
the seaboard.  
In December 1755 the order was given that ten new regiments were 
to be raised in Britain, and substantial bounties were offered as an incentive 
to recruiters.  A month later Parliament passed a bill offering commissions 
to foreigners in North America provided they were not Roman Catholic.
31
  It 
was hoped that as well as British settlers and American-born colonists, this 
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would attract French, Swiss and German recruits from the ever-increasing 
population of Britain’s North America dominions.  Those recruited to the 
regular army in America joined the 62
nd
 Royal American Regiment, which 
soon became the 60
th
 due to a restructuring of the army.  In October 1756 
the strength of the army was set at 49,000, with 30,000 troops to remain in 
Great Britain and 19,000 in the Colonies.
32
   
The destruction of Braddock’s force had left the backcountry almost 
undefended, and resentful Amerindians were quick to take advantage.  The 
raiding parties who ravaged the frontier were made up of Native Americans, 
occasionally accompanied by Canadian officers of the Troupes de la 
Marine.  This was a parallel war fought by many nations, including the 
Ottawa, Mingo, Shawnee, Miami and Delaware.  These tribes were not 
French allies fighting for French goals, but Native Americans fighting for 
freedom and security; most of all, fighting to end the threat to their land 
posed by the populous British Colonies.  The aims of French and Indians 
overlapped, allowing co-operation, but French influence over their co-
belligerents was tenuous and heavily dependent on the goods and supplies 
they provided to Native Americans from their forts.
33
 
French supplies allowed Native Americans to undertake a prolonged 
campaign of guerrilla war against the British frontier settlements.  French 
victuals fed the raiders and their families, while French powder kept their 
guns firing, removing the need for Native Americans to retire from the field 
to hunt and trade for these necessities.  Freed from the requirements of 
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hunting, the Native American fighters were able to hit the outlying British 
communities again and again, striking quickly, killing indiscriminately and 
rapidly fleeing with their new captives.  These raiding parties moved 
quickly through their woodland home, easily evading all but the most 
determined or lucky attempts to bring them to battle.  The destruction they 
wrought was incredible: Captain Dumas, the French Commander at Fort 
Duquesne, reckoned that the frontier war had cost the British some 2,500 
casualties, men, women and children, before the end of 1756.
34
  That year 
nearly 500 scalps and 200 prisoners were brought to Fort Duquesne with 
most thought to have come from Pennsylvania, and many more would have 
gone straight to Indian villages.
35
 
Despite this destruction, the Colonies were surprisingly slow to 
react, further underlining the desperate need for regular troops to be 
stationed in North America.  This was because their assemblies were 
dominated by landowners from the tidewater, who felt little sympathy or 
compassion for their suffering backcountry brethren.  In 1756 Maryland 
raised only 250 provincials to defend the colony.  The Virginia assembly 
authorised £1,500 to raise a Virginia regiment, but pay and conditions for 
soldiers were so bad that even after the introduction of conscription for the 
poor and destitute the regiment remained under half strength.  In 
Pennsylvania it was only after the Quakers in the assembly removed 
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themselves from politics, rather than compromise their pacifist principles, 
that action on a scale commensurate with the problem was taken.
36
 
The Colonies decided that the best way to make the backcountry 
defendable was to build a chain of forts the length of the frontier.  In theory 
the forts would be solidly constructed and well manned, with the gaps 
between them regularly patrolled, in order to prevent Native American 
raiding parties slipping past them.  In reality the forts were normally lightly 
manned stockades, incapable of defending themselves or mounting the 
active patrols necessary to make an effective barrier.  Some of the forts were 
so useless that they actually became targets for raids, as when in August 
1756 Fort Granville in Pennsylvania was burned to the ground and the entire 
garrison made prisoner.
37
  In reality, the only security lay in stopping the 
raids, which would require either cutting off the supply of French goods or 
negotiating with the area’s Native Americans.  With the first attempt to 
bring peace to the frontier through force of arms being a disaster, the British 
began to realise that the only hope for victory lay in a combination of 
negotiation and military might. 
The role played by Native Americans in the destruction of 
Braddock’s column, and the mayhem that unfriendly Native Americans 
were inflicting on the frontier, brought home to the British Government the 
need for better communication with Native Americans, and better conflict 
resolution.
38
  With the Crown attaching increasing importance to relations 
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with Native Americans, it became vital for the government to know what 
motivated them, and so it began to investigate what the Colonies had done 
that so displeased the Native Americans they dealt with. 
In 1756 Secretary of Indian Affairs Peter Wraxall reported to 
William Johnson that “an unaccountable thirst for large Tracts of Land” was 
greatly weakening British “Interest & Influence” amongst Native 
Americans.   Wraxall singled out the patents of “Keyderosseras, 
Connojohary and the Oneida Carrying Place” as the chief causes of unease 
for the Iroquois.  The secretary theorised that the “Indians suspect we have 
different views; [and] that to restore their Lands to their natural state and … 
[reinstate them] as Proprietors of the soil are not the ends we aim at.”
 39
 
  The other major cause of Native American anger identified by 
Wraxall was the dishonest actions of fur traders. Wraxall’s summary of the 
situation in the late 1750s was pithy and accurate.  “Our Power by the 
Indians was little respected—Our Intentions greatly suspected—they were 
exasperated by the avarice and dishonesty of our Indian Traders.”
40
  Johnson 
agreed wholeheartedly with Wraxall, and made sure the government was 
well aware of this via a barrage of letters to London.
41
 
The government was quick to act on this information, and one month 
after Johnson received his commission from the Crown, the Lords of Trade 
instructed Governor Hardy of New York to try to get the patents of 
Keyoderosseras, Connojahary and Oneida vacated and annulled, by 
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persuading the Legislature to pass a law to that effect.
42
  These patents 
covered huge areas of land, and had caused much anger amongst those 
Native Americans whose hunting they would have destroyed if occupied.  
In response to government instructions, the army and the Colonies 
started making real efforts to ease Native American fears over the future of 
their land.  The Treaty of Easton played a vital part in removing the Ohio 
tribes from the French sphere of influence.  The process that led to the treaty 
began with the Quakers, who were anxious to end the fighting in 
Pennsylvania, but army officers would play an important role in bringing 
that process to its conclusion.  The Quakers and their intermediaries had 
arranged a meeting with the Eastern Delaware in 1757.  At the meeting the 
Pennsylvanians were represented by their governor, William Denny, who 
managed to secure the neutrality of the Eastern Delaware by promising to 
look into their concerns.  This included the Delaware’s biggest bugbear, the 
‘walking purchase’, through which the Iroquois and Pennsylvanian 
proprietors had connived to cheat the Delaware out of a vast amount of 
land.
43
 
By easing the Delaware fears, the 1757 meeting paved the way for 
another conference the following year.  The driving force behind this second 
conference was General Forbes, a British officer.  Forbes was about to 
march on Fort Duquesne, and he knew that the only way for his mission to 
stand a chance of success was to neutralise the Shawnee and Delaware 
warriors, who would otherwise oppose him.  Unfortunately, Forbes was a 
very sick man, and so his efforts to bring about reconciliation with these 
                                                           
42
 Lords of Trade to Governor Hardy,19 March 1756, NYCD Vol. 7 pp. 77-78. 
43
 Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British 
North America, 1754-1766. pp. 205-206. 
49 
 
tribes were restricted to organising the conference through instructions to 
his subordinate, Governor Denny.  Forbes was well aware how necessary 
this meeting was, and also how vital it was that the Pennsylvanians made 
some concessions to Native American concerns.  As he wrote in his letter to 
the conference, “giving up sometimes a little in the beginning will procure 
you a great deal in the end”.
44
  Concern with making progress on the frontier 
had led to the army taking a direct hand in Indian affairs. 
Fortunately, the Pennsylvanians heeded this advice.  The Penn 
family returned all the land west of the Allegheny Mountains to the 
Iroquois, the British promised not to establish permanent settlements in the 
Ohio region after the war, and Governor Denny agreed to negotiate directly 
with the Delaware in future, as opposed to the traditional method of going 
through the Iroquois.  These concessions managed to allay the fears of the 
Ohio Indians, and so secure their neutrality for Forbes’s march on Fort 
Duquesne.
45
 
Following the capture of Fort Duquesne, renamed Fort Pitt, Colonel 
Henry Bouquet assured the Indians there in December 1758 that it was not 
the intention of the king to deprive them of their lands.
46
  These assurances, 
along with the promise issued at the Treaty of Easton to reopen trade with 
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the Native Americans of the Ohio Valley provided they withdrew support 
for the French, helped in neutralising some of those who had been allies of 
the French, but it was only after the taking of Fort Frontenac on Lake 
Ontario in 1759 that British diplomatic efforts really began to bear fruit.  
Fort Frontenac had been a major supply depot for French Native American 
allies, and its loss seriously curtailed the ability of the French to supply arms 
and presents to Native Americans.  As a result many previously loyal Native 
Americans left the French, most adopting a position of neutrality. These 
Native Americans now found the prospect of French defeat much more 
palatable thanks to the reforms forced on the British Colonies by the 
Crown.
47
   
British success at Fort Frontenac and elsewhere was the result of the 
rise to power of William Pitt.  Until Pitt took control, British war aims had 
been limited and confused.  Pitt decided that not only was it feasible to push 
the French out of Canada, but it was vital.  It would not be easy to take 
Canada, but funded by an ever-growing national debt, a flood of arms, 
ammunition, artillery and men began to flow into the American colonies.
48
  
The Colonies had proved unable to coordinate their defence on their own, 
and unwilling to do so under British command, and so Pitt treated them as 
partners who had to be persuaded to co-operate.
49
  In order to take direct 
control of negotiations with the Colonies himself, Pitt greatly reduced the 
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power of the commander-in-chief in North America when he replaced Lord 
Loudoun and gave Major General James Abercromby the role.  The main 
form of persuasion used by Pitt in order to secure the necessary colonial 
contribution to the imperial war effort was, in effect, bribery.
50
   
Pitt initiated a series of subsidies that offered reimbursement for 
nearly all colonial assistance to the war effort, with the exception of levy 
money and pay.  In response the Colonies contributed men and supplies 
more readily than ever before, though at a cost to the British of 
£1,544,830.
51
  The subsidies of colonial troops had finally managed to 
secure the rapid and extensive colonial action that the British had been 
struggling for since the beginning of the war.  Prior to this, raising colonial 
troops for use in the war had proved incredibly difficult,  as colonial 
assemblies would only vote limited funds for limited forces, and would 
often attach stringent conditions for their use.  Furthermore, those troops 
that were enlisted would only agree to serve for a limited term and under 
their own officers; all of this made coordinating operations with colonial 
forces very difficult.
52
    
In contrast to the paltry number of troops supplied by the Colonies 
previously, by 1758, as a result of Pitt’s lavish spending, the British were 
able to field 44,000 men in America.
53
  Weight of numbers, naval power 
and successful Native American diplomacy enabled the British to slowly 
turn the tide.  In 1759 Major-General James Wolfe captured Quebec and 
won posthumous fame, with an assault from the St Lawrence River.  In 
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1760 Montreal was taken by the British, making the French position 
untenable, and New France surrendered.
54
  Pitt’s strategy of stuffing the 
Colonies’ mouths with gold had worked, but it left behind a legacy of debt 
that would haunt the British for decades to come.  The cost of the war for 
the British was enormous: £5.5 million was spent on the army in America, 
almost £1 million went on the navy, and another £1 million on subsidising 
colonial troops.
55
  This extravagant spending created massive national debt, 
which would become one of the main drivers of British policy in the next 
decade. 
With the prospect of peace on the horizon, the government began the 
search for a sustainable way to manage relations with Native Americans on 
a long-term basis.  The Seven Years’ War had convinced the British 
Government that Amerindians were a power to be respected, and this is 
clearly seen in their subsequent legislation.  In 1756 Wraxall had proposed 
that there should be two Indian superintendents, one for the north and one 
for the south.  These men would have no involvement with the Indian trade, 
and would be subject to instruction from the army’s commander-in-chief, 
the government and the governors of the Colonies.  The superintendents 
would be responsible for all public meetings with Native Americans.  
Wraxall also proposed regulating the trade with Native Americans, 
relinquishing all claim to those grants that were not approved of by Native 
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Americans, and only allowing the sale of additional grants in the presence of 
the Indian superintendent.
56
   
In 1761 the government decided to adopt many of the features that 
Wraxall had proposed, and  William Johnson and John Stuart were given 
commissions as Superintendent for Indian Affairs along with a salary of 
£600 a year.  They were also told to obey punctually all the commands and 
directives of the commander-in-chief.
57
  Johnson was the Indian 
superintendent of the north and John Stuart became superintendent of the 
south after the death of Edmund Atkin.
58
  The Indian superintendents, 
despite Johnson’s wishes, remained subservient to the army.  This meant 
that as the Seven Years’ War came to an end it would not be Johnson who 
had the final word on Native American diplomacy, but the commander-in-
chief, and he would have very different views when it came to Native 
American diplomacy. 
  In addition to creating the Indian department, the Lords of Trade 
now made it clear that though they had not given up on new settlements 
they were taking the issue of Native American land rights seriously.  In 
1760 they ordered that the settlement of the area around the Great Lakes and 
on the frontiers of New York could go ahead only if “such settlements do 
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not interfere with the claim of our Indian Allies”.
59
  The temper of Native 
Americans, rather than the views of men in the Colonies, was now the 
deciding factor on where new settlements would be sited. 
A year later at the end of 1761 royal instructions were issued to the 
governors in America and the commander-in-chief prohibiting them from 
making grants of land that was occupied by Indians, or had “at any time” 
been claimed by them.  Governor Monckton was told to publish a 
proclamation to let Native Americans and settlers know that this law was in 
effect, and that anyone who flouted it would be prosecuted.  If anyone was 
to apply for a licence to grant lands, the governor was to refer the matter to 
the government in London. Finally, the colonial governors were ordered to 
make it public to everyone, including Native Americans, that the 
government was determined to uphold their “just Rights”.
60
  Security, not 
settlement, was the priority for the British Government, a decision that 
would soon set them on a collision course with American colonists. 
Security also necessitated the government finding a means of 
defending and holding the territories that had been won at such cost.  
Johnson had been lobbying the forts as the best way to control the frontier 
for some time.  In 1756 he reported that the Seneca, Onondaga, Tuscarora, 
and Oneida amongst others desired forts in their country.  The 
superintendent believed that placing forts in Native American towns was in 
part responsible for the French success in Native American affairs, and he 
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commended the idea as of the “utmost moment” to the Lords of Trade.
61
 A 
year later, in 1757, Johnson again recommended a system of forts on the 
frontier to deter Native Americans from further hostilities once the French 
were defeated.
62
  Johnson was not the only one to recommend a system of 
frontier garrisons: Governor Hardy and Edmund Atkin also recommended 
forts as the best way to manage relations with Native Americans.
63
  This 
idea was tried and tested; forts had been the chosen meeting place for trade 
and diplomacy on the Pennsylvanian frontier for many years, so it is not 
surprising that the British Government’s new effort to control trade and 
diplomacy with Native Americans was based on occupying forts in Native 
American territory.
64
 
The decision to use British regulars to man these garrisons was never 
seriously debated.
65
  In the minds of most British ministers, the reasoning 
was simple: at the start of the war, when the colonies had been threatened, 
they had failed to provide for their own defence, and to entrust the defence 
of empire to them now would be foolhardy.  For the British Government, 
using British redcoats under their control to defend their newly won 
territories was simply common sense.
66
 As J.R. Alden has stated, “There 
was no feeling among British politicians in 1763 that the task of defending 
                                                           
61
 Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 8 March 1756, NYCD Vol. 7 pp. 42-43, Johnson also 
recommended that missionaries be sent amongst the Indians. 
62
 Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 28 September 1757, NYCD Vol. 7 pp. 276-77. 
63
 Governor Hardy to the Lords of Trade, 16 January 1756, NYCD Vol. 7 pp. 2-7 and 
Lenman, Britain's Colonial Wars, 1688-1783. p. 134. 
64
 Jane T. Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 
1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). p. 237  The forts had 
been built at the request of the proprietors of Pennsylvania in order to regulate the fur trade. 
65
 Ian Ralph Christie and Ian R. Christie, Empire or Independence, 1760-1776: A British-
American Dialogue on the Coming of the American Revolution (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 
1976). p. 30. 
66
 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America C.1750-
1783. pp. 112-113. 
56 
 
the new territories should be handled by the colonists”, especially as the 
new lands were considered additions to the empire as a whole, not just the 
existing colonies.
67
 
Posting the army on the frontier was intended to serve a double 
purpose: the troops would both secure the new territories from French 
aggression and act to control the worst excesses of colonial settlers and fur 
traders.  This army’s new role of policing the frontier was in part the result 
of lobbying from army officers serving in the Colonies, who had 
recommended such a deployment as the only way to preserve the peace on 
the frontier at the end of the war.
68
  Unfortunately for all concerned, the 
deployment of the army to the frontier would be one of the major reasons 
that the peace following the Seven Years’ War was so quickly shattered. 
The end of the Seven Years’ War saw the British Army thrust into 
the role of representatives of the Crown, as seen by Native Americans, 
almost by accident.  The army had been posted to the frontier to defend the 
area from French counter-attack and to watch over colonial settlers and fur 
traders, but their location also made those officers who commanded His 
Majesty’s garrisons the first point of contact between Native Americans and 
the Crown.  How British officers coped in this role and the impact of the 
isolation and weakness of their garrisons on their actions will be explored in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
The legacy of the Seven Years’ War would affect the army’s actions 
in other ways.  The huge debt created by Pitt in order to achieve victory 
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would force his successors in government to keep a tight hold of the purse 
strings while they searched for a new source of income.  This drive for 
economy was to have a massive effect on the army’s relations with Native 
Americans, just as the need for new taxes would have a massive role in 
changing relations between the Colonies and the Crown.  The need for strict 
control of expenditure was certainly recognised by the commander-in-chief, 
and would play a pivotal role in relations between empire and Amerindians 
in the immediate post-war period. 
The actions of the commander-in-chief had such an effect on 
relations between the British and Native Americans because he had been 
handed indirect control over Native American diplomacy.  Not only did the 
commander-in-chief in North America have control of all those soldiers 
posted to the frontier, who were now in contact with Native Americans on a 
daily basis, but he possessed control of the Indian Department as well.  
What the new commander-in-chief intended to do with that power is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
 Amherst’s Policy 
 
As a result of the Seven Years’ War the commander-in-chief of 
North America had been left in control of relations between the British 
Empire and Native Americans.  Not only did both Indian superintendents 
have to report to the commander-in-chief, but he also directly controlled the 
hundreds of troops who had been deployed to the frontier at the end of the 
war.  The government set the tone of policy, but the slow and uncertain 
nature of communication gave men on the ground considerable latitude to 
follow their own agenda.  This gave General Jeffery Amherst, the 
commander-in-chief of the British Army in North America, the final say in 
how to treat those Native Americans who now dealt directly with the 
British; the government wanted peace and they wanted it cheap, but exactly 
how this was to be achieved was left to Amherst. 
As soon as fighting ceased on the American mainland, Amherst 
moved to alter the relationship between the British and Native Americans 
permanently, with the grand aim of transforming Native American 
behaviour.  Amherst regarded Native Americans as lazy and troublesome, 
and he was going to offer them a chilling choice: either be remade as 
obedient vassals of empire, or be destroyed.
1
   
It was the intention of Amherst to transform Amerindians into 
obedient servants of the British by forcing them to work for the European 
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goods they needed to survive.
2
  This was to be done by massively reducing 
gift giving and Amerindian access to rum, while providing Native 
Americans with a well-regulated and accessible fur trade.  The first step in 
this process was a radical cutback in the value of gifts that Native 
Americans received from the British.  Native Americans would no longer be 
indiscriminately presented with large gifts or numerous provisions, as had 
been the case during the war; instead Amherst ordered that there should be 
only token gifts of minimal value.  Amherst saw no need to “buy” the 
friendship of Native Americans; he told Johnson that “it is not My Intention 
ever to Attempt to gain the Friendship of the Indians by presents”.
3
    
Amherst felt that presents made Amerindians lazy and explained that he 
could not “See any Reason for Supply the Indians with Provisions; for I am 
Convinced they will never think of providing for their Families by Hunting, 
if they can Supporting them by begging Provisions from Us.”
4
  Indeed, he 
felt, “the more they get the more they ask”.
5
  
Amherst believed that Native Americans would remain idle as long 
as they received what they needed for free from the British.  By cutting off 
the supply of gifts he would force them to hunt for skins, which they could 
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trade for the goods they needed.  As far as he was concerned, once traders 
were established at British posts, Amerindians would be able to supply the 
entirety of their needs through trading furs, which meant there would be no 
need for presents.
6
   Amherst was not alone in this view.  In April 1761 
General Robert Monckton, who Amherst had placed in command of those 
provinces south of New York, informed Croghan that “we have open’d to 
them a Free, and advantageous Trade, by which they [Native Americans] 
may easily live; if they will follow their Hunting.  But that it will End in 
their ruin if they live in Idleness.  That we shall at all times be ready, to 
relieve their unavoidable necessity’s but that they must not think we are to 
maintain them in Idleness.”
7
 
This idea that trade could be used to transform character was often 
present in eighteenth-century thinking on race.  The idea was not just that 
trade was a superior way to organise a civilisation, but that societies that 
lived by trade were more civilised because trading made them that way.  
This means that Amherst’s ideas about trade improving character were not 
unusual for the time, and were in fact closely connected to eighteenth- 
century ideas about progress.   Rather than seeing racial characteristics as 
fixed or innate, many in the eighteenth century saw them as a result of 
environment or culture.  Therefore it is not surprising to learn that Amherst 
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thought he could change Native American morals by changing the way they 
earned their living.
8
 
The main obstacle to this mission that Amherst could see was the 
rum trade.  Officers like Amherst blamed what they saw as Native American 
idleness in part on their addiction to strong liquor.  Amherst’s decision to 
stop the rum trade was a foundation stone of his plan to make Native 
Americans into happy and hard-working serfs.  In stopping the sale of rum, 
Amherst aimed both at reducing the trouble that Indians caused the British 
and at making them less indolent.
9
  Amherst told one officer that “It is to be 
hoped from the Total Prohibition of Rum that the Indians will become more 
Industrious & be very well able by their hunting to Provide for their 
Familys.”
10
  The new commander-in-chief hoped that ending the rum trade 
would also reduce the trouble at British posts, where drunkenness was 
frequently cited by Native Americans as both cause and excuse for violent 
behaviour.  On occasion, Amherst did make mention of weaning Indians 
onto spruce beer, a very mildly alcoholic beverage that was supplied to the 
troops, as part of his effort to “improve” Native Americans, but it seems to 
have been no more than an idle notion and no serious effort was ever made 
to supply Native Americans with spruce beer.
11
  Amherst believed that 
ending the rum trade would leave Native Americans with no excuse for 
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neglecting their hunting, and that as long as Native Americans went hunting, 
they would be able to supply themselves with everything they needed 
through trade.
12
 
To further mould Native American behaviour, Amherst would 
reward those who acted as he saw fit, while punishing those whom he 
believed had misbehaved.  One of the incentives that he offered was the 
“protection” of the British Army.
13
  The offer was no sham, and Amherst 
approved of the efforts that his officers made to secure Native Americans’ 
lives, property and possessions. When an Amerindian was beaten and 
robbed near Ticonderoga, John Ormsby, the senior officer at the post, sent 
five men to find the perpetrators without success.
14
 Amherst heartily 
approved of the action taken by Ormsby, “as I would afford the Indians all 
the Protection they can expect, during their good behaviour”.
15
  Under 
Amherst the army would protect Native Americans, but only as long as they 
met the standards of “good behaviour” that he defined.  
Of course, if the innocent were to be protected, then the guilty had to 
be punished.  To ensure that this happened, Native Americans suspected of 
criminal behaviour in and around the forts would be subject to military 
justice.  This was possible because although the French forces in North 
America had been defeated, the peace was not signed till 1763. 
Consequently, while a state of war existed, Amherst believed that he had the 
power to subject Native Americans to courts martial.   He decreed that “The 
Indians are not to be permitted to Commit the least disorder at out Posts, 
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without being confined & Tried in the same manner as one of our own 
people [i.e. soldiers], for I am determined to make no Difference.”  This was 
no idle threat, and when the commander at Ticonderoga reported that 
Mohawks had made off with twenty-six pigs, Amherst told him that “when 
any of them [Native Americans] are Guilty of such Crimes at your Post, I 
desire they may be closely confined until you have reported the same to me, 
that I may give the necessary orders for bringing them to a Tryal”.
16
 
Any Native American brought to trial by the army had good reason 
to be worried, as Amherst firmly believed that the army had the right to put 
to death any Native Americans who had wronged them.  When two Indians 
were captured trying to kidnap some soldiers from a garrison, Amherst 
ordered their court martial, granting authorisation to approve the death 
penalty, if that was the sentence.  Native Americans who had not lived up to 
Amherst’s definition of good behaviour would receive no protection from 
him.  In a devious set of orders, Amherst instructed the colonel to carry out 
any ordered execution as soon as possible, as he was shortly to be replaced 
as the senior officer at the garrison, and Amherst hoped that his successor 
would be able to avoid much of the bitterness the executions would cause if 
he could blame them on his predecessor.
17
   
Amherst, keen to punish the bad, did not forget his promise to 
reward good behaviour.  When he was told that two deserters from the 
regular army had been caught and returned by Amerindians, he instructed 
that “At the same time, that I mean to stick … to … punishing the guilty; I 
shall likewise be as good as my word, in rewarding those that deserve it; 
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such seem to me the four Indians that pursued the five run aways and 
brought back two; to whom I would have you send some presents”.
18
  With 
the carrot and the stick, Amherst believed he could bend the Native 
Americans to his will. 
The aim of this brutal social engineering was to save the British 
money, and reduce the risk of trouble.  Amherst firmly believed that hard- 
working industrious Amerindians would not have the time to plan trouble 
for the British, nor the opportunity to carry it out.
19
  Amherst’s other aim, of 
course, was saving money.  If Native Americans could be made to accept 
that they would never again receive presents from the British, then it would 
represent an enormous saving to the British treasury.
20
  Yet though the 
British Government’s economy drive set the tone of Amherst’s policies, it 
did not create them. Amherst knew that he had to save money, but it was up 
to him to decide how to do so.  His instructions were only to keep the peace 
while saving money; the decision to use the army and the Indian 
Department to fundamentally alter the way Native Americans lived was his 
alone.  Amherst was the one who determined that savings could best be 
made by changing the way the British dealt with Native Americans. 
Amherst’s efforts to “improve” Native Americans were in part the 
product of his experience during the Seven Years’ War.  During the march 
to Montreal, which Amherst had led, many Amerindians had deserted the 
army, and Amherst was anxious that they should be punished, while those 
who had provided faithful service and stayed on till the end of the campaign 
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should be rewarded.  The general felt that only those Native Americans who 
were good servants of the British should receive gifts, but as he did not trust 
them, he could not rely on their word to determine who truly deserved 
British generosity.  Amherst’s solution to this problem, was to  
 
“Make a proper distinction between those that have behaved 
well, and those that have demeaned themselves so 
scandalously, I shall therefore require of Sir William 
Johnson, an exact list of those that have remained with us for 
whom I shall …. [design] some mark by which they may be 
known and distinguished, and which shall be transmitted to 
the different Posts, within your communication that yourself 
and officers commanding at the same, may whenever such 
Indians present themselves to you or them, receive them in a 
kind and friendly manner, and all those, who shall not be the 
bearer of this mark … ought to be kept at a Distance, and not 
suffered within any of the said Posts.”
21
 
 
The plan was put into practice in May 1761, when 182 medals were 
issued to those Native Americans who had accompanied Amherst to 
Montreal.  The officers at the posts were ordered that when Native 
Americans bearing the medals arrived at their forts, they should give them 
“all Marks of Favour in Their Powers”.
22
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During the Montreal campaign Amherst had written to General 
Monckton to stress the importance of being extremely frugal with those 
Native Americans attached to his army, and to take care when identifying 
Native Americans as friend or foe.  He illustrated why with the tale of a 
provincial soldier who had been captured by Native Americans allied to the 
French.  While he was their prisoner, the soldier observed these French 
Indians calling at two British forts, where they posed as friends and received 
provisions and supplies.
23
  Amherst clearly regarded the tale as both a 
warning and an excellent example of Native American behaviour.  
Throughout his time in the Colonies Amherst was obsessed with ensuring 
that only deserving Native Americans were rewarded, while those he 
deemed to have misbehaved were punished.  He believed that, given time, 
such a system would transform the lazy and treacherous savage into a 
faithful and useful subject. 
All Amherst’s plans rested on the incorrect assumption that Native 
Americans represented no threat to the British Army.  The commander-in-
chief viewed the likelihood of any Native American attack on the British as 
low, and the potential impact of any such attack as insignificant.  Amherst 
believed a mixture of self-interest and fear would prevent Native Americans 
from attacking the British no matter how harsh they were, though he still 
felt it prudent to keep Native Americans short of ammunition. 
This belief persisted because in all Amherst’s campaigns he never 
had to face substantial Native American opposition.  He had arrived in the 
colonies after Braddock’s debacle, and his victory at Louisbourg had been 
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achieved using conventional European siege tactics following an 
amphibious landing.  On his march to Montreal the main obstacles that 
Amherst faced, apart from securing the necessary supplies and assistance 
from the Colonies for his expedition to go ahead, were provided by French 
forts and ships, not Native American irregulars.  This was due both to the 
diplomatic efforts of Sir William Johnson and the presence of the 700 
Iroquois who accompanied Amherst.  The Iroquois who marched with 
Amherst served as a clear testament of the changing balance of power on the 
frontier and the new acceptability of the British as allies and partners - an 
acceptability which had been hard won through diplomatic concessions in 
previous years.
24
 
The Iroquois persuaded those Native Americans around Montreal 
who had previously supported the French not only to let Amherst’s men 
pass unopposed, but to act as guides for the British.  Without the presence of 
the Iroquois, Amherst’s attack on Montreal would have been a much 
bloodier affair, with a much smaller chance of success.  Amherst’s failing 
was in never understanding why the Great Lakes Native Americans let him 
pass.  He believed they were motivated by greed, opportunism and fear.
25
 
Amherst wrongly ascribed Native American conviviality to the strength of 
his army and the availability of British trade goods, and felt that nothing 
more would be needed to secure them to the British interest. 
Amherst considered that Native Americans’ self-interest would force 
them to accept British domination.  He felt that Amerindians would never 
risk depriving themselves of trade or British “protection” by attacking their 
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benefactors.  The general told Johnson in 1761 that the northern nations of 
Native Americans held no bad intentions toward the British because “they 
seem sensible, and indeed they cannot well be otherwise, of the advantages 
they may reap from His Majesty’s Protection”.
26
  In another letter he 
outlined how continuing “to Act like true & faithfull Allies to His Majesty 
…. will appear to be so much for their own interest, that they will be careful 
of Deviating therefrom”.
27
  For Amherst the advantages of living under the 
heel of the British were so obvious that Native Americans would have to be 
mad to consider attacking them. 
If self-interest would not suffice, then Amherst was confident that 
fear of British power would serve to keep Native Americans cowed.
28
  He 
told one officer that “they know our strength, & their own Weakness too 
well to Attempt any thing”.
29
  To Amherst British military might was so 
great and terrible that no sane Native American would ever entertain 
thoughts of rebellion.  This was extremely misplaced confidence from a 
man who had never faced significant Native American opposition. 
Amherst considered any possible attacks by Amerindians not only 
unlikely but also inconsequential.  His lack of experience of the horrors of 
forest warfare during the Seven Years’ War and his misreading of the 
Cherokee War left Amherst with a very low opinion of Native Americans’ 
ability in comparison to the British.  After the successful conclusion of the 
Cherokee War he declared that Native Americans “are a Dastardly sett, and 
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dare not face real Danger”.
 30
  In 1762 Amherst stated that “I am of the 
opinion that they [Native Americans] have neither the means, or opportunity 
of hurting us.”
31
  Even as Pontiac’s War was beginning Amherst was telling 
his officers that “for my own opinions, that they [Native Americans] Never 
can Hurt us, unless We are Weak Enough to put ourselves in their power”.
32
  
To further reduce the risk of attack, Amherst was also determined to 
keep Native Americans short of gun powder.  Amherst believed that with 
the French defeated, the British were now the only source of ammunition for 
Amerindians.  By restricting their supply of powder and shot Amherst 
aimed to remove the Native Americans’ ability to strike at the Colonies 
while at the same time cementing their dependence on British traders.  
When one officer questioned how much ammunition it was best to give to 
Native Americans, Amherst answered plainly “the less the better, for so 
long as they are deprived of it, they will do no more mischief for they 
cannot now get any Ammunition Elsewhere”.
33
   
In fact, so great was Amherst’s confidence in the army and its ability 
to fight Native Americans that he believed any conflict between them would 
end with the extermination of any Native Americans who dared to stand 
against the British.  He told one officer, “I am no ways apprehensive of their 
disturbing the Tranquillity that now subsist, for as soon as they do, so surely 
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shall they meet with destruction and I am very desirous they should be one 
and all acquainted with these my first Resolutions”
34
  
This then was the choice Amherst offered Native Americans: 
obedience or oblivion.  There was to be no middle ground, no room for 
compromise.  Either Native Americans transformed themselves into 
servants of their imperial master or they would be wiped out.  When in 1762 
rumours began to circulate that the Six Nations were forming a confederacy 
to attack the British, Amherst told William Johnson:  
 
“I must desire You to let them know from Me, that upon the 
first Hostilities they May be Guilty of, they Must not only 
Expect the Severest Retaliation, but an Entire Destruction of 
all their Nations, for I am firmly Resolved, Whenever they 
give me an Occasion, to Extirpate them Root & branch, but I 
am hopeful they will not force me to that cruel Necessity.”
35
   
 
As far as Amherst was concerned, this was a statement of fact.  He 
believed the British Army possessed the power to destroy any Native 
Americans who stood against them, and he was very prepared to use it.  
When in 1763 rumours about a possible Native American plot against the 
British began to circulate, Amherst told one officer that should the Native 
Americans get involved, “preserve in them it must End with their Total Ruin 
and Extirpation”.
36
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Amherst hated Native Americans and saw nothing wrong with 
threatening them with genocide.  Yet he clearly felt that the Native 
American character was not fixed, but could with the right treatment be 
transformed from lazy and duplicitous into hard-working and loyal.  This 
attitude was a product of Amherst’s experience during the Seven Years’ 
War, and reveals the uncertain status of Native Americans in the eighteenth- 
century British mind.  Amherst was clearly predisposed to dislike Native 
Americans before he arrived in the colonies, but his hatred of them grew 
because of what he saw as their greedy, lazy, and cowardly behaviour 
during the war.   
The most dangerous of Amherst’s delusions was his dismissal of 
Native American military power.  Amherst did not care if his plan to 
transform Native Americans did not please them, for he arrogantly assumed 
that they represented no threat to the British Army; rather, he believed that 
the army was perfectly capable of destroying any and all Native Americans 
who dared to oppose it.  This was a catastrophic misreading of the situation, 
from a man who had never had to face significant numbers of Native 
Americans in battle.  The lack of opposition to his march on Montreal, 
which was the result of years of diplomacy, he wrongly attributed to 
opportunism and fear.  These views, though, were not universal, and it 
would not just be Native Americans who resisted Amherst’s vision for a 
new frontier. 
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Chapter Three 
Weak Garrisons - Worried Soldiers 
 
Amherst believed that the strength of British arms left him free to 
treat Native Americans as he wished.  His plan was to use that freedom to 
make Native Americans into hard-working and obedient servants of empire; 
what Native Americans thought of this programme did not concern him.  
Amherst’s officers were mixed in their reaction to this plan.  Some were 
happy to go along with the commander-in-chief’s instructions to restrict 
presents to a minimum, but there were senior officers who were deeply 
concerned by their orders. 
Those officers worried by Amherst’s plan did not share his 
assumptions about the military superiority of the British Army, or his 
contempt for Native American attitudes.  This difference of opinion was 
primarily a result of environment.  Officers on the frontier were often in 
isolated posts, with small garrisons made up of ageing and injured soldiers, 
frequently struggling with endemic disease.  These officers did not have 
much faith in the awe-inspiring might of the army to prevent or defeat any 
Native American attack.  They were very worried by the angry reaction of 
Native Americans to Amherst’s plan, and frequently disobeyed their orders, 
because they felt that pleasing those Native Americans who surrounded 
them was more important than pleasing the general in New York.  Such 
actions stand at odds with the normal depiction of British officers only 
concerned with imposing their dominance on Native Americans.
1
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The forts occupied by the British were expected to play a multitude 
of roles.  Initially, they were intended as a defence against any possible 
French counter-attack, as well as jumping-off points for assaults on the 
remaining French positions.  As the war began to wind down, the functions 
of the forts multiplied.  They still retained their military function, and 
although fear of a French attempt to regain their empire never entirely left 
the British, it was primarily as a defence against Native Americans that the 
forts now served.  It was hoped that not only would the imposing British 
forts deter potential Native American attacks, but that in the event of a war 
they would provide a barrier preventing the ravaging of the backcountry, 
which was still a recent and painful memory for most settlers.  In addition to 
their military role, the forts were also intended to serve as marts of trade.  
By confining the fur trade to the forts, the British hoped to prevent the 
traders’ worst behaviour with careful scrutiny.  Finally, the posts would 
serve as intercultural meeting places, where Native Americans could bring 
their grievances to be heard, occasionally by an Indian agent, but most 
frequently by a British officer. 
In truth, the buildings that the British hoped would serve all these 
requirements were commonly not fit for purpose.  The forts occupied by the 
British Army were, with a few exceptions, flimsy wooden pickets or 
stockades.  To fully grasp the state that these constructions were in, we need 
to remove the preconceptions of strength and permanence that the word 
“fort” conjures up in our minds.  As Charles Stotz has pointed out, “frontier 
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forts hold for us today a romantic appeal that certainly was shared by very 
few of the soldiers who used them …. A typical fort exuded foul odours, 
harboured vermin, and bred confusion.  Except in the heat of a campaign, its 
garrison were often insubordinate.”
2
 
Those posts built by the British, or by the provincials and later 
occupied by the British, were normally timber forts, often erected in a great 
hurry with the enemy close at hand and were ever after in a state of 
continual disrepair.
3
  Wood rotted and pickets and fences became loose or 
were stolen, dangerously compromising the forts’ defences and exposing the 
men inside to the elements.  Army officers barraged Amherst and later Gage 
with accounts of rotten and crumbling garrisons.   By 1767 the decay at Fort 
Pitt was so bad that cattle could come strolling in, and the remaining 
stockade offered “only a shadow of Defence”,
4
 and the defences at Niagara 
were so ravaged by 1766 that they could not even keep out wandering pigs.
5
  
Sometimes things got so bad that the defences of a fort collapsed 
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completely, as happened at Louisburg, leaving the walls “a heap of Rubbish, 
and the Place entirely defenceless”.
6
 
 The cause of the trouble lay in the combination of a lack of 
preparation, poor workmanship and a poor choice of materials with 
unsuitable weather.  Fort William Augustus, “which was only built for an 
occasion”, was by the time of William Dunbar’s arrival in 1763 about to 
“tumble to pieces; the fascines which support the face of the work are 
entirely rotten, the last rains occasioned above 40 yards of it to fall down, 
…. I may venture to say that when the frost goes off & the rain in the spring 
begins that very little of the works will be left standing to repair if any.” 
Dunbar felt things there were so bad that “if this post is to be kept up, that 
next year they will be obliged to rebuild it entirely”.
7
 
Many forts were also at severe risk of flooding as they had been built 
on or near rivers to aid communication.
8
  By 1763 three sides of Fort Pitt 
had almost been washed away by two floods, one in 1762 and one in 1763.
9
  
The 1763 flood had been so bad that the officer in charge had considered 
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abandoning the fort.
10
  A flood carried away most of the houses at Fort 
Edward, destroyed the walls, and left the barracks near collapse.
11
  Years 
later, when the British occupied Fort Chartres, they found it perched 
precariously on a bank of the Mississippi, constantly in danger of being 
undercut by the river, and so extensive efforts were made to preserve it by 
shoring up the banks with rocks and rubbish.
12
  Such work was “a difficult 
and fatiguing piece of Service…. [for] the wall is above three hundred paces 
Long, and in some places above twelve feet high, it has frequently sunk Six 
feet in less than twenty four hours, owing to its being a sandy bottom, which 
is washed away by the rapidity of the current”.  So arduous was the work 
that it was one of the few pieces of maintenance for which the soldiers 
received recompense.
13
 
The work undertaken on these posts was a Sisyphean task; the hasty, 
cheap and slapdash repairs made one year before quickly fell apart.
14
  The 
work never stopped, and from the day they were occupied till the day they 
were abandoned the British struggled to keep their forts standing and 
defensible.  When Gage was told that Niagara once more needed repair in 
1764, he was dismayed, “and indeed surprised at the badness of the 
barracks, when I consider the money that has been expended there.  Works 
and repairs have been carried on at Niagara every year since it has been in 
our possession.”
15
  In 1767 Gage reported to Shelburne that  
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“The Continual Repairs wanting at the Forts, which are built 
of such perishable Materials that Parts tumble down every 
year, as also the constant Repairs of the Barracks, occasions 
the Expences[sic] of the Engineers; but nothing is done 
except making the Forts merely defencible[sic], and keeping 
the Soldiers from Wind and Rain.”
16
 
 
Necessary work on forts was often delayed as there was a lack of 
skilled men to carry out the work.  One officer reported of his post in 1763 
that “if proper tools and artificers are not immediately sent, the place will be 
extremely uncomfortable.  A Black Smith and armorer are absolutely 
necessary, none of whom are to be found among the troops here.”
17
  In 1765 
repairs to the Detroit barracks were delayed as there were not enough 
sawyers to cut the wood needed.
18
  At Michilimackinac they were so short 
of labour in 1764 that the inhabitants were drafted in to help keep the fort 
standing.
19
  Soldiers often lacked the skills for large-scale building projects 
such as those needed at Fort Pitt and Michilimackinac, forcing the army to 
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draft in civilian contractors.
20
  With most of the forts a long way from the 
large communities where skilled craftsman normally resided, this was both 
difficult and expensive. 
Packed into disintegrating accommodation, it is not surprising that 
many soldiers were frequently subject to debilitating illness.  At nearly 
every fort disease was a constant presence.  By the late 1760s the army in 
America was experiencing an annual rate of sickness running at 8%, with a 
5% annual mortality rate for common soldiers (from all causes).
21
   An 
account of life at Crown Point in July 1764 paints a bleak picture.  Not only 
were the garrison suffering from the usual fever and agues, but they had 
contracted smallpox, and to make matters worse the surgeon was 
incapacitated.  As a result of disease and desertion, the fort was barely left 
with enough men to mount a guard and cut the wood needed for fuel.
22
  
Beckwith described how of those who became sick many were “falling 
down and but few recovering”.
 23
 
Among the many diseases endemic amongst British soldiers in the 
west were typhus, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox and scurvy.  Garrisons were 
“havens for disease”, and though officers were aware of the basic principles 
of sanitation, they struggled to get their men to follow them.  As a result the 
death tolls due to disease were high.  From 1759 to 1760 149  men, 
including the commander, died of disease at Niagara.  Doctors could do 
little to help as they were still operating with little real understanding of the 
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human body or disease, and so often inflicting cures, including bleeding and 
purging, that were as bad as the maladies they were seeking to treat.
24
 
 The men were not only sickly, but they were an ageing population, 
many of whom had been left battered and bruised by their participation in 
the Seven Years’ War.  By 1764 the men at the posts had been in America a 
long time, and it was beginning to show.  In the seven companies of the 45
th
 
Regiment, there were 110 invalids; most of the men were between thirty and 
fifty, and there were only four with less than ten years’ service.
25
  This left 
less than twenty fit for duty, hardly surprising as the 45
th
 had been 
transferred to the colonies in the mid-1740s; while the 45
th
 had arrived in 
America earlier than most, such a decrepit regiment was the norm rather 
than the exception, with many regiments “chronically under strength.”
26
  
The 45
th
 regiment was an extreme example of the manpower shortages that 
affected all regiments, which had been exacerbated by wartime recruiting 
that had enlisted men for a term of years, rather than for life.
27
 It was not 
until 1765 that a rotation of regiments was started, providing relief to a few 
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of the veteran units who were stationed in the Colonies.
28
  Such was the 
extent of the manpower shortage that in 1762 Amherst sent out instructions 
that “I would not, on any account whatsoever, send away a Soldier who can 
do Garrison Duty”.
29
 
As a result, some of the garrisons were manned by only a handful of 
men.  Fort Bedford was occupied by only six soldiers, plus officers, and that 
was before one of the soldiers deserted.
30
  Most of the small garrisons were 
somewhat better off, housing contingents of ten or twenty-five men.
31
  This 
number was hardly likely to achieve much in the face of a concerted Native 
American attack, and would have done little to place British officers in a 
strong bargaining position when confronting those Native Americans who 
visited them. 
This shortage of manpower was exacerbated by the refusal of 
colonial militia to continue serving once the Seven Years’ War had ended 
and fighting had ceased.  Men with families, farms and businesses which 
they had neglected during their service were not keen to remain in the west, 
given the tedium of garrison duty, once the threat of attack by French and 
Indians had passed.  Those units not recalled by the Colonies in order to 
save money soon melted away as men took matters into their own hands and 
deserted.  The provincial regiments were quickly disbanded as well; made 
up of men from the Colonies but paid for by the Crown during the war, the 
Colonies were simply unwilling to support them once they had to foot the 
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bill themselves.  This left the redcoats thinly stretched along the frontier, as 
they were forced to take on almost the entire burden of occupation 
themselves.
32
 
 In addition, many of the forts were extremely isolated, with no 
chance of help arriving for days, if not weeks, after trouble started.  The 
fourteen posts and outposts occupied by the British were dispersed over an 
area of 100,000 square miles, with some of the garrisons separated from 
their nearest neighbours by huge distances.
33
  The weakness of the garrisons 
and forts and the men within them left officers with little confidence in their 
ability to dominate or inspire awe in those Native Americans who came into 
contact with the British.  British officers might have wished they could 
subjugate Native Americans, but their situation made this impossible. At all 
but the largest posts officers were forced to take Native American feelings 
into consideration as, due to their isolation and weakness, they were 
effectively at their mercy.  After another bout of sickness had swept through 
the garrisons, an officer at Detroit worried that “the Indians presume a good 
deal on seeing the Garrison at the several Posts so weak”, for Native 
Americans behaved “very different at the Small Posts from what it is here, 
and some Sheep have lately been taken from Sutlers on the road from Fort 
Brewton to this Place.”
34
   
Aware of their own weakness, Amherst’s orders to restrict the 
presents and powder given to Native Americans caused a great deal of 
apprehension amongst a section of senior army officers.  When officer 
James Gorrell received Amherst’s instructions, he recorded: “These orders 
                                                           
32
 Barker and Farmer, Redcoats: The British Soldier in America. p. 96. 
33
 Ibid. pp. 96-97. 
34
 Duncan to Johnson, 29 August 1762, WJP Vol. 10 p. 497-8. 
82 
 
made me uneasy, as I was assured I could not keep so large a body of 
Indians in temper without giving them something, as they had always been 
used to large presents from the French; and at the same time, if I did not 
give each nation the same I had given those that had been to see me, all 
would be lost to me and the service.”  Officers knew that Native Americans 
were not going to be awed into submission by the appearance of their tired 
army, and their only chance of avoiding trouble was to satisfy their demands 
for presents.  This Gorrell proceeded to do, handing out gifts including 
powder, lead, blankets and shirts to the Native Americans who came to his 
post.  Throughout the period covered by Gorrell’s journal, he had no trouble 
with the Native Americans that visited his post - a fact for which disobeying 
Amherst’s orders was no doubt largely responsible.
35
  This pragmatic 
response from Gorrell, with the aim of avoiding conflict, was not unique.  
 Captain Campbell, when he was the commanding officer at Detroit, 
felt that presents should be given until the Indians were accustomed to 
British rule, at which point they could be scaled back.  Even before he had 
received Amherst’s orders, Campbell was stressing how necessary it was to 
give some presents.  He told Colonel Bouquet: “The Indians Nations come 
to me from all Parts, I must give them some Provisions and other Small 
presents, I am much Surprised the Generals have not given some orders 
about it, I wrote very fully to General Amherst, the Necessity there was of 
managing the Indians at this time. I hope he will approve of what I have 
done [Emphasis added]”.
36
  Campbell was more explicit in another letter, 
stating “I am Still of opinion, that ye Crown Should be at some Expence to 
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keep the Indians in good Humour till the fate of the Country is known”.  
Campbell knew that the continuation of gift-giving was the only policy that 
had a chance to prevent trouble and it was the willingness of post 
commanders like him to disobey their orders, which delayed a rebellion in 
response to Amherst’s orders.
 37
 
Campbell was not alone. He had “daily Representations from the 
officer at the posts” upon the necessity of giving Native Americans presents; 
Henry Gladwin, a fellow officer, felt it was “impossible to manage” Native 
Americans without some presents.
 38
  None of these officers placed any 
reliance on the strength of the army keeping Native Americans acquiescent 
to their presence, unlike Amherst.  Just as with his instructions regarding 
presents, many officers found it hard to follow Amherst’s orders prohibiting 
the giving of ammunition, as they knew that this order would only cause 
trouble. Campbell told Colonel Bouquet, “I am certain if the Indians knew 
General Amherst’s sentiments about keeping them short of Powder it would 
be impossible to keep them in temper.”
39
  The commanders of small posts 
dependent on Detroit were of the same mind, and Campbell received a 
constant stream of letters from their commanders, asking that they might 
have powder to give to Native Americans.
40
 For Native Americans the 
shortage of ammunition was a life or death issue.  Without gunpowder and 
shot, Native American hunters were at risk of starvation, and warriors were 
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rendered defenceless, most having lost the ability to use bows and arrows 
many years before.
41
  Such drastic consequences were the inevitable result 
of Amherst reducing the supply of powder, and most Native Americans 
viewed its stingy distribution as an aggressive act.  
 At the more isolated posts commanders often had no choice but to 
continue giving presents to Native Americans as, sometimes hundreds of 
miles from re-supply, they were dependent on friendly Native Americans 
bringing in meat (usually venison) and corn.  In some cases supplies from 
Native Americans were all that stood between the soldiers and starvation.  
Far from universally seeking to impose their will on Native Americans, 
there were those senior officers who knew they could only continue to 
occupy their posts on their sufferance.  Gladwin told Amherst as much, in 
an attempt to secure Amherst’s approval for limited gifts, including 
ammunition: 
“Ouitattanon almost intirely depends on the Indians for their meats and … 
by this means Mr Jenkins has hitherto been able to maintain his post which 
otherwise he might have abandoned I believe this matter has not been 
mentioned to you before there I think it my duty to report it.”
42
  Ensign 
Holmes posted at the Miami told Colonel Bouquet how “the Indins they 
Bring In so Littel Meat that I Canot Get it as fast as the Men Requires it”, 
while they were “Continually tormenting me for presents”.  In desperation 
                                                           
41
 Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America. p. 182. 
42
Gladwin to Amherst, 23 Nov 1762, PRO, WO 34/49  The increased accommodation 
given by British officers to Native Americans when the British needed Indians to provision 
their garrisons has been commented on by McConnell.  McConnell, A Country Between: 
The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774. p. 153. 
85 
 
Holmes had written to both Croghan and Amherst, but had received no reply 
by the time he wrote to Bouquet.
43
   
These officers did what they could to keep Native Americans 
supplied with presents and powder because they feared the consequences if 
they did not.  Even after Amherst had forbidden officers to give powder to 
Native Americans, Campbell continued to disobey his orders, and even 
begged Bouquet to send him more powder.
44
  One officer described giving 
presents as “necessary” for “they are a jealous people and Should we hold 
our hand Entirely from them they will be Easily made believe We Intend 
them Some hurt”.
45
 If British officers’ only goal was to drive Native 
Americans to their knees, it seems unlikely that one officer would report 
after a tour of the posts that it was only “with greatest difficulty that the 
Officers can keep them in good humour”.
46
  Johnson himself recognised the 
impact of environment on the officers when he was later moved to note that 
he: 
 
“Cannot but observe that Gentlemen whatever their 
sentiments of Indians are previous to their going to the 
Outposts, seem to alter them when there, & to Consider [all] 
Expences incurred as Extremely necessary to the Publick 
Service.”
47
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  This hardly seems consistent with an unstoppable drive to put 
Native Americans in their place and dominate them, and more in keeping 
with a desire to avoid conflict.  So, while Amherst was not alone in his 
views on Native Americans, it is simply wrong to ascribe them to the whole 
of the British Army.  As well as those officers on the frontier content to 
ignore Native American pleading, there were those senior officers who 
simply wanted to keep those Native Americans they dealt with content in 
order to prevent violence; after all they were all too aware of how 
vulnerable they would be in their crumbling forts were they to come under 
attack.  
In War Under Heaven, Gregory Evans Dowd argues that during this 
period officers “expressed discomfort that Indians accepted gifts not with 
marks of scrapping gratitude but with demands for more”.
48
  Certainly the 
language used by officers when discussing gift-giving makes it sound as if it 
was something they resorted to only when it was absolutely unavoidable.   
When handing out presents to Native Americans, officers justified it as the 
only way of “Satisfying them”, because they felt “obliged” to hand over 
ammunition or because they were pestered.
 49
  Dowd argues that this 
indicates that officers deeply resented being forced to hand over presents, 
and asserts that “the British easily understood the meanings Indians attached 
to gifts;” that it was in part because they resented being forced to adapt to a 
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Native American form of diplomacy that they wanted to destroy gift-
giving.
50
   
This is not exactly the case; amongst British officers there was a 
fairly widespread belief that gift-giving was not an essential part of 
traditional Native American diplomacy, but instead a wartime aberration 
that had been created by the competition between the British and French for 
Native American allies.  The majority of British officers patronisingly 
viewed Native Americans as a blank slate, easily led by more intelligent and 
civilised Europeans.  The army blamed the French for Native American 
demands for presents, and would later blame them for Native American 
anger.  Rather than regarding Native American gift-giving diplomacy as 
traditional, British officers believed it was a product of French 
overindulgence.  Gorrell at Detroit explained that the demands of Native 
Americans stemmed from that fact that they “had always been used to large 
presents from the French”, a belief shared by Campbell. 
51
 After his tour of 
the frontier posts Hutchinson told Croghan that the “French had always 
Accustomed themselves both in the time of Peace, and during the late War 
to make these People great Presents three of four times a Year”.
52
  So 
amongst those British officers who tried to reduce the amount of presents 
they were giving to Native Americans there were those who might have 
been motivated by the thought of stamping out a Native American tradition, 
but there were also those who believed that they were merely combating the 
legacy of French largesse.   
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Officers held the belief that Native Americans were easily 
influenced, and it was not only the French who could cause problems with 
over-generous behaviour.  Robert Mackinen blamed the exorbitant demands 
of Native Americans in Florida on Major Forbes, and wrote to Gage 
expressing his sorrow that “they have been taught such a lesson, by having 
every-thing given to them at first, which they asked from Major Forbes; that 
at present they demand as a right, what they otherwise requested as a favour: 
it is difficult to avoid giving them offence, and their demands are generally 
very exorbitant”.
53
    
Army officers often talked about giving presents in a resentful tone 
because they were frightened of ending up out of pocket.  Officers on the 
frontier spent their own money, making sure to record all expenditures in 
their accounts. These were then sent to the commander-in-chief, who could 
pass them and issue monies to cover whatever the officer in question had 
spent. However, the commander could also refuse to accept them, and leave 
the officer out of pocket.  This was no formality or rubber stamping: 
accounts were routinely failed, leaving officers seriously out of pocket.  
Amherst took this responsibility seriously and ordered checks on the 
accounts of those officers which he considered unusually high.
54
 
It makes sense that men, frightened that they might be left to pay for 
the Indian presents they had brought if the commander-in-chief thought they 
had been too profligate, would do all they could to make it appear that they 
had given out only such gifts as were absolutely necessary. This is why 
officers used the language they did.  Trapped between their general’s 
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instructions and Native American anger, officers did what they could to help 
each other out.  Campbell asked that Gladwin be allowed to assist him in 
assessing the accounts of the posts dependent on Detroit, as he knew how 
vital it had been for the officers at these posts to purchase presents for 
Native Americans.
55
  Gladwin was aware of the pressure that the officers at 
the smaller posts felt to give presents, and in his orders he reminded them 
“that you will not contract any unnecessary expense there on account of the 
Indians, or your garrison as such accounts will not be paid.” However, he 
also reassured them that “I shall report to the General the necessity of giving 
the Indians some trifling presents to keep them in temper”.
56
  In turn, 
officers like Campbell asked William Johnson to put a good word in with 
the general for them, so that their accounts might pass.
57
   
While there were many British officers who were inspired by their 
precarious situation to do all they could to appease Native Americans, not 
all officers felt the same pressure.  Captain Ecuyer at Fort Pitt was certainly 
not in favour of distributing gifts; he confessed that “Mr Croghan asks 
constantly for powder, lead and knives for them; that embarrasses me.  
Sometimes I refuse, at other times I give a little, and at other times I do not 
know on which foot to dance; I fear I do too much.  Mr Croghan says we 
cannot refuse these trifles, which nevertheless, would be 45 lbs. of powder, 
90 lbs of lead, knives, vermilion, &c.  I informed him that I would not give 
them anything without having received your orders”.
58
 A few months later 
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Ecuyer had clearly made up his mind, calling the Shawnee beggars and 
promising Amherst that “We have determined to receive them very 
coldly.”
59
 This new attitude quickly took effect, and later that month the 
Shawnee left, “very much dissatisfied, although I have done for them more 
than I should perhaps”.
60
 
Campbell, Gladwin and others tried to persuade Amherst of the 
necessity of giving presents. Campbell even explicitly stated that it was 
“absolutely necessary to bestow some trifles on them in our taking 
Possession of the Posts as the Garrisons are small & the Distances great”.
61
  
Amherst did not listen, but stuck to his old line that “I never prepose to gain 
Indian friendship by presents.”
62
 The commander-in-chief felt that as long 
as Native Americans had access to trade there was no justification for giving 
them presents.
63
  Nothing could change his mind. Late in 1762 Amherst told 
Johnson that “If the Indians are Industrious, And Barter their Skins for 
powder, &ca. I don’t think they can have much occasion or Indeed that they 
can Expect to be supplyed[sic] by us”.
64
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Amherst insisted that all would be well as long as Native Americans 
had the opportunity to trade, but in the immediate post-war period 
opportunities for Native Americans to trade with honest merchants for the 
necessities of life were few and far between.  One of the most urgent 
requests from Native Americans at the end of the Seven Years’ War had 
been for the fur trade to be reopened, but in the early years of the British 
occupation Indian trade goods were in very short supply, as were reputable 
traders to sell them.  Rather, those traders who did venture west hoped to 
take advantage of Native Americans’ desperation and brought with them 
substandard goods, which they then tried to sell at inflated prices.  This 
meant that even those Native Americans who had hunted for skins to trade 
could find themselves without the European goods they desperately needed. 
65
 
A bad situation was made worse when the rum trade continued to 
flourish, despite the army’s best efforts.  The officers on the frontier tried 
hard to prevent the trade in rum, but it was an impossible task.  They could 
throw traders out of the forts, and seize the rum of those who passed through 
their gates, but it was easy to sneak rum past the posts in the surrounding 
woodlands and sell it directly in Indian villages.  This was acknowledged by 
senior officers like Gage and Bouquet, who knew that it would be 
impossible to stop the trade entirely.
66
  If the traders were banned from 
selling rum at British forts, then they simply set up shop elsewhere.  This is 
what the traders did at Toronto, and soon officers in Canada were 
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complaining that many Indians were arriving at their posts naked, having 
sold all their possessions for liquor at the town.
67
    The army did what it 
could, and a detachment sent to Toronto returned with one trader, and one 
trader’s servant in custody.
68
 
The dearth of Indian goods, high prices, and abundance of rum left 
the Native Americans, who had been promised a bountiful and fairly priced 
trade, bitter and angry.  It also made the presents handed out at the posts 
more vital than ever.  Native Americans who could not afford the 
exploitative prices charged by many traders, or who had been cheated of 
their hard-won skins when drunk, had little choice but to rely on British 
generosity, but Amherst was doing his best to stamp this out.  At a time 
when Native Americans desperately needed help because the fur trade was 
still in disarray, they were frequently told that none could be given.  
Disappointed, many Native Americans felt a growing sense of resentment 
towards the British. 
Johnson attempted to alert Amherst to this development, but without 
success.  Amherst felt that Indian agents were trying to inflate their own 
status by exaggerating the consequences of distressing Native Americans.
69
  
Rather than acknowledge their concerns, Amherst instead moved to exert 
more control over the Indian Department.  In 1762 he instructed Bouquet 
that “the Accounts in the Indian Department ought certainly be supported by 
written orders from the commanding officer, unless on particular 
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Emergencies when they cannot be obtained”.
70
  In September of that same 
year Amherst decreed that in future Johnson would have to request from 
him any powder he wished to present ahead of time.
71
  Whatever Amherst 
allowed Johnson to give the Indians was not enough.  In late 1762 Croghan 
noted that Indians passing Fort Pitt were requesting powder, but that 
Bouquet was unwilling to supply them without an order from Amherst.  The 
following year he reported that the Indians passing Fort Pitt were very 
“uneasy” at not being allowed any powder.
72
  
By the start of 1763 things had deteriorated further, and even 
Bouquet felt that something needed to be done. He informed the Indian 
department that:  
 
“it [was] necessary to be represented to the General this it 
has been customary to give Powder, Lead, … & Knives to 
Indian going to War to the Southward and that since these 
Presents have been suppressed those Indians are become 
very troublesome at Fort Pitt and more so at the other Posts: 
Stealing Horses, Cattle or committing other disorders on the 
communication which obstruct the Trade and discourage the 
country People from bringing Provisions to the Fort: and the 
Colonel is of opinion that those disturbances could be 
prevented at a moderate expense if a fixed sum was 
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appropriated yearly to be paid out in small presents to the 
warriors and occasionally to other Indians for services done, 
and in some clothes to be given to such as might be in real 
want, through age or Infirmerties [sic] which expense might 
be lessened after the War.”
73
 
 
Bouquet knew he could not openly question Amherst’s order, and so 
he tried to use the Indian Department as a channel to make his concerns 
heard.  He knew that the general did not fear war, so it was no use telling 
him that presents were necessary to prevent it. Instead Bouquet talked to 
Amherst in language he would understand, emphasising that there were 
Native Americans who needed the gifts to continue, and the improvements 
in behaviour that would result from a more generous attitude. 
  Bouquet was not the first to suggest setting aside an annual 
allowance for gifts: Campbell had suggested the idea to Amherst about six 
months earlier.
74
  Yet despite the pleas from the commanding officers of the 
two biggest posts on the frontier, Amherst would not allow this. He wrote 
that “As to Appropriating a particular Sum to be Laid out yearly in presents 
to the Warriors & ca that I can by no means agree to; Nor can I think it 
necessary to give them any presents by way of Bribes”, though “Colonel 
Bouquet may out of Charity, to such as are in need, want & reduced by age 
or Infirmities Bestow what he thinks will be of most service to them”.
75
  
Again, with war only months away, Amherst could not let go of his mission 
to transform Native Americans, with the result that aid would only be 
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available to those who he decided deserved it.  A few weeks later Amherst 
again emphasised that, though he was against the giving of presents to 
ordinary Indians, Colonel Bouquet should “order Captain Ecuyer to Relieve 
such [Indians] as appear to be Objects of Charity; but not to give those who 
are able to provide for their Families any Encouragement to Loiter away 
their time and Potency … about the Fort”.
76
 
Amongst British officers, as this chapter has shown, there were 
certainly those happy to enforce their supposed superiority over Native 
Americans, but it must be acknowledged that there were also those more 
concerned with keeping them happy than dominating them. This was 
certainly not what Amherst desired, but the reality of British weakness on 
the frontier was simply too obvious for those officers in command of 
isolated posts to ignore.  That there were those prepared to disobey Amherst 
indicates that there were British officers who believed that keeping the 
peace was more important than imposing their will on Native Americans.  In 
a culture like the British Army, where obedience to orders was so prized, 
this is a startling indication of the importance some officers attached to 
Native American feelings.  Indeed, they tried several times to persuade 
Amherst to change his attitude to presents, though with little result.  This 
attitude extended to more than just the giving of presents, and the next 
chapter will examine the other difficulties faced by the British Army in their 
encounter with Native Americans in the years before Pontiac’s War. 
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Chapter Four 
 The Problems of Frontier Diplomacy 
 
A section of senior British officers had been inspired to persevere 
with gift-giving despite Amherst’s orders because they knew their garrisons 
to be vulnerable.  The effect of this weakness on British behaviour did not 
end there.  There were some officers who hated Native Americans and felt 
secure enough to let their contempt show, but there were many more 
officers more anxious about their safety, who struggled to please the Native 
Americans they lived among.  They tried to master Native American forms 
of diplomacy but faced many obstacles in this, not least their own 
inexperience.  Officers also took action against colonists who moved on to 
Native American land, hoping it would help keep the peace. 
While such actions did help to ease tensions, they did not address 
Native Americans’ central grievance - the British occupation of the frontier.  
Native Americans found the numerous forts occupied by the British in the 
west threatening, and worried that they were but the first step in a coming 
invasion of their territory.  The vast majority of British officers never fully 
understood this fear.  When Native Americans began to confederate to better 
protect themselves, the British blamed not their own actions but rather those 
of the French.  Instead of acknowledging Native Americans’ concerns over 
the occupation of so many forts, the British instead concentrated on finding 
the French ring leaders they believed were inciting Native Americans to 
cause trouble. 
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Native Americans were already considering an assault on the British 
positions in the west when in 1763 news of the Peace of Paris arrived, and 
removed any hope that British domination of the Ohio and the Great Lakes 
would be reversed peacefully at the negotiating table.  Still 
uncomprehending the nature of their situation, the British were taken 
completely by surprise when disgruntled Native Americans initiated the 
conflict that became known as “Pontiac’s War”. 
The British Army was on the frontier to preserve the empire by 
keeping the peace, a task that was made considerably more difficult by the 
attitudes and actions of some of its own members.  Whenever soldiers and 
Native Americans mixed there was a high probability of violence, and if 
rum was added to the mix, then trouble was nearly certain.  In the years 
before Pontiac’s War the 44
th
 regiment seems to have been particularly 
prone to treating Native Americans in an appalling manner, beating and 
insulting them whenever the opportunity arose.
1
  In other incidents, Native 
Americans at Niagara were robbed and assaulted by soldiers, and five 
Native Americans were murdered by the garrison at Venango.
2
  Such 
behaviour from soldiers encountering Native Americans was not universal, 
but it was common. 
Neither was violent treatment of Native Americans confined to the 
lower ranks.  Officers who did not feel the need to keep Native Americans 
in good humour quickly found many ways to make this abundantly clear to 
them.  When the Indians of Conajoharee requested that an empty 
blockhouse inside a fort might be made available to them as a schoolhouse, 
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the blockhouse in question was quickly made into a stable.
3
  At Fort Ontario 
Alexander Duncan refused to let Native Americans make long speeches, a 
move that was a shocking breach of protocol, as most Native American 
diplomacy took the form of long speeches from headmen.  Such arrogant 
behaviour was no doubt responsible for the fact that Ontario received few 
Indian visitors.
4
  
Officers’ mistreatment of Native Americans was not limited to 
rudeness, and they could be just as violent in their actions as any common 
soldier. On one occasion an officer beat a Native American until he was 
bleeding profusely, in a disagreement over a business deal.
5
  Such behaviour 
understandably upset and angered Native Americans who had been 
promised that good treatment from the British would continue after the war.  
As a result, the ill behaviour of officers and men was a frequent complaint 
of Native Americans when they met with Sir William Johnson.
6
 
Again, though frequent, this ill-treatment of Native Americans was 
not approved of by all officers.  In contrast to those who abused Native 
Americans, there were other officers working hard to establish a good 
relationship with their Native American neighbours.  In their orders these 
officers emphasised the importance of keeping “a good understanding with” 
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those Native Americans who visited British forts.
7
  Even Amherst instructed 
that as long as they behaved, Native Americans should always be treated 
civilly.
8
  Those officers who were known to have disobeyed these 
instructions could be strictly reprimanded by Amherst and his subordinates.
9
  
After hearing complaints from Native Americans that they had been badly 
treated at Venango, Bouquet wrote immediately to the commanding officer 
there, and instructed him in a “Most Serious Manner” to prevent any future 
cause of complaint, to punish all who by word or deed injured a Native 
American, and provide redress for any Native Americans who complained 
to him.
10
 
Common soldiers who mistreated Native Americans received much 
harsher punishment.  In one instance a soldier who killed a Native 
American’s horse was given 100 lashes; at another time four men were 
whipped for robbing a Seneca.
11
  In order to try and prevent such incidents 
from taking place, officers tried to segregate their men from the Indians 
whenever possible.
12
  Such actions show that there were those in the army 
concerned about relations with Native Americans, and prepared to take 
action to prevent them being soured.
13
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In the hope of creating a good impression such officers struggled to 
adapt to the Native Americans’ traditions forms of diplomacy: for example, 
they would use traditional Native American ceremonies when meeting 
Native American representatives.
14
  However, the officers’ efforts at 
intercultural mediation were severely hampered by their ignorance and 
inexperience.
15
  While most officers had served against, or alongside, Native 
Americans on the battlefield, this in no way prepared them for their new role 
as the Crown’s diplomatic representatives to Amerindians.  Keen to make a 
good impression, these officers sought advice on such matters.  To 
Amherst’s credit, when Colonel Haldimand wrote to him asking for advice 
on Indian affairs, he directed him to Sir William Johnson.
16
   
When Lieutenant James Gorrell took command at Fort Edward 
Augustus on the St Lawrence River, he did all he could to overcome his 
inexperience.  Typically of those officers who wished to placate the Native 
Americans they met, at the time of taking his post Gorrell was ignorant of 
the norms of Indian diplomacy, desperate for guidance and short of vital 
materials.  Having examined his order from Donald Campbell at Detroit, 
and finding “very little respecting Indians,” he applied for more instructions, 
and was directed to Sir William Johnson.  Johnson was at Detroit for an 
Indian conference and warned Gorrell “that unless I [Gorrell] did my best to 
please the Indians I had better not go [to Detroit].” Johnson then promised 
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that after the conference he would make sure wampum belts were sent to 
Fort Edward Augustus, but Gorrell never received any.  Gorrell, desperate 
for the wampum he needed to carry out the ceremonies required by Native 
American diplomacy, made three attempts to contact someone who could 
supply some, but all failed.
17
 
Aware that greeting the Native Americans who lived in the region of 
his post without wampum to present to them would be disastrous, Gorrell 
was reduced to borrowing wampum from Indian women and fellow officers.  
This enabled Gorrell to make six belts, one for each nation that was to visit 
him, but he later found that some nations, which were represented by more 
than one town, required more than one belt.  Gorrell continued to do what 
he could, but his journal makes it clear that his wartime service in no way 
prepared him for his peacetime role in the west.
18
 
Gorrell was not the only officer to have trouble decoding the role 
that wampum played in Native American diplomacy.  At one meeting with 
some Six Nations headmen at Niagara, William Walters tried to refuse the 
wampum belts with which they wanted to present him.  Walters did this 
because he knew wampum was valuable and he felt he would be doing the 
headmen a favour, for by refusing their gift he was saving them money.  In 
reality, refusing to accept a wampum belt would have been a grave offence 
to the headmen, as it was something only done by Native Americans when 
they refused to accept the message contained in the belts.  As this wampum 
was intended to “renew the brotherly friendship” between the post of 
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Niagara and the Six Nations, its refusal would have been taken as a rejection 
of the Six Nations’ friendship.  Luckily, the headmen persuaded Walters to 
accept the belts, and so symbolically accept their friendship.
19
  Officers like 
Gorrell and Walters were clearly well-meaning, but struggled to do the right 
thing; they wanted to create good relations with those Native Americans 
they encountered, but they were severely hampered by a lack of 
experience.
20
 
The truth is that these officers’ previous service had made them ill- 
prepared for their role as cultural mediators on the frontier.  Many would 
have fought alongside Native Americans, and some would even have been 
involved in smoothing over the conflicts that occurred between the army 
and their Native Americans allies, but this was no preparation for what was 
to come.  During the Seven Years’ War officers might have been expected 
to soothe the anger caused by a scuffle between soldiers and Amerindians, 
but only the most senior officers would have been expected to take part in 
formal diplomacy between the Crown and Native Americans.  Now every 
post commander was expected to be a diplomat, representing the British 
Crown in dealing with Native Americans.  Not only were officers suddenly 
expected to undertake formal diplomatic meetings with Native Americans, 
but they had to carefully settle disputes between solders and Native 
Americans, settlers and Native Americans, and even Native Americans and 
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Native Americans.  This was something for which they had minimal 
training and far too often minimal aptitude.
21
  
Not only did most officers lack experience and other essentials such 
as wampum, but many lacked reliable interpreters, a prerequisite for clear 
communication with Native Americans.  The Six Nations complained of the 
need for an interpreter at Oswego.
22
  At Fort Brewster the commanding 
officer complained that “The Want of Interpreters frequently occasions 
Misunderstandings”.  In response to the situation, Johnson sent an 
interpreter, but he could not undo the damage that had already been done.
23
  
Even when interpreters were available, there was no guarantee they would 
be reliable.  Often they were French or Canadian traders, with little loyalty 
to the British.
24
  With few men amongst the British who could understand 
native languages, such interpreters could often distort the messages that they 
were supposed to deliver for their own ends. In one example in 1762 the 
Mohawk complained that the translator at Detroit was causing trouble by 
not conveying their words accurately to the commanding officer.
25
   
As well as struggling with Native American forms of diplomacy, the 
army would also on occasion take active steps to address Native American 
grievances, in order to maintain good relations.  When Bouquet received 
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reports that Native Americans were being disturbed by hunters and squatters 
moving on to their land and killing their game, he issued a proclamation 
ordering officers to seize any such people they should find, and send them 
to Fort Pitt where they would be tried and punished.
26
  Bouquet was not 
alone in taking such action.  Both General Monckton and Captain 
MacDonald took steps to remove hunters and settlers from Native American 
land when they learned that they were upsetting Native Americans.
27
 
These examples prove that officers did not react to Native 
Americans as a monolithic group.  There were those who detested Native 
Americans and who revelled in the opportunity to put them in their place 
which a posting on the frontier granted them.  Other officers felt that the 
priority should be to establish good relations with Native Americans.  Their 
attitude stemmed largely from circumstance and experience.  As discussed 
in the last chapter, officers whose circumstances consisted of crumbling 
fortifications and small garrisons understandably saw little need to 
antagonise Native Americans if it was avoidable.   
Just how much their vulnerability affected the actions of British 
officers is demonstrated by events at Fort Le Beouf.  After an epidemic of 
horse stealing, including the theft of some horses that had been only 200 
yards from the fort (giving a good indication just how far outside their 
garrisons British power extended) Townsend Guy, the officer in charge, 
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ordered some men to move outside to guard the horses.  As the men left the 
fort, they came upon some more Native Americans stealing horses, which 
resulted in a fire fight.  The men quickly retreated inside the fort, whereupon 
the Native Americans fired upon it.  As soon as the firing ceased, Guy 
invited the Native Americans into the fort, gave them a drink, told them that 
they should not steal horses from the garrison, and then let them go.  Even 
though these Native Americans had been stealing the king’s horses and fired 
on king’s men, Guy did not demand compensation or attempt to detain 
them.  These are hardly the actions of someone who felt in a position of 
dominance.  Such actions point more to a desire for reconciliation than 
revenge, a desire that was largely based on fear.  Afraid of possible 
retaliation and aware of the vulnerability of the small garrison at Le Boeuf, 
twelve men and a corporal were sent to reinforce the post, after Guy had 
reported the incident.
28
   
Those who struggled to reach an understanding with the Native 
Americans whom they encountered clearly faced considerable obstacles.  
They did not understand Native American languages or culture, and their 
guides into this new world were often unfriendly and unreliable French 
Canadians.  It is therefore wrong to assume that every disagreement between 
British officers and Native Americans was the result of arrogance or hatred 
on the part of the army.  Misunderstanding could result in trouble just as 
often as malice.  Indeed, the British never truly understood the Native 
Americans’ biggest grievance regarding their actions. 
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For most Native Americans, the large number of posts occupied by 
the British in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War was their greatest cause 
of concern.  They could not understand why the British needed so many 
warriors and forts if their intentions were peaceful.  At the Treaty of Easton 
in 1758 the British had agreed not to erect permanent settlements in the 
Ohio region, so it was a simple and insulting breach of promise when the 
town of Pittsburgh began to grow around the garrison at Fort Pitt.  The 
Oneida and Tuscarora reminded Johnson of British wartime promises after 
the surrender of Canada in 1760, but the British were not going to give up 
their forts.
29
  This greatly angered large numbers of Native Americans who, 
rightly, felt betrayed by the British.  Many tribes began to suspect that the 
forts would be staging posts for a new British attempt to take their land.  By 
1763 this fear had become widespread, and one officer noted that “the Six 
Nations, Shawnese, & Delaware Indians are Ill Disposed … They say We 
mean to make Slaves of them, by Taking so many Posts in their Country”.
30
 
Yet though they were aware of some Native American concerns, few 
officers realised the anger caused by the British Army’s occupation of 
French forts and construction of new posts.  There was a fundamental 
breakdown in understanding.  The British thought of the forts and the land 
as French, and so felt that they had won ownership of them with victory in 
Canada.  Native Americans felt that the forts, and the land they stood on, 
had never belonged to the French; rather, as they conceived it, they had 
allowed the French to build and occupy forts on their land in return for 
compensation in the form of access to trade and gifts.  As far as Native 
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Americans were concerned the French defeat did not entitle the British to 
occupy the forts.  This might have been overlooked had the British kept up 
the old agreement by providing access to cheap trade goods and plentiful 
gifts, but this they failed to do.  Almost nobody in the British Army realised 
the resentment they created simply with their presence on Native American 
land.
31
 
It was not just the occupation of the posts that worried Native 
Americans: they were also angered by the fact that wherever the army 
moved in they began making extensive changes to the surrounding 
landscape, such as clearing woodland and planting crops to feed the troops.  
This meant that the British forts had a much greater and more obvious 
impact on the environment than small garrisons favoured by the French.  
For Native Americans, already afraid that the army was intending to take up 
permanent residence in the backcountry, these changes were a most 
unwelcome development.  These fears were voiced by an Onondaga 
headman at conference in 1763: “At Fort Brewton We daily see ye People 
cleaning large Fields of our Land. The Same at Osswego Falls, Not 
withstanding it was told to us by ye General that they were only to be 
temporary Posts for ye protection of provisions”.
32
 
  Native Americans, resentful that the army was taking control of the 
landscape in spaces that had traditionally been their domain, channelled this 
anger and resentment into acts of resistance that aimed to challenge British 
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control of the environment.  At Fort Hendrick, though the Native Americans 
had at first welcomed the British, they quickly made their objections known 
when the army began cutting wood on Native American land.  Typically, 
the commanding officer at the garrison blamed Europeans, in this case the 
Schuyler Family of settlers, for stirring up the Indians. However, even had 
they wished to, the Schuylers would not have been able to force the Indians 
to object to the army’s presence if the Native Americans had not already felt 
aggrieved.
 33
  This refusal to see their actions as the cause of Native 
American anger was typical of many British officers; they simply could not 
imagine that Native Americans would autonomously make choices or take 
action without prompting from an outside source.  In reality, Native 
Americans did not need any coaxing to complain about the ever-increasing 
number of acres cleared by the British. 
It was not just the forts themselves; many Native Americans were 
also concerned by the large number of settlers who followed the British 
Army into the west.  The presence of the army encouraged settlement, by 
providing a market for goods and giving settlers a feeling of safety.
34
  The 
roads cut through the woods by the army for their campaigns during the war 
also made access to the frontier easier.
35
  The growing settlement around 
Fort Pitt was a prominent source of Native American anger.  As the number 
of men stationed at the fort grew to over 1,000 a burgeoning community of 
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civilians appeared to cater to their needs; there were over 160 houses outside 
the fort by April 1761.  This new town was a worrying development, which 
left Native American headmen wondering if the British “designed to Build 
another Philadelphia on their Lands”.
36
  Relations were further soured by 
Amherst allowing officers and ex-officers to create new settlements around 
posts like Niagara.  These settlements were intended to provide supplies for 
the garrisons at reasonable prices, but also created a considerable amount of 
trepidation amongst Native Americans who viewed them as the beginning 
of a process that would end with them dispossessed of all their land.
37
 
Native Americans were very worried about British intentions, and 
when they received a frosty welcome at the forts many felt that their worst 
fears had been confirmed, and so they began to move their villages further 
west, away from the British.  The Indians at Oswegatchie hoped that they 
might be safe if they put a river between themselves and the British.
38
  
Amherst was pleased by this development as “it is much better the beasts 
should settle on the north side” of the river, further from the British.
39
 
Just how bad relations between Native Americans and British had 
become is illustrated by the behaviour of a Native American sympathetic to 
the British at Detroit.  In 1762 Henry Gladwin informed Amherst that “we 
have with some difficulty made another convert, who seems to be under 
great apprehension for fear of being discovered, and as he speaks a little 
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English, and some Dutch, he will not allow of an Interpreter, and in order to 
avoid suspicion, he desires he may be turned out of the Fort, as a 
troublesome fellow, whenever he is found here by any of his Brethren”.
40
 So 
great was his compatriot’s hatred of the British that the Native American in 
question desired the British to pantomime his eviction from the post, rather 
than face the accusations that he was collaborating with them. 
The language used by Gladwin would seem more appropriate from a 
police officer infiltrating a criminal organisation, as opposed to a group 
whose friendship the British were meant to be actively courting, and 
indicates how little trust existed between the two groups at this time.  The 
convert was a Native American who had agreed to provide intelligence to 
the British, and though he was prepared to help the British, he was plainly 
terrified lest anyone should find out.  Clearly by 1762 the army was so 
detested by those Native Americans in the vicinity of Detroit that any 
Native American seen to be openly helping the British would become an 
outcast, and was risking attack. The Amerindians’ precautions demonstrate 
just how unpopular those who collaborated with the army had become 
amongst Native Americans by this time.   On the other hand, Gladwin’s 
language makes it clear that he was already very suspicious of those Native 
Americans whom he was meeting.  This atmosphere of fear and distrust, 
created by Britain’s broken promises of evacuating the Ohio, had reached 
crisis level thanks to Amherst’s restrictions on presents.
41
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It did not take long for Native American resentment and anger over 
the British occupation of the west to harden into something more concrete.  
War belts began to circulate through both the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley 
tribes, as those Native Americans prepared to fight sought out like-minded 
allies.  The British, refusing to realise that these plots were a reaction to 
their occupation of the frontier, blamed the French and Canadians for 
“stirring up” Indians and creating trouble.  The British simply failed to grasp 
that Native Americans were making their own decisions, and were not being 
led by others.  Reducing the British presence on the frontier was never 
discussed; instead, British officers tried to stop the steady stream of 
wampum belts and strings by searching for ringleaders and instigators so 
they could remove them from the backcountry, hoping that Native 
Americans would soon come to accept British domination once they ended 
the influence of the French. Rather than altering their treatment of Native 
Americans, officers concentrated on finding the ringleaders who they 
believed were behind the distribution of the war belts.  When Thomas Gage, 
at that time Governor of Montreal, was informed that belts were being 
passed amongst the Indians, he ordered Major Gladwin “to endeavour to get 
further information, & to find out the Principals concerned”.
42
 
This view that the French were responsible for inciting Native 
Americans to rebellion was common to many senior officers, and went hand 
in hand with the misconception that Native Americans would not take action 
unless prompted to do so by somebody else.   James Gorrell remarked on 
the “villainy used by the Canadians to corrupt the Indians and excite them 
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against the English” in order to keep the Indian trade for themselves.
43
  
Edmund Moran at Fort Edward Augustus reported to his superiors that “The 
Indians would do very well here, but for the Canadians, they Spirit them up 
to everything that’s bad against the English”.
44
  
This was another area where Amherst and his men differed.  
Amherst never believed that the French were responsible for causing unrest 
amongst Native Americans, but he believed that if Native Americans were 
threatened enough, they would behave.  When Gladwin reported his 
concerns about French troublemakers amongst Native Americans, he was 
disgusted that Amherst threatened to drive Native Americans “off the face 
of the earth” rather than “striking at the root” [i.e. the French].
45
 
 Just as they blamed the French for Native American demands for 
gifts, so most officers incorrectly blamed French traders and Jesuits for 
Native American attempts to restore the French Empire in North America.  
In reality, the effort was led by Native Americans; men like Pontiac were 
desperate for a counterweight to British power. As time went on and Native 
Americans realised exactly how harsh British rule could be, this desire 
grew.  In truth, the French were split; some helped and encouraged Native 
Americans to take up arms against their old enemy, while others, afraid of 
the consequences of another war, remained aloof or only helped under 
duress.
46
  The French also provided a convenient excuse for Native 
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Americans to blame when their plans and wampum belts were discovered, 
and one the British were all too ready to believe.  French traders were not 
the only ones who came under suspicion. Many army officers such as Henry 
Gladwin were sure it must be the Jesuits, who had long been missionaries 
amongst the Indians, who were causing the trouble.
47
   
William Johnson also saw the Jesuits as a troublesome influence on 
Native Americans. In 1762 he informed Amherst that Native Americans 
were being “inflamed by their Priests and Jesuits residing amongst them”. 
He added that “I am of opinion there are not wanting Emissaries, 
particularly amongst the Clergy who make it their business … feeding them 
up with expectations of the French becoming again possessed of the 
Country, as well as by every means which artifice can suggest to render us 
obnoxious to them.”
48
  Johnson and Croghan were of one mind on this. 
After hearing rumours of two Frenchmen moving through various tribes and 
urging them to attack the British, Croghan wrote 
 
“I … believe that the French living at the Ilonois [sic] 
Country and those residing at our different Posts over the 
Lakes have been endeavouring to Poison the minds of 
several of the Western Nations of Indians in Prejudice to His 
Majesty’s Subjects and endeavouring to Stir up all these 
Nations to Murder his Majesty’s Officers and Soldiers now 
in Possesion of the several Forts given up to his Excellency 
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General Amherst, by the Capitulation at Montreal on the 
Reduction of Canada.”
49
 
  
 Indian agents resented the influence Jesuit missionaries had over 
Native Americans, but, unlike most officers, were well aware that the 
occupation of the frontier, compounded by reductions in gift-giving, was the 
main reason for Native American anger.  Just before the outbreak of 
Pontiac’s Uprising Johnson wrote that the current troubles with the Indians 
“have been some time a brewing, and have been greatly occasioned by their 
meeting with much neglect & receiving few or no favours from Us, for 
permitting us to Occupy the Several Out Posts in their Country”.
50
 
With relations on the frontier already fraught, it was a poor time to 
be making more demands of Native Americans, but this is exactly what 
Amherst decided to do.  During the Seven Years’ War Native Americans 
had taken over 1,000 colonists captive, over 1,000 people from 
Pennsylvania alone, with one French official estimating that more than 
3,000 people had been taken captive from Virginia by August 1756.  A few 
had been tortured to death, but many more had been adopted and large 
numbers of them remained in Indian towns and villages.  Those adopted 
would take on the roles and family ties of dead Native Americans, whom 
they had been captured to replace.  Reactions to this sudden change in 
lifestyle and culture were mixed; while some longed for escape, others 
found much to admire in Native American society and quickly adapted to 
their new circumstances.  This change was made easier by the good 
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treatment they received from Native Americans, for as long as the captives 
did not try to escape they would be accepted into Indian society.
51
   
At the end of the Seven Years’ War many adoptees had been living 
as Native Americans for several years. They had married, had children, and 
the younger ones often could not remember a time before their adoption.  
Such people were perfectly content where they were, and had no wish to 
return to homes and lives that they could barely remember.  This did not 
matter to General Amherst. He, along with most officers and colonials, 
regarded these peoples as captives held against their will, whom the Indians 
were duty bound to free and return home.  It should be remembered that 
though these adoptees may have enjoyed their new lifestyle, they had often 
left behind devastated families who did not know whether their loved ones 
were dead or alive.  These people pressured the army and colonial 
authorities to return their relatives, and it was partly in order to help these 
deeply traumatised people that the army pressured Native Americans to 
return their captives.
52
 
In response Amherst let it be known that “I by no means Intend to 
leave any Subject of the British Crown, in the hands of any of the Enemy’s 
Indians; …the Kings Subjects Wherever I find them … I design to 
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release.”
53
  Yet he was demanding the nigh on impossible. Not only did 
many captives have no wish to return, Native American headmen had no 
power to force those families with captives to give them up.
54
  The Shawnee 
tried to explain the situation to Croghan, telling him in late 1761 that they 
had set all their “captives” free, but only five wished to return.  Croghan 
merely gave them more presents, in the hope that this would persuade them 
to return all their “captives”.
55
 
When the Native Americans of the Ohio Valley proved reluctant to 
return all their adoptees, Amherst’s response to the problem was to suspend 
all presents till the captives were returned.  He explained his thinking in a 
letter to Colonel Bouquet. 
 
“The Behaviour of the Indians in the detaining the Captives, 
Contrary to their repeated promises, is a very sufficient 
reason for suppressing all presents; and I am well convinced 
a due observation of this alone, will soon produce more than 
can ever be expected from Bribing them: we have a recent 
instance of this in South Carolina, where the Cherokees have 
at last delivered up all the English Prisoners that were 
remaining amongst them.  And this was brought about 
merely by laying a restraint on the Trade which accordingly 
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produced the desired effect, when Treatys, Bribes, and all 
other methods had failed.”
56
 
 
This decision greatly angered many already irate Native Americans, 
but it was not yet enough to push them into open rebellion.  For that, it 
would take a development that would crush all their hope of a peaceful 
removal of the British from the frontier. 
 The British take-over of the frontier was a disturbing event for many 
Native Americans, as was the defeat of the French in Canada, but while the 
Seven Years’ War continued there was always a chance that the French 
would be restored to power as part of a peace settlement.
57
  When in 1763 
the end of the war came, and with it the announcement that France had 
ceded control of Canada and the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys to the British, 
many Native Americans were deeply shocked. Not only was their father 
now gone, never to return, but lands the Native Americans considered as 
their own had been ceded by the French king.  When the news of the peace 
settlement reached the backcountry, the Native Americans’ mournful 
reaction stood in sharp contrast to British celebrations.  James Kenney noted 
in his journal that after the news was announced, “many of ye Indians seem 
more sober than they used their practice of singing & dancing was remarked 
to be ceased last Night.”
58
 Gladwin also observed the effect that news of the 
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peace had on those Native Americans he met, and suggested that maybe 
they should be given some rum and medals in order to raise their spirits.
59
 
 After hearing of the peace, the Shawnee changed their plans to bring 
in those “captives” still among them.  They hoped that their adoptees could 
also function as hostages and so prevent the army from attacking them.  On 
hearing that Britain would take possession of those French lands that they 
had conquered during the war, “they said plainly that the English would 
soon be too great a People in this Country.”
60
  Still Croghan tried to alert the 
army to the coming storm.  In March 1763 he wrote to Bouquet to warn him 
that if they were too much distressed by a lack of presents and the surrender 
of France, the Ohio Indians would not consider the consequences of a war 
with the British.
61
  Amherst did not care; he felt that as it was in the Indians’ 
interest to remain at peace with the British, their feelings on the French 
surrender were of “little consequence”.
62
 Rather, Amherst believed “they 
will on due consideration, Deliver up all the Prisoners agreeable to their first 
Promise, and not Drive us to the Necessity of using harch[sic] methods.”
63
  
This renewed drive to recover captives combined with the French surrender, 
coming on top of the occupation of the frontier, restrictions on powder 
restrictions and limits on gifts, was too much for many Native Americans to 
stand, and so they decided to go to war.  
Pontiac’s War was thus not caused by British efforts to dominate 
Native Americans.  British actions, such as the occupation of posts and the 
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insistence on the return of prisoners, were interpreted by Native Americans 
as a prelude to a full-scale attack on their society.  The British never grasped 
this.  While there were some officers who simply did not care what Native 
Americans thought, even those officers who did never realised the truth.  
Rather, officers hoped that Native Americans could be placated through 
diplomacy or by removing the French ringleaders, whom they held 
responsible for Native American violence.  Reducing the army’s presence 
on the frontier was never considered as an option.  The last chapter 
demonstrated that officers were prepared to protest when they felt their 
orders would result in trouble, but there were no objections from officers 
concerning the occupation of the frontier.  This implies that despite the 
efforts of some officers, there was a huge gap in understanding between 
Amerindians and the army in their midst. 
The main obstacle to understanding was the officers’ own prejudice.  
They were concerned by Native American anger, but did not credit Native 
Americans with the capacity to organise themselves to resist the British.  
They felt that this would only be possible with European help, as Native 
Americans lacked the intellect to do it themselves.  This prejudice allowed 
officers to blame the Native Americans’ attempt to confederate on the 
actions of French-Canadian troublemakers, when in reality it was caused by 
their own presence on the frontier.  Up until news of the peace deal reached 
the Native Americans there was always a possibility that the British would 
be forced to leave the frontier peacefully.   It was only once this was no 
longer an option that Native Americans chose to attack. 
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Chapter Five 
 Pontiac’s War 
 
The start of Pontiac’s War came as a huge shock to the British.  In 
the late summer of 1763, often using subterfuge, Native Americans captured 
nearly all the British posts in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region.  The 
subsequent war lasted nearly two years and brought about the removal of 
Amherst as commander-in-chief of North America.  The surprise attacks 
that began Pontiac’s War revealed a deep split in the British Army over the 
treatment of Native Americans.  Those on the frontier had trusted Native 
Americans enough to allow them access to their forts and even barracks in 
large numbers; in contrast, Amherst was deeply shocked by such behaviour.  
In response to the success of the surprise attacks, British officers announced 
that they would take no prisoners, should Native Americans be met in battle, 
and smallpox-infected blankets were issued to Amerindians.  The army felt 
such a monstrous response was justified because Native Americans had not 
followed European codes of behaviour in their previous wars with the 
British.  
Amherst was at a loss to explain the outbreak of war, but resolved to 
punish those Native Americans who had taken up arms so brutally that they 
would never dare to do so again.  Indeed, his plans went further than this: 
Amherst hoped to weaken Native American society permanently, so that 
war against the British would be beyond them in the future.  However, 
before Amherst could put his plan into action, he was ordered to return to 
Britain, and was replaced with General Thomas Gage.  Unlike most of his 
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officers, Gage did not blame Pontiac’s War on the French.  Rather, he 
supposed Native Americans had felt threatened by the cession of Canada to 
Britain, and so had gone to war in order to reduce British power.  Unlike 
Amherst, Gage did not believe Native Americans to be irrational, and he 
knew that the British Army was not strong enough to destroy the Native 
American ability to wage war.  Gage believed that Native Americans had 
gone to war in order to further their own interests, and so felt that to 
guarantee peace for the foreseeable future he had to convince Native 
Americans that war against the British was most definitely not in their 
interest.  Whereas Amherst had hoped to make war against the British 
impossible, Gage sought to make it unthinkable.  This he would do by 
making a show of British strength and then demanding a harsh peace.  Gage 
hoped that once columns of soldiers arrived in Native American 
communities they would feel so vulnerable that they would not only accept 
whatever terms the British offered, but that they would refuse ever to 
contemplate going to war again.  
The conflict that would later become known as Pontiac’s War began 
with a series of spontaneous and well-executed surprise attacks.  The term 
“Pontiac’s War”, brought into use by Francis Parkman, is a misnomer: 
religious leaders such as Neolin played a larger part than Pontiac in the 
genesis of the conflict.
1
  Pontiac himself was a follower of Neolin, though 
while Neolin hoped for an end to all contact with Europeans, Pontiac hoped 
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for the restoration of the old French father.
2
  As a result of the pluralistic 
nature of Native American society, there has been a great deal of historical 
debate concerning the war aims of those Native Americans who took up 
arms against the British.  While figures such as Neolin and Pontiac had 
many followers, there was no single person in charge of the Native 
Americans’ war, and so there was nobody to define the objectives of all 
those who fought.  Those who followed Neolin were fighting for the 
removal of all Europeans; others merely wanted the British removed from 
the frontier. But both groups would have fought alongside each other and 
alongside Native Americans who had heeded the call to arms for other 
reasons.  Amongst these Native Americans would have been those fighting 
to avenge past wrongs committed by British soldiers and settlers, in addition 
to young men who would have been fighting primarily to make a name for 
themselves.
3
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The War began in May 1763 with Pontiac leading a siege of Detroit 
which would go on to last six months.  At the same time as Pontiac 
launched his siege of Detroit, and without any central direction, other Native 
Americans were spontaneously seizing British frontier posts.  Most of these 
attempts relied on subterfuge rather than open attack, and they were widely 
successful until eventually the only British posts left in the north-west were 
Niagara, Pitt and Detroit.  Fort Pitt was in a perilous position as, though it 
wasn’t under close siege, communications had been severed and it was in 
danger of being starved out.  The whole British position on the Northern 
frontier was in the balance until Colonel Henry Bouquet defeated a Native 
American ambush at Bushy Run and so relieved Fort Pitt.
4
 
While they were fighting for a multitude of reasons, the Native 
Americans who went to war with the British were united in the tactics they 
chose.  Those Native Americans who planned the attacks knew that their 
best chance of gaining access to the British forts was to use surprise; once 
word of hostilities spread, the army would lock the gates, and the sentries 
would be alerted, making it much more difficult and costly for the attacking 
Native Americans to force their way into the posts.
5
  To prevent this, the 
attacks came unannounced, successfully taking the British by surprise in 
almost every instance.  So widespread was anti-British feeling amongst 
Native Americans that almost every attack took place without any warning, 
which would have required only one Native American to break their silence. 
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The only attack that was prevented by a warning was at Detroit. The 
identity of the person who alerted the British that a coming peace 
conference was in fact cover for a planned attack is disputed; it may have 
been an old Native American woman, or an officer’s mistress.
6
  Whoever 
was responsible for issuing the warning, it did its job and the attack on 
Detroit was the only one that failed.  All the other forts assailed by Native 
Americans were successfully taken.  At Fort Sandusky the garrison was 
massacred and the commander was taken prisoner after he sat down to 
smoke tobacco with some “of his own Indians.”  At St Joseph, a party of 
Pottawatomis gained access to the fort by asking to see their relations there, 
and then seized the commander.  The commander of the garrison at Miami, 
despite being warned by a Frenchman that he had heard cannon fire on his 
journey to the fort, was taken when he left the stronghold to visit a Native 
American woman, who he was told was ill and wanted the commander to 
bleed her.  Once the garrison learned their leader was captured, they soon 
decided to surrender.
7
  At Michilimackinac the fort was taken under cover 
of a ball game, with Native American women carrying weapons into the 
post concealed under their blankets.
8
  Venango was taken in a similar 
fashion, with the Indians “entering the Fort as friends, after which they put 
the garrison to the sword”.
9
  In the aftermath of their only failed surprise 
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attack at Detroit, the Native Americans there placed it under siege, and cut 
off the route to Fort Pitt.
10
   
The methods chosen by Native Americans for their attacks bring to 
light the fact that British posts often played host to large numbers of Native 
Americans;  after all, when planning a surprise attack the emphasis is on 
avoiding unusual actions that will alert your enemy that something 
untoward is going on.  If Native Americans had never visited British 
officers to smoke tobacco, or never congregated around British garrisons to 
play games, making plans that relied on the army allowing them to do so 
would have made little sense.
11
  The garrisons at those posts taken by Native 
Americans certainly did not feel threatened by allowing Indians access to 
their defences, or even barracks.
12
  Had there not been some degree of trust 
between the army and Native Americans, then the surprise attacks would 
never have been so successful.  Predictably, Amherst heaped scorn on those 
officers who had let themselves be deceived in this manner.  After he heard 
of the taking of Venango and Presqu’ Isle, he stated that it was “amazing 
that one officer should permit such a number of Indians to come in upon 
him as friends, and put himself in their power”.
13
  Amherst called the 
attitude displayed by some of his officers in dealing with Native Americans 
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a “most unaccountable Infatuation”.
14
  Clearly, those officers who had 
frequent visits from Native Americans had taken care to keep the extent of 
their relations with Native Americans hidden from Amherst, and their 
commander’s outbursts show that there was a huge gap between how 
Amherst expected his officers to regard Native Americans and the reality.  It 
was only because Amherst’s opinions of Native Americans differed so 
greatly from certain of his officers that he found their behaviour so 
inexplicable.   
Amherst struggled to explain not only the behaviour of his officers, 
but also what had motivated the Native Americans to attack in the first 
place. He settled on the surprising rationale that the British had treated 
Native Americans too leniently, and that this “kindness” had been 
misinterpreted as fear, going so far as to call the attacks “Ingratitude”.
15
  He 
never entertained the notion that the war might have been a response to 
Britain’s occupation of the frontier. 
While he struggled to suggest a cause for the war, Amherst had no 
doubt about how best to end it.  The outbreak of Pontiac’s War did not 
dissuade Amherst from his belief that he could alter Native American 
behaviour through severe chastisement.  Rather, he came to see the whole 
conflict as an example of Native American misbehaviour that could only be 
stopped by applying ruthless correction.  The commander-in-chief felt that 
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punishment was “very Requisite for the future good behaviour of the 
Indians” and would secure “Peace and Quiet” for the coming years.
16
 
Amherst’s war aims went beyond merely bringing Native Americans 
to heel through brutal treatment.  He hoped to “put it out of the power of the 
savages to Repeat their attempts [to remove the British from the frontier] 
with any degree of success”.
17
  This meant using the war to weaken Native 
American power by killing them and destroying their towns, so that they 
would have to accept subjugation by the British.
18
  It was this desire to 
weaken the Native American capacity to resist British domination which led 
to Amherst’s infamous order to Bouquet to infect Native Americans with 
smallpox, via blankets from the garrison’s hospital.  Amherst and others in 
the British army were well aware of the role disease was playing in eroding 
Native American power, and saw no objection to its use as a weapon, but 
their attempts were rendered ineffective by their own ignorance.  The 
garrison at Fort Pitt did hand out blankets from their smallpox hospital but 
this effort was most likely ineffectual, as the smallpox virus, Variola Major, 
thrives in cool and dry conditions, and not those of a summer in the Ohio 
Valley.  Native Americans were far more likely to catch smallpox through 
their contact with the disease-ridden garrisons of the British Army than 
through ill-conceived but deliberate attempts to infect them.
19
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Whatever the source, smallpox devastated many Native American 
communities around this time, and played a huge part in weakening Native 
Americans’ resistance during Pontiac’s War.  Killbuck, a Delaware, 
reported that the Shawnee alone had lost at least 150 people to the disease in 
1764.
20
  While the incident of the smallpox blankets is the most well-known 
of the British army’s barbarities, it was not the only time that Amherst 
ordered his officers to commit heinous actions against Native Americans.  
He had previously informed Bouquet that “I wish to hear of no Prisoners, 
should any of the villains be met with in Arms[underlining in original].”
21
 
Bouquet in turn proposed hunting down Native American “vermin” with 
dogs.
22
  
Proposals such as these, and Gage’s wish that the army would soon 
be able to “set all their villages in a Blaze”, highlight the fact that it was 
assumed by many officers that the rules or laws of war did not apply to their 
Native American opponents.
 23
  This attitude stems from the events at Fort 
William Henry during the Seven Years’ War.  After a European style set-
piece siege, this British fort surrendered to the French on 9 August 1757.  
Montcalm, the commander of the French force, extended lavish generosity 
to his opponents, as was common in Europe at the time.  They would hold 
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on to their muskets and private belongings and be allowed to return to the 
British as “parolees” having agreed that they would not take up arms against 
the French or their allies for the next eighteen months.  Despite the fact that 
this agreement would deprive their warriors of their expected scalps and 
booty, it was reportedly approved by those Native American headmen 
accompanying Montcalm.  When French soldiers began to lead the British 
away, they were surrounded by 1,600 Native American warriors desperate 
to claim what they believed were their rightful spoils of war.  In the ensuing 
struggle, at least 69 British soldiers were killed, mostly resisting Native 
American attempts to deprive them of their possessions, with a question- 
mark lingering over the fate of a further 115. With a total of 2,400 soldiers 
in the column that was attacked such numbers seem relatively small, but 
despite this the event soon became known as the massacre of Fort William 
Henry, and was to have a massive impact on the minds of British officers in 
America.
24
 
For many in the British Army the “massacre” quickly came to 
symbolise the savagery and duplicity of Native Americans.  Such ideas were 
reinforced by the “massacre” at Fort Loudon in the Cherokee War.  Upon 
the fort’s surrender, the Cherokees had agreed to allow everyone inside safe 
passage to Virginia or Fort Prince George.  Instead, the retreating column, 
which as well as soldiers included both women and children, was attacked 
and 27 men and three women were killed.  Once the fighting was done, 120 
were made prisoner, and one unfortunate was tortured to death.
25
  In the 
minds of many British officers, this cemented the view that Native 
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Americans were bloodthirsty and perfidious, and it was this view that they 
felt excused their own barbarous actions.  In short, many in the army felt 
that because they could expect no mercy from Native Americans they were 
justified in showing Native Americans none in return.
26
 
The assumption that Native Americans could never be trusted can be 
clearly seen in Amherst’s reaction to the news that many garrisons had 
surrendered once surrounded by Native Americans, rather than fighting to 
the death.  He confessed himself amazed that they “should be so infatuated 
to capitulate with them, or have the least Confidence in their promises or 
Mercy”.
27
  For him the very idea of trusting Native Americans was 
madness. When he heard of Ensign Christie’s surrender at Presqu’ Isle, the 
only explanation that Amherst could conceive of was that “his brains must 
have been turned”.
28
   Of course, such opinions were clearly not universally 
held; when faced with the option of fighting to the death or trusting to 
Native American mercy there were those officers who chose the latter, a 
choice they were unlikely to have made if they were convinced surrender 
would inevitably be followed by slaughter.  Still, the view that Native 
Americans could never be trusted was widespread. Gage warned that 
“Capitulation with Indians must ever turn out a massacre of the whole”.
29
  
For some officers, the idea that their comrades may have trusted Native 
Americans, even when the only other choice was certain death, was 
shocking and almost inexplicable.  
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Such opinions were only reinforced by reports that massacres had 
followed the triumphant Native American attacks that had opened the war.
30
 
Gladwin, who before Pontiac’s War had been one of those who had tried to 
persuade Amherst to adopt a more lenient policy, felt in the wake of the 
Native Americans’ surprise attacks that the army would be “fools as to trust 
them after what has happened … nor would I advise any future Commander 
to trust them so far as to put it in their power to hurt him.  So much for a 
worthless Race of People who deserve no Mercy at our Hands.”
31
  The link 
between British perceptions of Native American behaviour and their 
subsequent treatment was made explicit by Bouquet, who after hearing of 
the alleged “massacres” that followed the capitulation of several garrisons to 
Native Americans desired to “extirpate that Vermin from a Country they 
have forfeited and with it all claim to the rights of humanity”.
32
 
Like many of his officers, Amherst was furious that the first Native 
American attacks were spectacularly successful and caught the British 
entirely by surprise.  In response, there was little the army could do. With 
his troops scattered all over the country, it would take time before they 
could be concentrated and mount any offensive action; the necessary 
supplies had to be organised, taking more time, and the British were not 
even sure who their enemies were.  
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Amherst was convinced that the power of the British Army, with 
some help from colonial troops, would be enough to guarantee victory, and 
so he refused all offers of aid from Indian nations still tied to the British.  
When several tribes offered, through William Johnson, to send war parties 
against Britain’s enemies, the general refused to have anything to do with 
them.  At a face-to-face meeting with George Croghan he told him he would 
not employ them, as he felt there was not an Indian in America to be 
depended on.
33
 In a letter to Johnson Amherst declared that “their assistance 
is rather a dangerous expedient” and informed him “I can by no means think 
of employing them upon this Occasion”.
34
  He expressed exactly the same 
sentiments when writing to Murray in Canada: “I am so far from Desiring 
any Assistance from them [Canadian Native Americans], as many wish to 
do, that I have none to ask of them, but rather to desire they will give us 
none, but live peaceable and behave well, and they may be Assured they 
will be treated accordingly”.
35
 
For the British it was vital that they took action as soon as possible. 
Detroit had been under siege from the spring of 1763 onwards.  There was 
little chance that the fort would be taken by a Native American assault, but 
there was considerable risk of the garrison starving or running out of 
ammunition.  That July, in response, Amherst began assembling a 
concentration of troops at Niagara to send against those Native Americans at 
war with the British.  At the same time, Amherst began sending 
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reinforcements to Bouquet in Philadelphia, and ordered him to march to the 
relief of those posts that had been placed under siege.
36
   
 Bouquet set out for Fort Pitt in the late summer of 1763, and his 
march from Lancaster, in Pennsylvania, was the turning point of the war. On 
August 4, just short of the creek at Bushy Run, Bouquet’s column was 
attacked by a large force of Native Americans.  Their initial attack was 
repulsed, and Bouquet and his men formed up on a hill to better defend 
themselves, but were quickly surrounded.  The army managed to hold 
together until night brought a brief respite, but the attack resumed the next 
day.  The British were sustaining heavy casualties, and after many days’ 
hard marching the men were thirsty, but with no supply of water within the 
British lines the supplies they had been carrying quickly began to run out.  
Bouquet knew he had to try something, so he ordered some of his men to 
fake a retreat, in the hope it would encourage the Indians to advance into the 
open, where they could be destroyed.  The plan worked; the Native 
Americans made one failed attempt to break through the British lines before 
the shock of the first reversal and the casualties they had endured forced 
them to break off the attack.   Bouquet and his men reached Fort Pitt on  
August 10.
37
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 The men and supplies delivered by Bouquet saved Fort Pitt and 
preserved the British foothold in the west, but the casualties Bouquet’s 
column had sustained left him too weak to push on to Detroit.  Had the 
Native Americans succeeded in destroying Bouquet’s column or forcing 
him to turn back, they may very well have succeeded in their aim of 
removing the British Army from the west.  Native American morale was 
dealt a severe blow by Bouquet’s success, which had destroyed hopes of a 
quick and decisive victory.  In the winter of 1763, shortly after the relief of 
Fort Pitt, the Native Americans besieging Detroit sued for peace. Gladwin 
gladly accepted their offer.
38
  
In August 1763 Thomas Gage replaced Amherst, who returned to 
Britain.
39
  Gage’s priority was to secure a peace that would be safe and 
durable. Unlike most of his officers Gage believed that the war was not a 
result of French puppeteering, but an expression of genuine Native 
American anger.
40
  Many British officers believed that it was mainly the 
baleful influence of the French on Native Americans that had caused the 
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war, and that to ensure peace in the future it would make sense to limit 
contact between the two groups as much as possible.  Bradstreet felt that for 
a lasting peace the British must “wean them [Native Americans] from the 
French”.
41
  Another officer advised Johnson that “I would remove every 
Canadian from all out Posts to the inhabited Part of Canada, as also the 
Priests, to prevent their doing Mischief; I wish the same could be done with 
Respect to those at the Illinois.”
42
 
Yet such attitudes should come as no surprise, as “fear and loathing 
of Catholicism was deeply imbedded in Protestant culture”.  It was a 
common assumption at the time that a large network of Catholic spies and 
sympathisers not only existed in Britain, but were actively plotting to take 
over the country.
 43
  When the army moved to the Colonies, they carried 
these prejudices with them, and so were predisposed to see a Catholic hand 
in every disaster and reversal. 
The problem for this mindset was the existence of men like Pontiac:  
Native Americans who appeared not to be under the control of worldly 
Europeans, yet were still doing all they could to drive the British from the 
frontier.  As a result, British accounts of Pontiac always emphasise his 
unique status amongst Native Americans: almost an outside influence, an 
atypical demagogue, who had driven the otherwise peaceful majority Native 
Americans to war.  Amherst called him “the Chief Ringleader of the 
Mischief”.
44
  Gage informed Johnson that the Native Americans living on 
                                                           
41
 Colonel Bradstreet's thoughts on Indian Affairs. 4 December 1765 NYCD Vol. 7 pp. 690-
694. 
42
 Eyre to Johnson 7 January 1764 WJP Vol. 11 pp. 5-10. 
43
 Stephen Conway, War, State, and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). pp. 176-181. 
44
 Amherst to Gladwin, 10 August 1763, PRO WO 34/49. 
136 
 
the Illinois “were well disposed till Pontiac arrived about the beginning of 
that Month… [and] undid in one night,  What He had been doing for Eight 
Months.”
45
  As late as May 1765 Campbell was reporting that “all the 
Nations of Indians towards the Illenois[sic] are at present very ill disposed, 
and that, entirely owing to Pondiac, and some disaffected people that are 
among them.”
46
 Almost nobody in the army understood the consensual 
nature of Native American politics.  They did not realise that Native 
Americans would not follow leaders with whom they disagreed.  Many 
officers felt that, just as with the French, only once the baleful influence of 
Pontiac had been removed could there could be a lasting peace.   
 Amherst certainly thought it would be a good idea to get rid of 
Pontiac, and offered the soldiers at Detroit £100 if they could kill him.
47
  
When this failed to bring about his assassination, Amherst offered an 
additional £100 if Gladwin thought it would act as a greater 
encouragement.
48
  A huge sum of money at the time, Amherst would never 
have offered his men similar encouragement to assassinate a European 
officer, no matter how troublesome they were.  Gage was slightly more 
sanguine, opining that Pontiac “shou’d be gained to our Interest, or knocked 
in the head, He has great Abilities, but his Savage Cruelty destroys the 
regard we Should otherwise have for him.”
49
   
Gage shared with his officers a certain regard for Pontiac, and a 
distrust of the French.  He was glad they were to cede Louisiana to the 
Spanish, “by which we shall get rid of a Most troublesome Neighbour and 
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the Continent be no longer embroiled with their Intrigues.”
50
  He also 
proposed banishing the Jesuits from the “upper posts”.
51
  Yet though Gage 
shared his officers’ suspicions of the French, he did not hold them 
responsible for the war.  
This is borne out by Gage’s behaviour when two Frenchmen were 
arrested for carrying messages to the Illinois country and joining the Native 
Americans in their fight against the British.  Gage sent Gladwin at Detroit 
the powers to court martial the pair, but urged him to gather proof against all 
people suspected of such behaviour because “If the Indians conclude a 
Peace, He will have Plenty of Accusations against the French; The Savages 
will throw all the Blame on them to exculpate themselves; but they so blend 
Truth with Falsehood in their Narrations, that it is a difficult matter to 
distinguish one from the other.”
52
  Gage was prepared to believe the French 
settlers had been stirring up Native Americans, but he knew that the war had 
not been their creation. 
Unlike many of his contemporaries Gage realised how much 
resentment Native Americans felt towards the British.  He told Johnson that 
it was the “hatred” felt by many nations that had led them to believe the 
rumours spread by the French, and that they “had a fleet actually come up 
the River St Lawrence, I fear, there are few Nations who would not have 
taken Arms against Us”.
53
  Gage was almost alone amongst officers in 
comprehending that Native Americans might blame the French in an effort 
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to avoid culpability for the conflict.
54
   He was one of few within the army 
to agree with Johnson that Native Americans “do not give the true reasons 
for the Commissions of their Acts of hostility”.
55
   
Unlike Amherst, Gage had some idea as to why the war had begun.  
He knew that after peace was signed between Britain and France, Native 
Americans “saw us the sole Masters of the Country, the Balance of Power 
broke, and their own Consequence at an End.  Instead of being courted by 
two Nations, a Profusion of Presents made by both, and two Markets to 
trade at, they now depend upon one Power… Rude and uncivilized as these 
Savages are, they have had sense enough to perceive the disadvantages 
which must arrive from them”.
56
  Gage felt that Native Americans had gone 
to war with the British with the aim of weakening British power, as they 
saw British domination of the frontier as detrimental to their interests.  
While he looked down upon them, he still considered them to be rational, 
and so he felt it was important to appeal to their self-interest.  This is in 
contrast to Amherst, who had little explanation for why the war had begun 
because he viewed Native Americans as irrational.  Amherst’s efforts to 
weaken Native American power were a result of his denial of their 
rationality; after all, if Native Americans could not be trusted to act 
reasonably, then the only way to guarantee that they would not launch 
another illogical attack on the British was to put it out of their power to do 
so. 
Amherst was removed before he could bring his plans to fruition, 
and the task of ending the war fell to Gage, who unlike Amherst believed 
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that Native Americans could be reasoned with.  This meant that in order to 
bring the war to a close, and ensure it was not to be repeated, Gage would 
need to convince Native Americans that war against the British did not 
serve their interests in any way.  Bouquet had suggested that the best way to 
end the war and secure a lasting peace was to make Native Americans so 
afraid of confronting the British Army that they would not go to war against 
it again.
57
  Gage agreed and explained why in a letter to Halifax shortly after 
becoming commander-in-chief in 1763:  
 
“I am perfectly Sensible that the War we are now engaged in 
against the Indians, is ruinous and destructive, and that Peace 
can not be restored too soon, provided it can be made sure, 
and lasting; but in our present Circumstances, there is 
nothing can produce this Salutary End, but the carrying on 
an active and vigorous War against the Savages, till their 
Distresses shall oblige them to Sue for Peace, and that We 
have obtained a proper Satisfaction for the Injurys we have 
received.”  
 
It was only then that the “Measures of equity and Moderation… 
together with the Sense the Barbarians will retain of our Power to chastise 
Them, must doubtless secure its duration”.
58
  Note that Gage makes no 
mention of destroying the Native American capability to wage war.  Unlike 
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Amherst he knew that this was beyond the British Army, and so any peace 
would have to be a negotiated one. 
While Gage emphasised harsh measures, the Proclamation of 1763 
provided a note of reconciliation.  This document was the British 
Government’s temporary solution to the problems created by the end of the 
Seven Years’ War.  On top of the numerous letters that the government had 
received from men like Johnson and Gage during the Seven Years’ War and 
its aftermath, the document was influenced by the writings of Henry Ellis, a 
former Governor of Georgia who had returned to London, and had written 
several documents on the need for reform in the colonial system of Native 
American management.  Ellis was a mercantilist who favoured keeping the 
Colonies confined to the coast, as he believed that this would keep the cost 
of administration down and keep Native Americans happy.  Ellis also feared 
that if the Colonies were allowed to move too far inland they might become 
ungovernable, and so start moving inexorably toward independence.
59
  
Many men had influenced the development of the proclamation, but 
it was conceived by Charles Wyndham, Earl of Egremont, and drafted by 
the Earl of Shelburne, who both intended the proclamation as a basis for 
further growth.
60
  The idea of including the frontier in the government of 
Canada was proposed, but was rejected for the time being by the Lords of 
Trade, who felt that including the frontier in the government of Canada 
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could lead people to assume that the government only had rights in that area 
because of the conquest of Canada.
61
 
  The most important change contained in the proclamation was the 
provision for a boundary line which would define the limits of the Colonies.  
This was not new; implementing a boundary line had been discussed at the 
Albany Congress in 1754, and during the deliberations that produced the 
Treaty of Easton in 1758. In 1759 Johnson had suggested that the Colonies 
should settle boundaries with Native Americans, and “religiously” observe 
them.
62
  The boundary line, which was ill defined, ran approximately along 
the Appalachian Mountains, a barrier beyond which settlers had already 
moved.  Shelburne envisaged not an end to expansion, but a regulation of 
expansion.  The power to negotiate grants of land was taken away from the 
Colonies and private individuals, and reserved solely for the Crown.
63
  By 
taking direct control of land management the British Government hoped to 
keep Native Americans happy while keeping future expansion possible.  
This was a loss of sovereignty for both colonists and Native Americans, 
who now could no longer give or sell their land at their own discretion.  
 When they made the decision on temporarily halting expansion into 
the Ohio Valley, ministers did not believe that they could simply halt 
colonial expansion.  They hoped that it could be diverted into the newly- 
conquered and less contentious areas such as Florida, Georgia and Nova 
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Scotia.
64
  It was even hoped by some that Florida could be used to supply 
the empire with valuable semi-tropical products.
65
  The status of these new 
areas was outlined in the proclamation. The Province of Quebec was 
brought into being, consisting of the area of French Canada east of the Great 
Lakes, and Florida was divided into two provinces, with East Florida 
consisting of most of old Spanish Florida and West Florida of those areas 
west of the Apalachicola up to New Orleans.
66
 The government hoped that 
legal and secure settlement would be a more attractive option than an illegal 
squat prone to attack from Native Americans at any moment.  Pontiac’s War 
was not responsible for the Proclamation of 1763 but it did greatly speed its 
creation, and after news of the war reached Britain the proclamation was 
drafted in only six days, and was then dispatched from Britain on a specially 
detailed packet ship on October 11.
67
 
The new commander-in-chief was well aware that the new 
proclamation could go a long way to convincing Native Americans that 
peaceful coexistence with the British was their best option.  Upon receiving 
it Gage sent copies to those commanders of the various posts “with Orders 
to publish the same as Speedily as possible”.  He also transmitted a copy to 
Sir William Johnson, so he could explain it to those tribes who still 
communicated with him.  Gage was sure that the proclamation would 
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convince the Native Americans “of His Majesty’s Sincere Intention to 
favour and protect Them”.
68
 
In order to bring the war to a close Gage decided to stick to 
Amherst’s plan of sending two columns into Native American territory, but 
made some changes of his own.
69
  The British troops on the frontier were so 
weak and scattered that it had taken nearly a year since the first attacks to 
assemble a force that the British felt was large enough to risk sending 
against the Native Americans.  One column under Bradstreet assembled at 
Niagara, and contained around 1,000 provincial troops, 300 Canadians and 
1,000 regulars.  During the summer of 1764 this force was to secure 
communications with Niagara and then attack the Wyandots, who it was 
alleged supplied other enemy tribes with corn.  Bradstreet was then to 
proceed against the Shawnee and the Delaware, and from there down to 
Michilimackinac.  Gage had ordered Bradstreet to “chastise the Tribes who 
continue in Arms and to receive under His Majesty’s Protection, those who 
desire …. To conclude a lasting Peace with the British Nation.”
70
  At around 
the same time, and with the same mission, Bouquet and his force of 1,500 
men at Fort Pitt were to march on the Delaware, who were regarded by the 
British as one of their chief enemies.
71
   
The second part of Gage’s plan was intended to prevent Native 
Americans receiving supplies from the French.  For Gage the main worry 
was not the influence the French had, but the ammunition he believed the 
French in the south were selling to Native Americans. Many officers were 
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certain that Native Americans were getting their supplies from the French.  
Bouquet told Gage “it appears plainly that the Savages have brought Powder 
at the French Villages near Fort Chartres, and that they will continue to 
supply them in hopes to keep us out of that Country and exclude us from 
their extensive trade.”
72
  Gladwin felt that peace at Detroit would ultimately 
depend on the level of support and supplies that the Native Americans 
received from the French.
73
  Fraser at Kaskaskia told Campbell in 1765 that 
“The Indians would almost have made peace with us on our own terms 
before this convoy came up, as they were in greatest want of everything, but 
the French who intended to quit New Orleans, as it is credited to the 
Spaniards have sent all their goods up here”.
74
   They were backed up by 
reports from Indian agents such as Alexander Mckee, who blamed Shawnee 
insolence on expectations of supplies from the French.  Mckee reported that 
the French had sent supplies up to the Shawnee on at least 3 occasions.
75
 
Native Americans needed powder and shot not just to fight, but also 
to hunt.  The British had suspended trade at the opening of the war; if the 
French supplies of ammunition could be halted, Native Americans would 
have nowhere else to procure more.  Without ammunition those Native 
Americans at war with the British would be forced to make peace, or risk 
starvation and destruction.  Gage aimed to cut off supplies from the French 
to Native Americans, and then he hoped that Native Americans would be 
forced to make peace with the British, as they would be the only ones 
capable of supplying them with what they desperately needed.   
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Convinced that cutting off the Native Americans’ supply line was 
key to shortening the war, Gage tried everything he could to stop the flow of 
goods from the French in the south.  He placed watches on several rivers to 
try and intercept anyone supplying the Indians.
76
  In June 1764 Gage 
ordered Robert Farmer at Mobile to find some way of preventing the French 
from sending supplies to the Illinois without interfering with their right to 
navigate the Mississippi; exactly how Farmer was meant to achieve this was 
left to him.
77
  Amherst had written to Mobile in 1763 with similar orders, 
but attached much less importance to the matter; he considered that any 
supplies sent from there would “be but very inconsiderable, and would be so 
long of coming that it could not answer their present purpose” of aiding the 
fight against the British.
78
 
Though he felt that the French were not the main cause of the war, 
Gage was still keen to destroy the close relations that they enjoyed with 
Native Americans.  In order to drive a wedge between French colonists and 
Native Americans, Gage ordered that Bradstreet’s column be accompanied 
by a unit of Canadians.  William Johnson had suggested this to Amherst in 
September 1763, as had another army officer, hoping that once Native 
Americans saw British and French troops fighting side by side it would 
break “the chain of affection” between the two.
79
  Gage had previously 
suggested the idea to Amherst, who turned it down as he had been worried 
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that the Canadians would assume that the British needed them and so try to 
extract concessions from them.
80
   
Once Gage had replaced Amherst, he proceeded to put his plan into 
action.  A Canadian company was assembled and assigned to accompany 
Bradstreet’s expedition.  Gage informed Governor Burton: “I shall order 
Bradstreet to let them be the first to draw blood, and endeavor [sic] to make 
them as obnoxious to the savages as possible.”
81
  The new commander-in-
chief hoped to drive a wedge between the Canadians and Native Americans 
by forcing them into combat against each other.  If the Canadians were seen 
to be attacking Native Americans on the orders of the British, it would be 
much harder for them to pass themselves off as the Native Americans’ only 
true friends.  Whether the Indians found the Canadians obnoxious or not, in 
reality Gage’s plan had little effect in terms of souring relations between 
Canadians and Native Americans. 
As well as securing the assistance of Canadians, Gage made sure 
both Bouquet’s and Bradstreet’s columns were accompanied by friendly 
Native Americans.  In the spring of 1764 Gage had authorised the use of 
“friendly” or “allied” Native Americans against the enemy.
82
  Shortly 
afterwards, Gage begged Johnson to furnish Bradstreet’s expedition with 
some friendly Indians.
83
  Johnson was able to furnish Native Americans 
from those tribes who remained friendly to the British to accompany both 
expeditions. 
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 The critical moment of Bradstreet’s march came when he 
encountered and treated with a delegation of Shawnee and Delaware Indians 
at Presqu’ Isle in August 1764.
84
  He made a full peace with them, which, as 
well as demanding the return of all “prisoners” amongst the Native 
Americans and the condition that the Native Americans relinquish all claims 
to British posts in their country, also stipulated that in future all Native 
Americans suspected of a crime against the colonials would be tried by half 
Indian, half white juries.
85
 
When Gage was informed of the peace that Bradstreet had made, he 
was shocked and angry.  Gage refused to “ratify or confirm” Bradstreet’s 
peace, fuming that Bradstreet had never been empowered to make such a 
treaty.  The colonel only had the power to sign a ceasefire, and direct the 
enemy Indians to send delegates to Johnson, the only one with the authority 
to make a peace.  It was Gage’s nightmare that Native Americans would see 
any British concessions as a direct result of Pontiac’s War, and as a result 
would in future pick up the hatchet every time they felt they had a grievance 
against the British.   Now, not only had Bradstreet overstepped his authority 
but in doing so he had made a peace “Derogotory to the Honour and 
Reputation of His Majestys Arms Amongst the Indian Nations, unsafe for 
the future Peace and Tranquility of His Majestys Subjects, and the Basis of 
Future Massacres”. In order to prevent this, Gage was determined that any 
peace deal would be tough, and that it would only come after those Native 
Americans who had taken up arms had been convinced of the reality of 
British military power. 
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As far as Gage was concerned, Bradstreet had failed on both 
accounts; he had not managed to get close to any Native American 
settlements, never mind destroy them, and the peace he had brokered was 
far too lenient.  Gage was terrified that this peace would soon be broken by 
Native Americans looking for fresh concessions, who would feel that the 
army was no threat to them.
86
  Gage knew that the troops gathered together 
in Bradstreet’s and Bouquet’s columns would take many months to 
reassemble once they were dispersed, and so represented a singular 
opportunity to impress the strength of the British military on Native 
Americans.  If this chance was squandered and Native Americans were not 
sufficiently convinced of the might of British arms, then Gage feared they 
would resort to war every time they were unhappy with their treatment.  
Bradstreet had not made Native Americans suffer enough before signing a 
peace, nor had he demonstrated that it was in his power to make them suffer.  
Not only that, but Gage came to believe that the Native Americans had 
negotiated in bad faith with the intention of preventing him marching into 
their country.  Gage had two pieces of evidence to support his claim: first, 
that even after Bradstreet’s peace, Native Americans still continued to attack 
the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia;
87
 second, that the Indians that 
met with Bradstreet carried none of the usual diplomatic items such as 
wampum belts that they would surely have carried if they had been sent as 
envoys to make peace.
88
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  Bouquet’s expedition was much more successful. His column 
advanced through several deserted Delaware towns, and he then established 
a camp within striking distance of several occupied Shawnee and Delaware 
towns, where he made peace with the Shawnee, Seneca, and Delaware.
89
  
He proved that Native Americans could not remain safe from the British 
army by retiring into the woodlands.   Hard hit by disease and with winter 
approaching, these tribes could not afford to put their crops at risk by 
antagonising Bouquet, and so had plenty of reason to negotiate.
90
    Gage 
was ecstatic when Bouquet made his peace in the woods near the Shawnee 
and Delaware villages, for he had shown that these places were not beyond 
the reach of the British Army.  The commander-in-chief believed that this 
made the British Army a credible threat to truculent Native Americans, 
something which Bradstreet’s expedition, which stalled almost before it had 
started, had manifestly failed to do.  It delighted Gage that Bouquet had 
demonstrated to those Native Americans with whom he had dealt that it was 
within the power of the British army to destroy their homes and families.  
The general believed that this had enabled Bouquet to dictate sufficiently 
demanding terms, which the Indians could not refuse without putting their 
homes and families at risk. One of the main conditions of the peace was that 
the tribes should return all prisoners and captives amongst them.
91
  Gage 
told Johnson: 
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 “I am Convinced without marching into the heart of their 
Country, and shewing them we would Dictate a Peace on our 
own Terms, with that Firmness & Steadiness which Colonel 
Bouquet has kept up with them in all his Transactions, that 
we should have had no Peace at all.  His March threw them 
into a Terror & Confusion.  He has Obliged them to deliver 
up even their Own Children born of white woman. — Above 
Two Hundred Prisoners were in his Hands, & his Partys 
Collecting the rest among the Shawnese Villages…. Colonel 
Bouquet believes from their present Humble Dispositions 
that they are Sincerley Disposed for Peace; and they will not 
Easily break it, provided they are kept under proper 
management.  That no traders are permitted to go to their 
Towns to cheat them.”
92
   
 
Gage believed that Bouquet’s expedition had demonstrated to those Native 
Americans fighting the British that their villages were not safe, and that this 
realisation had robbed them of the will to fight.  Still, Gage was glad that 
Bouquet had stipulated “that the French are entirely Excluded from coming 
among them,” when making his peace with the Shawnee and Delaware, 
though the General admitted this “cannot be Effected till we possess the 
Illinois”.
93
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 The British still refused to trust Native Americans, and so Bouquet 
insisted that hostages were provided to ensure that the conditions on which 
he had insisted were met.  Bouquet took six hostages from the Delaware and 
six from the Shawnee; of the Shawnee hostages he sent one away, two fell 
sick so were sent back to their nation, and three ran away.
94
  Bouquet 
ascribed the flight of his hostages to their fear of punishment at British 
hands;
95
 given the brutal treatment that Native Americans sometimes 
received from British officers, this seems an all too plausible explanation.   
Rather than inspire the British to treat Native Americans better, the 
war convinced Gage that only by offering harsh peace terms would Native 
Americans be dissuaded from going to war again.  Gage informed Halifax 
that “for the sake of future peace, of a Peace which shall be sure and lasting” 
he had instructed Sir William Johnson to secure from the Chenussio, a 
particularly anti-British village of Seneca, “the Advisers of the War, or at 
least that the Murderers before demanded, should be delivered up.  And that 
an End might be put to all future Claims and Disputes about the Portage of 
Niagara, I demanded that the King’s Subjects should have the Right 
formally delivered up to them of a free and uninterrupted Transportation 
both ways, over that Carrying Place, without Fee or Reward, or Demand 
whatever of any Indemnification.”
96
  Johnson successfully secured the 
agreement of the Chenussio to these terms.
97
  Gage and Johnson took a 
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similar line with the Seneca, agreeing “we should accept of no Terms; 
unless they made proper Satisfaction for the Injurys they have committed”.
98
   
Part of Gage’s plan for a lasting peace was to make the British 
presence on the frontier more secure.  To this end he requested William 
Johnson to secure grants of land around the forts at Niagara and Pitt in his 
peace negotiations.  Gage then hoped to grant the land in lots to ex-soldiers 
and other reliable men who would be required to perform military service by 
the terms of the grant.  Thus there would be created a “Military settlement” 
around each post, supplying it with food and aiding its defence.
99
  So, far 
from encouraging the British to make new concessions, the war had in fact 
prompted Gage to make new demands from Native Americans. 
100
 
This is borne out in the terms that most tribes agreed to when they 
made peace with Johnson.  There were almost no stipulations in which the 
British ceded anything to Native Americans.  Instead the British generally 
demanded the return of all “prisoners”; the removal of all French and black 
people from Native American villages; increased cessions of land and free 
rights of navigation; and that whichever tribe they were making a treaty with 
broke off all contact with those who promoted war.
101
  The army was even 
able to send parties into Native American villages to ensure that all 
“prisoners” were returned.
102
  The outbreak of war inspired the British to 
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demand more control over Native Americans, including their inter-tribal 
diplomacy, and to dictate who they allowed into their communities.
103
   
The start of Pontiac’s War and the army’s reaction to it highlight the 
deep divisions that existed among officers in their attitudes to Native 
Americans.  The success of the surprise attacks suggests that some officers 
on the frontier trusted Native Americans to a degree, as does their decision 
to surrender to them.  Yet officers like Amherst were left aghast by their 
choices, unable to explain them without invoking insanity.  The fact that it 
was those officers who were actually on the frontier, who trusted Native 
Americans enough to allow them into their forts and buildings, suggests that 
prolonged contact with Native Americans softened their attitudes to them, if 
not vice versa. 
In the wake of the stunning success of the Native American surprise 
attacks, the British Army resolved to show them no mercy.  The smallpox 
blankets were issued, and no one disputed the fact that Native American 
villages were legitimate targets.   Undoubtedly some officers like Amherst 
were racist and needed no excuse to indulge in savagery, but for others it 
was the failure of Native Americans to adhere to European standards of 
behaviour that motivated them to act as they did.  The idea that it was 
ridiculous to hold another culture to their own invented moral code simply 
never occurred to the British. 
Neither did officers consider the thought that it was their presence on 
the frontier that lay behind the war.  Instead they chose to blame the French, 
the insidious puppet masters, on whom they could blame all their difficulties 
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with Native Americans.  Such an attitude saw Native Americans reduced to 
childlike and simple beings in the British imagination, always vulnerable to 
the machinations of smarter and more sophisticated Europeans.  It was 
fortunate that Gage, as the new commander-in-chief, was one of the few 
officers who did not believe that this was the whole story.  He was worried 
about French influence over Native Americans, but he credited Amerindians 
with the intelligence to be acting in their own interests, and this was why his 
chosen strategy was based on convincing Native Americans that war against 
the British would never be in their interest. 
The gap between Amherst and the officers on the frontier, and 
between Gage and his officers with regard to their views on Native 
Americans, makes it clear that within the British Army attitudes to Native 
Americans varied considerably.  In reality it was their experience and the 
situation in which they found themselves, much more than any preconceived 
notions of difference, which shaped British behaviour. 
This is confirmed by Gage’s actions.  He was desperate to impress 
the strength of the British Army on Native Americans while he had the 
chance, because he assumed that once the war was over the troops would 
again be scattered to their isolated posts.  It should also be noted that the 
two columns that Gage sent against his Native American enemies both 
chose to negotiate rather than fight.  This choice does not make sense if 
British officers’ only motivation was a hatred of Native Americans.  The 
actions of Bouquet and Bradstreet suggest that bringing the war to a speedy 
conclusion was a far greater concern for them than taking revenge on Native 
Americans for wrongs.  Ending Pontiac’s War had taxed the abilities of the 
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British Army to the limit, and maintaining the fragile peace that followed 
Pontiac’s War would not be any easier. 
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Chapter Six 
Gage’s Policy 
 
In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War the British Government’s 
overwhelming concern was economy, the importance of which ministers 
never tired of stressing in their letters to their subordinates.  Most in the 
government believed that the best way to keep expenditure down was by 
avoiding any more costly Indian wars.  Ensuring continuing peace was left 
to the Indian Department and the British Army in America.  The 
government had hoped to introduce a comprehensive policy to deal with the 
problems created by expansion in the west, which was detailed in 
Barrington’s plan of 1766.  Unfortunately, the plan was reliant on the funds 
raised by the Stamp Act in order to function.  When the Stamp Act was 
repealed, the government’s plan became unworkable. 
In the absence of a coherent policy for the frontier, the government 
settled for setting broad objectives and letting Gage and Johnson figure out 
the details.  The new commander-in-chief  knew how important it was to 
avoid another expensive Indian war.  After all, Amherst had just been 
removed for allowing a new war to break out and failing to bring it rapidly 
to a close.  Gage knew that if he did not want to be dragged home in 
disgrace he would have to avoid blundering into another Native American 
war.   
Gage believed that it was possible to win over Native Americans by 
listening to them and treating them with respect.  He hoped to win their 
acquiescence to the British occupation of the frontier by showing them that 
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their views would be taken seriously and their grievances dealt with.  His 
secondary aim was to separate them from French influence.  To fulfil this 
second objective, Gage was determined to take possession of the Illinois.  In 
order to secure Native American consent for Britain’s occupation of the 
frontier, Gage made sure to seek their approval before new settlements and 
posts were built. Once the posts were occupied, Gage expected his officers 
to provide Indian headmen with limited presents and deal with their 
complaints.  By these methods Gage hoped slowly to gain the trust of 
Native Americans, and so ensure continued peaceful relations.  Gage aimed 
to build trust in order to persuade Native Americans to accept British 
domination because he knew that the army lacked the power to force them 
to do so. To this end he was prepared to go against colonial governors and 
even his own officers in order to preserve the peace.   
The National debt had stood at £74.6 million at the start of the Seven 
Years’ War, and had almost doubled to £132.6 million by its close.  New 
taxes introduced in Britain in order to service the debt, such as the cider tax, 
were greeted with protest and resentment but the government desperately 
needed to increase revenue.  Even though Parliament had retained many 
wartime taxes after the war’s end, these were only just covering the interest 
on the debt, and without an increase in income the government would never 
be able to pay back the money it had borrowed to fund the war.
1
  On top of 
the debt created by the conflict came the cost of garrisoning the army in 
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America.  In 1765 the army had 10,000 men on the frontier, which was 
costing the British Government £360,000 a year.
2
 
Unwilling to burden themselves with yet more taxes, the landowners 
who made up the majority of Parliament decided to tax the Colonies in order 
to raise the money that the government so desperately needed.  To that end 
the government passed the Revenue Act and Sugar Act in 1764, and the 
Stamp Act in 1765.  The Mutiny Act, also passed in 1765, required colonists 
to feed, house and transport troops in certain circumstances, in an attempt to 
force Americans to meet some of the cost of garrisoning British troops in 
the Colonies.  Within Parliament itself these measures were not 
controversial, as nearly all MPs subscribed to the belief that Parliament 
could exercise its authority throughout the empire.  Most members of 
Parliament felt that it was only fair that the American colonists should help 
to pay for an army that was, in part, for their protection.  This attitude was 
summed up by Grenville during the parliamentary debate on the Stamp Act, 
who asked whether “These children of our planting nourished by our 
indulgence, until they are grown to a good degree of strength and opulence, 
and protected by our arms, will … grudge to contribute their mite to relieve 
us from the heavy load of national expense, which we lie under?”
3
 
Unfortunately, like many Native Americans the American colonists 
felt that the British Army was far more likely to be used to persecute them 
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than to protect them.
4
  In Britain those who questioned Parliament’s right to 
tax the Colonies, most notably William Pitt, were in a minority.  In America 
the reverse was true and many were aghast that the British Parliament, 
where they had no representation, would deign to tax them.  In reply MPs 
cited the theory of virtual representation, which held that places such as 
Birmingham which had no MP, and therefore no direct representation, were 
still represented by members of Parliament from other constituencies, who 
were supposed to consider the interests of those without MPs in addition to 
the interests of their immediate constituents.  The Colonies did not care 
much for this argument, and began to organise boycotts of British goods. 
Shaken by reports of riots in the Colonies and the potential economic 
disruption which boycotts could have at home, Grenville, who had 
introduced the legislation, was dismissed.  He was replaced by the 
Rockingham ministry which quickly repealed the Stamp Act, though 
Parliament quietly asserted the principal of their right to tax the Colonies in 
the Declaratory Act.
5
   
The government had been relying on the money raised in America to 
pay for their new plan for the frontier - the 1766 Plan for the West, drawn 
up by Barrington, but with the repeal of the Stamp Act the plan was 
unaffordable and so was never adopted.
6
  The government would not arrive 
at a new plan until 1768.  With the failure of the British Government to 
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produce a workable plan for the west, Gage was left to fulfil the 
government’s objectives in whatever manner he could.  
With the collapse of the 1766 plan Gage was forced to fall back on 
the policies outlined in the Proclamation of 1763, along with his own ideas 
and the rather vague instructions that he received from the government.
7
  At 
the beginning of 1764 the Duke of Halifax had informed Gage that “many 
Persons of Consideration, as well in America, as here, are of Opinion that 
the Indians have of late years been too much neglected, and that the 
Commencement, and Continuation, of their present Hostilities have been in 
a great Measure owing to an apparent Contempt of Their Consequence, 
either as Friend or Foe.”
8
    In 1767 Shelburne told Gage, “His Majesty’s … 
wishes that every means may be used to conciliate the Tribes, and be made 
sensible His gracious Disposition towards them.”
9
  The British Government 
did not just expect Gage to take Native American views into account when 
making decisions; rather, they hoped he would do whatever he could to 
avoid another costly war against the Native Americans.  
If the letters from London had not made the government’s wishes 
clear to Gage, then the fates of his contemporaries should have.  Amherst 
was removed not just because he failed to bring a speedy end to Pontiac’s 
War, but also because he allowed a conflict with Native Americans to begin 
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in the first place.
10
  Even though he might not have been informed directly, 
it seems unlikely that Gage would have been ignorant of the condemnation 
that Amherst had received at home.
11
  He would have been in touch with 
friends and family in Britain, not to mention those officers and politicians 
who were linked to him by patronage.  However it happened, the message 
got through, and when Gage heard that Governor Johnstone of West Florida 
was trying to start a war, he warned, “If Governor Johnstone is determined 
to bring on a war at all events let him answer the consequences".
12
  Gage 
knew that the governor was risking his career with his warmongering, and 
was no doubt little surprised when in 1767 the governor was recalled for 
that very reason.
13
 The fate of Amherst and Johnstone, combined with 
numerous missives urging the Crown’s officers in America to live in 
harmony with Native Americans, made it clear to Gage, the army and the 
Indian Department, that their political masters wanted peace with the 
Indians, and if they wanted to keep their jobs they would have to do all they 
could to achieve it, whatever they thought of Native Americans.
14
  
With the government’s financial situation so precarious, they were 
quick to make Gage understand that economy was a high priority - a 
message he made sure to pass on to his officers.
15
  Unlike Amherst, 
however, he knew there were times when expense could not be avoided.  
When Captain Murray gave presents to the Shawnee to consolidate their 
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friendship after the end of Pontiac’s War, Gage heartily approved as he 
knew “Expenses of this kind must be bore on such critical Occasions and it 
must be plainly told that they must either be approved of, or We must have 
war again.”
16
  So although Gage knew that economy was a high priority, he 
was also well aware that excessive penny-pinching would only lead to 
trouble and greater expense later on. 
The lack of a comprehensive government policy made Gage’s 
attitudes key, for he was not just the commander-in-chief of the army in 
North America, he also oversaw the running of the Indian department.  At 
the end of 1766 Shelburne explained to William Johnson that as 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the north he should correspond with, 
and obey, the commander-in-chief.  Shelburne reasoned that the 
commander-in-chief would be in contact with all the governors, so he would 
be in possession of the best information on which to make any decision.
17
  
This was not new, but Shelburne’s explicit instructions made it clear to both 
Gage and Johnson that the Indian Department was still subordinate to the 
army.  So Gage not only controlled the actions of the army, but also had to 
be consulted on major decisions made by the Indian Department. This 
makes understanding his thinking key to understanding the way the British 
conducted their relations with Native Americans in the aftermath of 
Pontiac’s War.   
Gage’s most important assumption was that Native Americans were 
rational beings, and his treatment of them was firmly based upon this 
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characterisation.
18
  Unlike Amherst, who had been unable to explain the 
outbreak of Pontiac’s War, Gage believed its roots lay in Native Americans’ 
rational fear of Britain’s growing power.  He told Halifax,  
 
“The Savages have been induced to combine so readily 
against us, not only by their Attachment to the French, and 
the Jealousies infused in them by that People, of our bad 
Designs against all the Indian Nations; But thro’ Motives of 
Policy, which would have engaged More enlightened 
Nations to take Measures, tho’ perhaps better concerted, of 
the Same Nature.  They saw us sole Masters of the Country, 
the Balance of Power broke, and their own Consequence at 
an End…. Rude and uncivilized as these Savages are, they 
have had sense enough to perceive the disadvantages that 
must arise to them, from the Conquest of Canada.”
19
 
 
Unlike most of his contemporaries, Gage possessed some 
understanding of why Native Americans were so worried by Britain’s 
annexation of Canada.  Gage was aware that Native Americans dreaded 
Britain’s “Extension over the continent by driving out the French, and think 
us too powerful Neighbours”.
 20
  He felt that Native Americans had gone to 
war in an effort to avoid becoming entirely beholden to the British.  The 
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new commander-in-chief held that Native Americans were aware of their 
interests, and he knew that they were prepared to go to war to protect them.   
Writing about Pontiac’s War later, Gage would argue that “the Savages have 
shewn (sic) us, that they understood their Political interest, extremely 
well”.
21
  He therefore set out to convince Native Americans that their 
interests were best served by a peaceful alliance with the British. 
The commander-in-chief believed that Native Americans would 
come to accept British domination given enough “time and Management”.
22
  
He hoped that “with proper care and management it is to be hoped that any 
suspicions of bad designs in us will entirely subside.”
23
  Gage believed that 
the recent conflicts between Britain and Native Americans, in particular 
Pontiac’s War, were the results of specific and correctable errors made in 
diplomacy with Native Americans.  In his mind these struggles were not the 
inevitable result of a clash of civilisations, races or cultures, and therefore 
they were avoidable, provided the proper steps were taken. Once he was 
commander-in-chief, Gage made it his job to ensure that Native American 
grievances were listened to, and that everything possible was done to make 
them happy in order to ensure a continuing peace. 
However, Gage felt his efforts to win the affections of Native 
Americans could only achieve limited success while Amerindians remained 
under the spell of their French father, and so one of his first priorities 
following the end of Pontiac’s War was taking control of the Illinois 
Country.  Fearing that unless the influence of their French father could be 
removed Native Americans would never be reconciled to the British, Gage 
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had made it a priority to take possession of the French posts on the river.  
These forts had been ceded by the French to the British at the end of the 
Seven Years’ War, but because the British had been unable to reach them 
they were still occupied by their French garrisons.  Gage believed that, left 
unchecked, the French inhabitants of the Illinois would continue to inspire 
Native Americans to make war on the British.  Gage’s worst nightmare was 
that those nations hostile to the British would move there, where succour 
and support from French traders would allow them to cause trouble for the 
British indefinitely.  Gage theorised that taking control of the area would not 
only allow the army to keep an eye on the French but would give the area’s 
Native Americans no choice but to make peace with the British, for “They 
will See Themselves Surrounded by our Forts, and that they Must depend 
upon the English alone, for all their Supplys.”
24
  Gage even went so far as to 
say “there is a good Prospect, if we get Possession of the Illinois and 
reconcile those Savages to our Interests, then we shall have no difference 
with any Nation of Indians upon the Continent.”
25
 
The methods which Gage instructed his offices to use when securing 
the Illinois would set a pattern for the way he also ordered his officers to 
behave when dealing with occupying new land on the frontier.  Gage 
believed that the best chance of taking the Illinois would come from 
negotiating with Native Americans to securing their consent for the British 
occupation of the posts.  The British expedition would attempt to reach the 
posts by travelling north from the Mississippi.  Gage instructed the officer in 
charge, Farmar, to use “flattering Speeches and Presents” when he met those 
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Native Americans local to the area, in order to “obtain their free Consent to 
our passing up and down the Mississippi without Interruption.”  If that did 
not work, Major Farmar was authorised to “make use of Threats” and use 
the friendly Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes to force the Illinois tribes to 
accept the British invasion, as long as he did so “without bringing on a 
general War; which He will take every Precaution to avoid”.
26
  These 
instructions reveal Gage’s priorities clearly.  He favoured diplomacy when 
dealing with Native Americans, and felt that force of arms should be a last 
resort, and only considered if it was certain that the conflict would not 
spread. 
Farmar failed in his attempt to “take” the Illinois, and it was not until 
Croghan made a voyage down from Fort Pitt that the British made any 
headway in taking control of the forts.  In the wake of Pontiac’s War, 
Croghan had managed to secure the assistance of a group of Shawnee 
headmen in his voyage.  Once underway, they were attacked by Illinois 
Indians, who killed three of the Shawnee and took the rest of the party 
prisoner.  Upon realising what they had done, and terrified of war with the 
Shawnee, the Illinois Indians promptly freed Croghan and the remaining 
headmen, and begged the British to make peace between them and the 
Shawnee.  This they did, while at the same time securing the southern 
Indians’ permission to occupy the French posts.  Once this had been 
achieved, Captain Stirling and 100 men from the 42
nd
 regiment set out to 
relieve the French garrisons.
 27
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It was not just the garrisons in the south that worried Gage. 
Throughout his time in charge, he continued in his efforts to remove French 
influence from Native American communities.  In 1767 he told Johnson that 
“If we could prevail upon the Indians to bring in all the French familys 
settled amongst them, it would be a good service."
28
  While the commander-
in-chief may have wished French traders gone from the frontier, in reality 
there was little which his efforts could have achieved. In 1769 Gage was 
complaining that the French were still among the Indians of “whose 
Machinations Sir William Johnson makes constant Complaints”.
29
 
There were many senior officers who agreed with Gage’s policy of 
removing the French from the frontier.  In 1767 Turnbull complained that 
the French around Detroit were still poisoning Indian’s minds, and that "the 
removing of them entirely would be much in our interest.”
30
  Tayler 
believed that if the French traders from New Orleans were removed then the 
nations in the south would “remain on a peaceable footing with us”.
31
  Guy 
Carleton hoped that one of those Canadians who he believed stirred up the 
Indians would be caught and prosecuted, which would serve as an example 
to the rest.
32
 
Still, though Gage felt French trouble-makers exacerbated the 
friction between the army and Native Americans, he was well aware that 
they were not the cause of it.  When in 1769 it looked as if there  might be a 
new Indian war, Gage told Johnson, “As for their Jealousy of our Power, 
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Intrigues of the French and their attachment to them, those Circumstance 
may require Some management on our part, but I think can not alone be the 
Occasion of a Rupture between us.”
33
 
The new commander-in-chief knew that the removal of the French 
from the frontier would have little effect unless the army made a serious 
effort to win Native American hearts and minds.  Once of the biggest 
changes that Gage instituted was to restore gift-giving.  Gage recognised 
that Native Americans should be given “occasionally some small Presents” 
but that the amount should be strictly controlled, to prevent the British 
becoming “Tributarys, by giving them a Profusion of Presents, whenever 
they chuse(sic) to be angry”.
34
  Gage knew that his officers were bargaining 
from a position of relative weakness, and that this encouraged many of them 
to forget economy and instead hand out gifts without restraint, in an attempt 
to avoid angering those Native Americans amongst whom they lived.  The 
new commander-in-chief, aware that gift-giving was necessary but anxious 
that it should not spiral out of control, let his officers know that they should 
hand out only a limited number of presents.  He instructed one officer with 
respect to treating Indian tribes, “We should assist them when in want, & at 
all time treat them with kindness & humanity without suffering them to 
impose upon us or becoming their dupes.”
35
  In a later letter he was more 
direct, ordering that “Presents are not to be given profusely, but with a 
sparing hand”.
36
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There were certainly those amongst Gage’s senior officers who 
agreed with him about the necessity of presents.  In the summer of 1765, 
after most tribes had made peace with Sir William Johnson, Campbell 
assured Johnson, “I shall use my Utmost endeavours duering my stay here 
to preserve the Peace and Tranquility that Subsist at present, and show the 
Savages all the Civilities in my Power, particularly to Pondiac.  I could wish 
to have it in my power to give a few Presents to some of their Chiefs when 
they come to see me with some of their Tribes, otherwise it will be 
impossible for me to Treat them as I could wish.”
37
  Bouquet acknowledged 
“we have evidently brought upon us this Indian war, by being to saving of a 
few Presents to the Savages, which properly distributed would certainly 
have prevented it.”
38
 When Colonel Bradstreet set down his thoughts on the 
best way to treat Native Americans, he recommended that:  
 
“The Officers at all Posts, where the Savages frequent, 
should be enabled to treat particulars, such as Chiefs and 
well affected, with a little Rum, Pipes & Tobacco, with 
provisions in cases of necessity; they having been 
accustomed to much more from the French, & expect it from 
us; the expence is a trifle, but the want of that Civility may 
be severely felt.”
39
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These officers’ acceptance of Gage’s policy stands in stark contrast 
to the flood of protest that greeted Amherst’s attempts to outlaw gift-giving. 
Gage knew that it would take more than a few presents to make Native 
Americans into British allies, and the new commander-in-chief held that for 
relations with Native Americans to run smoothly, close co-operation 
between the Indian Department and the army would be key.  Gage valued 
Indian agents highly, and considered their expertise, experience and 
intelligence essential for successful interaction with Native Americans.  
Throughout the time he was in command, Gage gave great regard to Indian 
agents and their knowledge.  Even during Pontiac’s War Gage was telling 
Johnson, “The Number of your Deputys, Interpreters &c should be 
increased, and the Several Nations with whom they are to deal, allotted to 
them.”
40
  When Major Farmar was sent down to the Illinois Country, Gage 
was worried that he was, “not very knowing in the Treating or Management 
of Indians, so that I wish Mr Croghan was sent out.”
41
  As soon as the war 
was over Gage told Johnson that he wanted people who could “manage” 
Indians at the principal posts, particularly Detroit.
42
  In the south, he told 
Stuart that he should issue instructions to all the officers in his district 
concerning how to treat Native Americans, and should  “inform them of the 
policy and interest of the several tribes, & how they are connected, and 
disunited with each other.  All which it is necessary every person should be 
acquainted with, who carries on our affairs with the Indians.”
43
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Gage felt that mistakes had been made in past dealings with Native 
Americans, and that these mistakes could be avoided by the application of 
the knowledge that Indian agents possessed.  Rather than blaming friction 
between the army and Indians on Native American arrogance or stupidity, or 
on a clash of cultures, Gage saw at least part of the explanation in his 
officers’ own ignorance.  If he could remove that ignorance by forcing his 
officers to listen to their Indian agents, Gage hoped that he could ensure, or 
at least increase, the chance of good relations between the British Army and 
Native Americans. 
Gage’s contention that peaceful coexistence was possible as long as 
Native Americans were treated well can be clearly seen in his orders. Gage 
wanted everyone under his command to understand that it was vital that 
Native Americans were handled respectfully.  The new commander-in-chief 
considered this crucial in keeping the peace.  In his own instructions to 
officers at garrisons, Gage always emphasised treating Native Americans 
with respect.  He told Robert Bayard, who relieved the previous garrison 
commander at  Detroit in 1766, “I cannot too strongly recommend it to you 
to treat them with kindness and humanity, avoiding too familiar an 
intercourse with them, and that you will give out orders effectually to 
prevent their meeting any insult, or their being treated churlishly, or with 
rudeness or contempt”.
44
  Gage knew that if Native Americans were to be 
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kept happy, they would have to be treated well, and so that is what he 
ordered his officers to do.  He told Major Farmar that “it behoves Us to do 
everything to please these people [Native Americans], & avoid every 
occasion of quarrel.”
45
  Those officers who did what they could to please 
Native Americans quickly won their commanders’ approval; Gage told 
Bouquet, “Captain Murray does very well to Cultivate that 
[friendly]Disposition, by showing them [the Shawnee] favour, and receiving 
them in a Friendly manner.”
46
   
Other senior officers echoed Gage’s concern over the treatment of 
Native Americans.   Even before the end of Pontiac’s War, Bradstreet was 
ordering that “it is absolutely necessary they [savages] be treated with 
civility moderation and kindness whenever they come here [Detroit] that 
you hear them patiently [and] see justice done them in their trade”
 47
   One 
officer reported to Gage that he had instructed the commanders of the 
garrisons in his area to “treat the Indians who come to their posts in a 
friendly manner civilly”.
48
  Finally, the engineer Harry Gordon praised the 
good treatment which the Seneca received from the commander at Niagara, 
calling such conduct “very necessary”.
 49
  While such sentiments were 
hardly universal amongst officers, these letters make it clear that Gage was 
far from being alone in his desire to see Native Americans treated with 
respect by the British Army. 
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Part of Gage’s plan to keep Native Americans happy was to provide 
them with access to well-regulated trade.  Under the rules outlined in the 
proclamation, colonial governors would issue traders with licences.  As well 
as obeying the proclamation and all laws regarding trading with Native 
Americans, governors were free to attach conditions to the licences that they 
issued, which the traders also had to obey. Upon purchasing a license the 
traders left a deposit, which they would forfeit if they broke the conditions 
of their licence.
 50
  In order to ensure that the traders were behaving, 
commerce would be confined to the army’s posts so that it could be 
overseen by Indian commissaries operating in concert with army officers.
51
  
It was felt to be better to ban traders from going into Native American 
communities as there was no way to control their activities once they were 
there. 
Gage ordered the officers at the posts to offer all assistance to the 
commissaries as they tried to protect the traders, prevent Indians being 
cheated, stop the sale of rum and spirits, and enforce the conditions of the 
traders’ passes.  Unfortunately for the army, this plan for trade failed to win 
the support of either traders or Native Americans, the two groups on whose 
co-operation it depended for success.
52
  Traders were not pleased with being 
restricted to forts, particularly those from Quebec, as they had been allowed 
to travel to Native American villages when they were under French rule.
53
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Despite many complaints from these and other traders about being confined 
to the posts, Gage refused to alter the rules keeping them there.
54
 
Yet just as when Amherst was in charge, British officers would 
break the rules set by their commander if they felt that it would help keep 
the peace.  One officer in Canada had let a few traders go out to Native 
American communities as he felt that the Indians were in great want of 
goods, and feared that the Native Americans would resort to violence if 
nothing was done.  Those traders not permitted to go were furious and 
complained loudly to anyone who would listen, including General Gage.  In 
response, Gage reminded his subordinate of his orders, which he ruefully 
agreed to obey.
55
 
The officers were well aware that one of the Amerindians’ main 
grievances before the war had been the abuses of the fur traders, and so, in 
agreement with Gage, they considered it important that once the war was 
over the fur trade should be overseen properly, to ensure it was honest and 
open. This, it was hoped, would keep Native Americans happy, and so 
reduce the chance of future conflict.  Officer William Eyre proposed that 
officers “by Way of Magistrate to see Justice done between the Indians and 
the Traders”, should be stationed at posts.
56
  Bradstreet suggested that there 
should be a court at Detroit so that “Offenders, Inhabitants, Indians, Indian 
Traders & others, might be brought to justice, and punished by a Law that 
might prevent litigious suits, and satisfy the Savages, that the stricktest[sic] 
justice is done them at all times.”  Furthermore, as “the Savages have a 
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contemptible opinion of all Indian Traders”, Bradstreet proposed that “it is 
therefore necessary the Officers commanding at the Posts should not Trade, 
but inspect into the Trade, prevent abuse, and bring offenders to that justice 
the Law may require, by this, they will be respected, and beloved by the 
Savages.”
57
 
The officers at the posts did what they could to regulate the fur trade, 
but it was not an easy task.  In Florida a trader refused to refund a Choctaw 
who claimed that a kettle which he had been sold had had a fault in the 
chain.  An officer ordered the trader to give the Indian a new kettle, but the 
trader refused.  After refusing three times to exchange the kettle, the trader 
was confined to a “vaulted dungeon too bad for the worst of criminals”.  
The man was freed after nine hours when he agreed to exchange the kettle, 
and was told he would only be allowed to continue trading if he paid a 
security to the army to guarantee fair dealings in future. This he refused, and 
instead left the province.
58
 
Traders at Detroit were also refusing to obey the regulations. They 
argued that they only had to obey Acts of Parliament, which left them free 
to ignore the Proclamation of 1763.  To make matters worse, only two of the 
traders at the posts had bothered to obtain a licence from a governor.  
Turnbull, the officer in charge, despaired that clandestine trade was carried 
on with “impunity”.  In order to bring some order to the chaos Turnbull 
proposed that the traders leave a bond of 500 pounds of New York currency 
with him, which he would return as soon as they produced a government 
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licence.  They all refused.
59
  A month later Turnbull reported that "they 
[traders] have been worse and worse every day.  Trampling upon all order or 
authority whatsoever in short I was under a necessity of Confining Two of 
them for a breach I may say of every order or regulation.”
60
 
Worried that attempts to enforce the regulations might leave his 
officers open to law suits from traders, Gage ordered them to let the 
commissaries take the lead, and with it the risk of being sued, in all cases.
61
  
Gage felt that the problem stemmed in part from colonial governors, who 
did not impose strict enough conditions on the traders when they issued 
them passes.  Again, he ordered his officers not to interfere in such cases, in 
view of potential legal problems. 
62
  Gage was right to be worried. In 1767 
he was told by Stewart, the Indian Superintendent for the Southern District, 
that the colony of Virginia, “Jealous of the Liberty of the Subject, have 
Appointed Commissioner to manage the Indian Trade, and will not Suffer 
the Traders to be Subjected to any Regulations or Restrictions whatsoever.”  
Charitably, Stewart believed that Governor Fauquier had only undertaken 
this action as he had not received a copy of the proclamation, and so he sent 
the governor instructions and information regarding the regulation of the 
Indian trade.
63
 
The commander-in-chief desperately wanted to be able to control the 
fur traders, but felt unable to do so under the current regime.  The problem 
was that the authority and jurisdiction of the Indian Department and the 
army were ill-defined and weak. As a result, whenever they tried to take 
                                                           
59
 Turnbull to Gage, 10 January 1767, Gage Papers WLCL. 
60
 Turnbull to Gage, 17 February 1767, Gage Papers WLCL. 
61
 Gage to Brown, 17 November 1766, Gage Papers WLCL. 
62
 Gage to Massey, 15 September 1766, Gage Papers WLCL. 
63
 Gage to Shelburne, 20 August 1767, Gage Correspondence, Vol. 1 pp. 144-145. 
177 
 
traders to task for cheating Native Americans, or ignoring the regulations, 
they faced legal challenges.  Frustrated by this, Gage proposed to the Board 
of Trade “That they must be restrained by law, and a judicial Power 
Invested in the Officers Commanding at the Posts, to See such Law put in 
force.  And without this, Regulations may be made, but they will never be 
observed."
64
  By the beginning of 1768 Gage felt that “The framing new 
Laws in the Provinces, and inforcing Obedience thereto, for the better 
Securing the Indians in their Persons and Properties, seems a most essential 
Point”.
65
  The expenses of any potential war against disgruntled Native 
Americans meant that for Gage, at least, Native American concerns took 
precedence over colonial ones. 
In addition to providing plentiful and honest trade and treating 
Native Americans with respect, Gage believed that only if Native 
Americans’ concerns were listened to and addressed could peace be 
maintained.  For many Native Americans, their greatest worry was 
European settlers’ designs on their land.   Establishing new Colonies in the 
interior of America was not part of Gage’s agenda, and neither was making 
large additions to those Colonies already in existence, but he was not against 
new settlements per se.  Gage felt that new communities that served some 
useful purpose, such as helping to feed the army, should be allowed as long 
as they could be established without antagonising the local Native 
Americans.   
After the army took possession of the posts on the Illinois, French 
settlers and Indians began to move away. Gage told Johnson that if this 
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should continue, the army would need and welcome new settlements to feed 
the garrisons there, “using necessary precautions to avoid disputes with the 
Indians”.
66
  When Gage gave the go-ahead to such settlements, he usually 
did all he could to ensure that Native Americans were informed and, if he 
thought it necessary, that they approved of any settlement.  When Gage 
decided to allow a farm at Little Niagara (Fort Schloser) to feed the cattle 
there, he told Johnson, “It may perhaps be necessary that the Seneca Should 
be apprised of it, and told on what Account it is done, and that it is not 
undertaken with a view to make or begin any settlement there.”
 67
   
When officers attempted to annex land for the use of the army on 
their own initiative, Gage insisted that they could only do so with Native 
American consent.  In 1768, when Mr MacDougal wanted to occupy Hog 
Island in the straights just outside Detroit with a farm to feed the garrison 
there, the commander-in-chief once again put his policy of certifying Native 
American consent into action.
 68
  Gage issued detailed instructions to 
MacDougal on how to proceed “in your Presence by Indians concern’d in 
the property of these Lands to which you must sign the marks of their 
Tribes, and you will certify the same to be done by you under my authority 
and in your Presence.” This would ensure that consent for the new farm had 
been obtained and recorded.
69
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It was the same when new posts were to be established: Native 
American approval had to be secured before construction could go ahead.  
Gage instructed Archibald Robertson, the engineer in charge of establishing 
a post at Iberville, that “As the friendship of the Indians is to be conciliated 
by every means in our power so you will use every Endeavour to obtain 
permission from those who may claim a right to the land before you begin 
any work.”
70
  It all came down to trust.   Gage wanted Native Americans to 
trust the army. He knew that without trust Native Americans would never 
accept the continued presence of the army in the west.  For this reason he 
ordered his subordinates to inform Native Americans of new settlements, 
and secure their permission before constructing new forts; this he hoped 
would build trust, and that this trust would lead to acceptance. 
It was not just the construction of new forts or settlements that 
required consultation with Native Americans; as far as Gage was concerned, 
it was any issue that might cause them worry.  When Gage heard that British 
vessels sailing across Lake Huron had panicked the Chippewas in the area 
and caused them to move away, he instructed Campbell to “try to calm the 
Indians fears, [and tell them]the vessels are for their benefit as well as ours, 
as they can carry great quantities of goods.”
71
   In his efforts to win over 
Native Americans, Gage even attempted to portray action taken on the 
orders of Whitehall as being undertaken at the request of Native Americans.  
When Gage received orders that the troublesome (for the British) French 
settlers around Post Vincent should be removed, he instructed Johnson to 
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give the Indians there “Some Specious Reasons for it, that tend to their 
Benefit and our own” so that good relations could be preserved.
72
 
Although Gage may have been anxious to keep Native Americans 
content and avoid any more wars, he did not necessarily believe that they 
had rights to all the land they claimed.  Rather, the general believed that 
Native Americans held the rights to discrete parcels of land, either due to 
their habitation there since ancient times or through the right of conquest.  
In the case of white settlements in the Illinois Country, Gage told George 
Croghan that the local Indians had no right to object as “these lands were 
never theirs, they followed the French there and sat down upon them … 
And never received or demanded from the French anything for them, of 
course [they] have no right to them nor ought we have any thing to do with 
purchases from them as in other parts of the continent.”
73
  In essence, Gage 
argued that because the Indians had settled on these lands only recently, 
they had no claim to them and therefore could not sell them.  Gage felt that 
as the Native Americans had not charged the French for establishing 
settlements there, they had established a precedent.  Gage was worried that 
if Native Americans realised that they would receive gifts when outposts 
and settlements were built on their land, then they would start to claim land 
that they had no right to in order to get more gifts.  In his orders he 
specified, “We must not pretend to seize what is really theirs by Force, or 
yield implicitly to their demands, of all which they pretend to belong to 
them.”
74
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In cases where true ownership of the land was in doubt, Gage 
believed it was best left to the law.  The general never made any attempt to 
exclude Native Americans from the legal process; in fact quite the opposite, 
as he encouraged Native Americans to use legal avenues to recover their 
lands.  When he had been Governor of Montreal, he had encouraged Native 
Americans to engage in a law suit against the Jesuits.  The Jesuits had been 
granted land by the French government to aid their missionary work, upon 
which Native Americans could settle, but nobody else.  Counter to this 
condition, the Jesuits had been renting out some of the land to French 
tenants.  The Indians took the matter to Gage and he called a council to 
determine the matter, which found in their favour.  Gage was well aware 
that by taking the side of the Native Americans and exposing the duplicity 
of the Jesuits, he would go a long way to winning the Native Americans’ 
trust.
75
  Gage learned this lesson well, and put it into practice when he was 
commander-in-chief. 
     Gage adopted the same position during a similar case in 1766.  Johnson 
wrote to inform Gage that a Mr Cartier had told the Caughnawaga to leave 
their land; Cartier had a deed to the land, but Johnson had doubts as to its 
validity.
76
 Gage replied that he thought the whole thing was a trick and that, 
should the claim be genuine, evidence would be found in the registers of the 
French government still located at Quebec.   Gage advised Johnson that 
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“you should lay all this Matter before the Governor of Quebec without 
Delay, and desire that the Indians Rights may be defended in the best 
Manner, and carried as far as it will be proper to pursue it, of which the 
Lawyers will be the best judge.”
77
  The basis for this recommendation was 
Gage’s belief that Indians did have very limited rights to discrete areas of 
land and that they should have recourse to the legal system.   
Though it might have been expected that Gage would dispute French 
land claims, this was not the only time he sought to defend Indian land 
rights.  When he received reports that officers at Detroit and on the Illinois 
had been granting lands to white settlers, Gage acted quickly and annulled 
all the grants.  He argued that such a power to make grants of land lay only 
with the Crown, and he was “not Satisfied that it is His Majesty’s Pleasure, 
that the Increase of the Settlements should be encouraged”.
78
  The 
commander-in-chief had not taken this case to the courts, but then there was 
no need to do so, as he could simply order his subordinates to annul the 
grants.  Gage was prepared to assert Native American land rights, not just 
against the French, but against his own officers, because he knew that it was 
only by making Native Americans feel secure that the peace would 
continue. 
Gage was a mercantilist who believed that further expansion of the 
Colonies, only possible by taking land from Native Americans, would not 
benefit Britain or the Crown whom he served.  Gage argued that new inland 
colonies would be too distant for profitable trading, and the Colonies would 
begin to manufacture goods themselves in order to supply their needs.  This 
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would break their links with and dependence on the mother country, and 
perhaps even lead to independence.
79
  Rather, he believed, it was “for the 
Interest of Great Britain, to confine the Colonists on the Side of the back 
Country, and to direct their Settlements along the sea-Coast, where Millions 
of Acres are yet uncultivated”.  Not only would it be better for Britain to 
confine the Colonies to the coast, but Gage questioned whether any move 
inland “could be effected, without an Indian War, and fighting for every 
Inch of Ground”?  Rather, he felt it would be better to leave the Indians in 
peace and trade with them, as “Our Manufactures are as much desired by the 
Indians, as their Peltry is sought by us”.  Thus leading Gage to the 
conclusion “that the Principles of Interest and Policy should induce us rather 
to protect than molest them”.
80
  Gage felt that expanding the Colonies any 
further westward would be of little benefit to Britain, and would come at a 
tremendous cost in lives lost and trade destroyed. 
Gage’s was a good choice to try and bring peace to the frontier, for 
he believed it was not only possible but desirable. The British Government 
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did not want to waste money fighting Native Americans, and Gage believed 
there was nothing to be gained from such conflicts anyway. In 1762 Gage 
had declared that “the only end of making war with these Gentry [Native 
Americans] is to obtain Peace; nothing else is to be had from them; and I 
believe without using them very ill, Peace is easily preferred”.
81
  Even 
before Pontiac’s War was over, Gage acknowledged that “the War we are 
now engaged in against the Indians, is ruinous and destructive, and that 
Peace can not be restored too soon, provided it can be made sure and 
lasting.”
82
  
Gage saw the long term goals of the British Empire and Native 
Americans as fundamentally compatible.  He realised that Native Americans 
wanted to hold onto their land, and he felt that the British were best served 
by leaving them there, as this would allow the fur trade to flourish.  This is 
why the new commander-in-chief put so much effort into winning the trust 
of Native Americans. He could afford to be patient because he saw the 
continued presence of Native Americans on the Colonies’ borders as 
actually beneficial for Britain, as they would keep the Colonies in check and 
provide a market for manufacturers from the home country.  As Gage 
believed that there was no fundamental conflict of interest between the army 
and Native Americans, he saw no reason why the two groups could not live 
in peace, provided the army took care to treat Native Americans with 
respect and take account of their grievances. 
Calling all of this a plan or strategy would be to ascribe a coherence 
to Gage’s thoughts that did not exist at the time.  It would be more accurate 
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to say that they were a series of assumptions that guided Gage in his 
planning whenever he dealt with Native Americans.  He assumed that it was 
possible to live in peace with them, and that this could be achieved through 
acknowledging those things which distressed Native Americans and then 
dealing with them.  He also assumed that the interests of the British were 
best served by confining the Colonies to the seaboard, and so there was no 
need to remove Native Americans from their land.  Following on from these 
assumptions, war against Native Americans became not only undesirable 
but counter to the best interests of the British Crown, and it was for that 
reason that Gage struggled so hard to prevent it.  Gage also recognised that 
the army was too weak to consider any other options. He might have felt 
that “If we had more troops we should make fewer presents”, but he knew 
that “the Government finds that the Expense of one Regiment will bribe a 
great many Indians and that it is much more for our interest to make 
presents, than go to war.”
83
  
This was in sharp contrast to the views of Amherst, who distrusted 
and hated Indians, and after the outbreak of Pontiac’s Uprising seemed to 
relish the chance of destroying them as a people.  Amherst warned Johnson 
that: 
 
“I shall only say, that it behove the whole race of Indians to beware 
(for I fear the best of them have in some measure been privy to and 
concerned in the late mischief) of carrying matters much farther 
against the English, or daring to form conspiracys, as the 
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consequence will most certainly occasion measures to be taken that 
in the end will put a most effectuall stop to their very being.”
84
 
    
Amherst believed that Native American power could be so 
weakened that they would be forced to accept British domination; Gage 
believed that force was primarily a means to bring Native Americans to the 
negotiating table (or council fire).  If Gage had likewise considered conflict 
inevitable, then there would have been little reason to establish a dialogue 
between the army and Native Americans.    
Gage was not against new settlements per se. The new commander-
in-chief was, after all, anxious to establish new farms near his posts to help 
feed his garrisons.  Rather, he differentiated between the extension of the 
Colonies further inland by cessions of new land from Native Americans, 
which he was against, and settlement on land that he felt the British had a 
right to, such as those areas in the immediate vicinity of the posts.  
When the British Government proposed directing people to Florida 
and Georgia to solve the increasing problem of land hunger elsewhere in the 
Colonies, Gage told Governor Grant that “as matters now stand the Consent 
and good will of the Indians is the best and only security we can have for 
settling.  And that should first be gained, and all of them thoroughly 
reconciled to our taking such a step, before we attempt it.”
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As Gage saw it the choice was simple: no matter the location, the only 
options were to either purchase the Native Americans’ land from them 
fairly, or be prepared to go to war with them.    When British settlers 
brought plots of land in Florida from the Spanish, the Creeks protested and 
threatened violence.  The Creeks believed that the only land which the 
Spanish had any right to sell or cede was the land that their forts had been 
built on; the rest would remain their property.  Gage thought that “it’s pretty 
plain, that a formal Purchase should be made of the lands from the Indians, 
or we must maintain Possession by Force of Arms.”
86
  Given that both Gage 
and his political masters held that the second option was undesirably 
expensive, and probably impossible with the army so weak, the only choice 
was to secure Native American consent before taking control of their land. 
Gage was even prepared to go against governors, such as Governor 
George Johnstone in Florida, in order to avoid war with Native Americans.  
Florida was at this time divided into two separate colonies, East and West, 
and was one of the new territories that Britain had gained from France at the 
end of the Seven Years’ War.  West Florida was officially established as a 
Crown colony in 1763, with Johnstone as its first governor.  It did not take 
long for the governor and the army to fall out.  Johnstone reached the colony 
in October 1764 and the first letters complaining of his behaviour to Gage 
are dated November of the same year.
87
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The conflict in Florida was more than a simple personality clash. 
Johnstone frequently quarrelled with army officers in West Florida 
regarding many matters, but at the heart of the dispute was the issue of who 
had command of the troops based in the province.
88
  Johnstone was 
attempting to claim control over the military in the colony, and the most 
likely reason for this is that he was planning a war against the local Creeks.  
Johnstone knew that unless he could establish himself as commander-in-
chief of all military forces in the colony he would not be able to dictate the 
course of his hoped-for war.  After the murder of two traders by the Creeks 
in 1766 it seemed that Johnstone was about to get the war he wanted.  John 
Stuart, the Superintendent for Indian Affairs in the Southern Department, 
noted that “Mr Johnstone is so convinced of the necessity of a war with the 
Creeks that in a letter to the Secretary of State … he propositions a plan of 
operation against them.”
89
  
William Tayler, the officer in charge at Pensacola, was at first 
squarely behind the governor, and displayed the callous attitude toward 
Native Americans typical of some officers.  Not only did he believe that 
“every hostile measure permitted by the Laws of Nations should be used 
against the Creek Indians, in return for the murders,”
90
 but also that “if we 
succeed in the war with them, no women or children which we may happen 
to take should be left in the country, they should be moved to other parts at a 
distance or to the islands.”
91
  Such a move would have meant the destruction 
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of the Creek culture and caused great distress to all the Indians involved, but 
Tayler showed no concern for such matters. 
What did concern Tayler, however, was whether the war was 
necessary or indeed if it was in the best interests of the Crown.  If the colony 
was to go to war, then it would likely receive a large influx of money from 
the government to ensure a successful outcome. Tayler began to wonder if it 
was the prospect of this money that would largely be spent at the governor’s 
discretion that made Johnstone so keen to fight.  Tayler was also afraid that 
both he and the colony’s civil leaders lacked experience in Indian affairs, 
which might result in them blundering into a war accidently when other 
options were available. To remedy this, he resolved to meet Stewart the next 
time he was in the area, and enlist his aid in untangling the present crisis.
92
  
Tayler understood that Gage was unequivocally against war if it could be 
avoided. When news of the trouble in Florida reached Gage, he thundered 
that “no man in his senses will wantonly go to war with them [Native 
Americans]; and nothing but absolute necessity should ever prevail upon us 
to do it”.
93
   
Concerned by what was happening, and no doubt spurred on by 
Gage’s letter, Tayler sent an agent to talk to the Creeks.  Tayler’s emissary 
informed the Indians “that your excellenys [General Gage’s] intentions and 
mine was, that they should live in peace with us, but if they persisted that I 
was to bring down troops from all parts to attack them.”  Shortly after this 
exchange, a meeting took place between Tayler and two Creek headmen, 
Emistesgo and Molten, at which the Creeks informed Tayler that they had 
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provided satisfaction for the murders by killing the chief responsible and 
leaving “his body for the beasts in the woods.”  As Gage had wished, 
Tayler’s decisive intervention had prevented a costly Indian war in the 
south. 
  Though the officers in western Florida never openly accused 
Johnstone of trying to start a war, the recommendations made by Tayler for 
preserving peace with the Indians made it clear who he thought was to 
blame for the crisis. Tayler advised Gage, “His Excellency is not insensible 
that my duty calls upon me to attend the general interest of the whole, 
without being limited to a single province, and I must humbly express my 
conclusion of the necessity of one great plan for the whole country, 
independent of the partial or interested views of any future governor either 
for his province in the second place, or himself in the first [Underlining in 
the original]”
 94
   
Tayler’s view strongly implies that as far as he was concerned 
Johnstone was an agitator interested in encouraging an Indian war.   
In the wake of Pontiac’s War, Gage tried to preserve the peace using 
a two-pronged strategy. French support would be cut off by taking control 
of the Illinois, and Native American affections courted by making sure that 
the army always acted with one eye on their opinions.  To this end Gage 
tried to mould his officers into successful go-betweens, stressing the 
importance of understanding Native American views and close co-operation 
with the Indian department.  
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In areas that had caused friction in the past, such as the building of 
new settlements, the army tried to remove Native American fears and secure 
their consent before acting.  The army and the Indian department also tried 
to ensure the fur trade was well run, but here they came up against the limits 
of their power.  Gage wanted to end those abuses that had so angered Native 
Americans before, but he knew that if his officers took the lead they would 
be left open to lawsuits.  Rather than instruct them to do nothing, he ordered 
them to let the Indian department take the lead, while he lobbied the 
government for changes to the law. 
Such actions illustrate that the reality of the situation on the frontier 
was the determining factor in Gage’s treatment of Native Americans.  For 
Gage it was vital to listen to Native American concerns because this would 
bring peace and prosperity to the empire, as well as allowing him to keep his 
job.  Rather than Gage’s actions being dictated by a need to dominate, he 
saw his role as preventing another war by working for reconciliation with 
those Native Americans on the empire’s border. 
Pontiac’s War had brought about a huge change in the army’s 
treatment of Native Americans, but not because it changed the attitudes of 
those within the army.  There were officers who approved of Gage’s policy 
of bridge-building, the same ones who had urged Amherst to adopt a less 
confrontational policy before the war, but  Pontiac’s War had done little to 
change these men’s attitudes. However, it had given them a leader who 
agreed with them.  It should be noted that while Amherst’s policies drew 
strong protest from many officers, Gage’s more moderate orders were 
normally accepted without complaint. 
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While most officers were able to fall into line behind their new 
commander-in-chief, there were many in the Colonies who felt that Native 
Americans had forfeited their right to live alongside the Colonies with their 
behaviour during Pontiac’s War.  The next chapter will examine how the 
army struggled to keep the peace on the frontier while many in the Colonies 
did all they could to undermine it.   
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Chapter Seven 
A Lack of Authority 
 
Gage’s efforts to persuade Native Americans to accept British 
domination faced two significant obstacles:  frontier violence and squatter 
settlements on Native American land.  Both these troubles sprang from the 
same source, the poor white settlers who kept moving west in ever greater 
numbers.  The commander-in-chief knew that if the army failed to contain 
these problems the Native Americans would likely take matters into their 
own hands, and there would be another Indian war.  Desperate to prevent 
that, the army struggled to tackle both problems, but faced huge difficulties 
in doing so. 
In the aftermath of Pontiac’s War when dealing with white criminals 
who had attacked Native Americans, army officers were initially unsure 
how to act.  In fact their powers were extremely limited, and officers could 
do little more than send offenders to the nearest colony for trial.  This 
proved grossly inadequate, as most offenders escaped any form of 
punishment, which greatly displeased those Native Americans who had 
been promised satisfaction.   Keenly aware that such broken promises were 
deeply damaging to relations with Native Americans, Gage ordered his 
officers not to intervene, while Native Americans were allowed to take their 
revenge on those who had wronged them.   
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The army found their powers similarly limited when they attempted 
to deal with illegal settlements on Native American land.
1
  They knew that 
such settlements disgusted Native Americans, and the army wished to 
remove them, but officers were forbidden to use force.  The regular army 
was only allowed to move against civilians if ordered to do so by a civil 
authority.  More concerned with grabbing what land they could for their 
colonies, and afraid of their assemblies, colonial governors refused to ask 
the army for aid in dealing with these settlements.  Despairing of ever 
getting help from the governors, Gage was prepared to sacrifice these 
communities if it would prevent an Indian war. 
The government made sure, via the instructions, that Gage was 
aware of just how seriously they took violence against Native Americans.  
When the Paxton Boys barbarically murdered a large number of friendly 
Conestoga Indians, Lord Halifax made the significance of the issue perfectly 
clear. He informed Gage that “You will cause every proper measure to be 
taken which may tend to prevent the bad consequence of those impressions 
which the said Murders will probably have made on the Minds of the 
Indians in general”.
2
 What exactly constituted “Proper measures” was left to 
Gage’s discretion.  A little over a year later, Conway reminded Gage that 
the “unjustifiable Behaviour” of “Settlers on the Borders … requires the 
greatest Attention”, and just a year later Shelburne ordered Gage to use 
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“Your utmost Endeavours” to support the proclamation and prevent disorder 
on the frontier.
 3
 
The government in London expected Gage to intervene actively 
when Native Americans had been attacked, and so Gage expected his 
subordinates to keep him informed of all such incidents.  In the summer of 
1766 Gage was notified by Sir William Johnson that several Onondaga 
Indians had been killed near Fort Pitt.  The general replied that he had 
received several reports from the commander at Fort Pitt and that none 
mentioned the murders.  Gage expected that his officers would report any 
such incident to him if they knew of it, and so he concluded that the incident 
had taken place but that the commander of Fort Pitt must be ignorant of the 
affair.
4
  When officers did not send Gage the information he required he was 
greatly annoyed. Colonel Reed felt his anger when, after months on the 
Illinois, he had neglected to inform Gage of his “situation, that of the French 
and Spainyards [sic] the Disposition of the Savages, or any other 
Intelligence proper for me to be acquainted”.
5
  Gage clearly felt that it was 
vital he was kept informed of developments on the frontier, including the 
temper of Native Americans, as he attached a good deal of importance to 
such matters. 
In the closing phase of Pontiac’s War, many frontier settlers seized 
their opportunity for revenge by assaulting any Native American they could 
get their hands on; some Maryland volunteers killed and scalped an Indian 
near Pittsburgh, and a group of settlers travelled to Fort Augusta with the 
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intention of murdering all the Indians there, only to be foiled when it turned 
out the Indians had already fled; in Augusta County Virginia nine 
Cherokees were murdered, and near Redstone Creek two Indians were killed 
and scalped.
 6
  Gage was very concerned that if such attacks on Native 
Americans were to continue it would make it impossible to bring the 
conflict to an end. He despaired that “if this disposition in the People of the 
Frontiers of killing every defenceless Indian they meet with continue, it will 
be too little purpose to confer or treat with any of the nations”.
7
  Gage knew 
that it would be impossible for the leaders of the Indian nations to get their 
young warriors to accept a peace if settlers were seen to be murdering 
Indians with impunity.
8
 
In a case where an Indian headman was killed, Gage was so worried 
that it might prolong the war that he threatened to take the matter to the 
highest authority if he could not secure sufficient co-operation from the 
colonies.  He told Bouquet, “And if it [the murder of the Chief] should be 
the cause of the continuation of the war, and further broils with the Savages, 
it will be necessary that the King should know what has been done in it, and 
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what obstructions there are in the Provinces to preserve the common course 
of Justice.”
9
 
It is not surprising that settlers felt such anger toward Native 
Americans.  Two thousand settlers and traders were killed or captured by 
Native Americans during Pontiac’s War.  Thousands more were driven from 
the homes and farms, or faced the trauma of losing a loved one.  The 
resentments created by such destruction were never going to dissipate 
quietly.
10
 
Native Americans who had been the victims of such attacks made 
their feelings clear to the empire’s Indian agents.  Shortly after the 
conclusion of Pontiac’s War, Ogista, a Seneca Chief, complained that three 
Indians of his nation had been killed by white men, but aware that the new 
state of peace was precarious, he asked that they not be punished.  Instead, 
he hoped that Johnson would advise them to “do better in future” so that the 
friendship between whites and Seneca could be maintained.
11
   Native 
American leaders were prepared to offer the British some leeway, but they 
knew that they would not be able to keep control of their young warriors in 
the face of repeated insults. 
The seriousness with which Gage took such crimes can be seen in 
his orders.  After the apprehension of a man who had murdered an Indian, 
Gage made it clear that it was vital Bouquet dealt with the matter correctly. 
He informed him to ensure that “nothing may be wanting in us towards 
carrying on the Publick service, as far as in our power.  The fact is already 
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reported to His Majestys Secretary of State.”
 12
  Orders like that ensured that 
most officers on the frontier understood that catching and punishing those 
who abused Indians was seen as vitally important by the commander-in-
chief and the British Government.   
Amongst senior officers on the frontier there were those well aware 
of how much anger violent attacks on Native Americans caused, and they 
did what they could to prevent them.  At a conference with the Wolf King 
held at Pensacola Captain Robert Mackinen took time to assure the Creek 
headman that should “the white people” be guilty of any “mischief”, then 
the Creeks should bring them down to the fort where they would be 
punished.  The Wolf King replied that he hoped Mackinen would be able to 
prevent the white people doing any mischief.
13
  However, Mackinen was 
making a promise he did not have the power to keep.  Unless those who 
transgressed against the Indians were soldiers, he did not have the authority 
to punish them.  No matter what they had done, he could not punish any 
civilians, only transport them for a civil trial in the nearest colony.  It is 
possible Mackinen was making this promise with the knowledge that it was 
in bad faith, but he may simply have been confused about what powers he 
actually possessed.  If he was mistaken, Mackinen was not the only British 
officer who overestimated their authority in the backcountry. 
In the wake of the Proclamation of 1763, there was much confusion 
about what powers the army actually possessed to enable it to carry out its 
role on the frontier.  It was often only when officers were confronted with 
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the crimes of white settlers for the first time that they discovered just how 
limited their powers were, and how difficult it was to bring miscreants to 
justice.  This is clearly demonstrated by an episode on the eve of Pontiac’s 
War, when the British officer, Captain Cochrane, was confronted with 
disgruntled Indians.  The Native Americans complained of white people 
venturing into their hunting grounds near Fort Prince George and destroying 
their stocks of beaver. Cochrane immediately ordered the officer stationed 
there, Ensign Price, to apprehend them and deliver them up to a civil 
magistrate.
14
  Price managed to secure three prisoners but the governor, after 
consulting with his attorney general, ordered that they be released, despite 
being not entirely sure what he was to do in such cases.  Cochrane refused 
to carry out the governor’s order to free the prisoners, insisting that only he 
had that power; he then outlined his position in a letter to Gage, and 
requested further orders”.
15
   
Cochrane and Mackinen were not the only ones who did not 
understand the limits of their power as army officers in North America.  
This confusion existed right at the top of the army and within the elite of the 
colonial establishment. Gage was unsure what his powers were; governors, 
when presented with prisoners were unsure what to do; officers simply held 
people captive while waiting for enlightenment from above.  Such 
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enlightenment was not often forthcoming.  In his reply to Cochrane Gage 
only managed to clarify the situation a little:  
“Your having made prisoners of some of the Beaver Hunters, will its 
hoped, prevent other pursuing that business, which must bring us into 
frequent Quarells with the Indians unless prevented.  I find a sort of law 
prevailing throughout the provinces, not to take up people for crimes 
committed in other provinces, which I suppose was the reason that Gov Bull 
thought the Beaver Hunters could not be tried in Carolina, as the fact was 
committed in Georgia.”
16
 
 The phrase “I find a sort of law” is hardly characteristic of someone 
who had been well briefed on their powers, or who was now clear as to their 
extent.  Initially, Gage had hoped that he could bring those who killed 
Native Americans beyond the boundaries of the Colonies to a court martial, 
but in fact he possessed no such power.
17
  This he realised would make “the 
bringing a Murderer to Justice very difficult indeed”.  The general had no 
doubt that the “Lawyers would have discovered more easy methods, to 
bring the murder to his tryal” had the victim been white.
18
 
It was the Mutiny Act of 1765 that finally granted the army the 
powers to bring frontier criminals to justice.
19
  Prior to this, the army had 
lacked any officially sanctioned way of securing punishment for civilians 
who committed crimes outside the Colonies.  The Mutiny Act specified that 
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the army would not be allowed to place people on trial or court martial 
them, but would only be allowed to apprehend the accused and, provided 
there was a written and signed oath from a witness, transport them to a 
magistrate in the adjoining province, where they would be held until they 
could have a civil trial.
20
  
The decision to use this system was a disaster.  The army and the 
Indian Department were given the responsibility of keeping Native 
Americans happy but denied the authority to punish those who most 
distressed them.  Whenever Native Americans came to an officer or Indian 
agent to complain about an attack upon them or their tribe, it was incumbent 
upon the officers and agents, as representatives of the empire, to promise 
them that something would be done.  If they did not, then the Native 
Americans would soon see that there was little point in dealing with them.  
The problem with the system was that although the empire’s representatives 
had to promise that offenders would be punished, they could not guarantee 
that this would happen, as any punishment was contingent upon a successful 
trial over which the army and the Indian Department had no control.   
Hillsborough later regretted the decision, and acknowledged that the 
settlements in the west 
 
 “which not being included within the Jurisdiction of 
any other Colony are exposed to many Difficulties and 
Disadvantages from the want of some form of Government 
necessary in Civil Society, it is very evident that,  if the case 
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of these Settlements had been well known or understood at 
the time of forming the conquered Lands into Colonies, 
some Provisions would have been made for them, and they 
would have been erected into distinct Governments, or made 
dependent upon those other colonies, of which they were 
either the offspring, or with which they did, by 
circumstances and situation, stand connected.”
21
 
 
Even getting offenders to trial proved to be an enormous problem for 
the Crown’s agents in the west.  The first difficulty for anyone wishing to 
bring a criminal from the backcountry to trial was simply finding them.  
This was especially difficult for the small and isolated garrisons of the 
regular army.  Recently moved to the frontier, rotated from garrison to 
garrison and with a pitifully slow rate of movement off-road, the British 
regulars had little chance of finding backcountry settlers who did not wish 
to be found.  Those they were chasing often had extensive local knowledge, 
large networks of friends and family to hide them, and ample warning of 
approaching columns should they be discovered.  This made rooting them 
out a very difficult task for the army.  The low probability of being caught 
encouraged many backcountry folk to seek violent solutions in any conflict 
they might have with Native Americans - something of which Gage was 
well aware.
22
 
Even when suspects could be detained, there was no guarantee that 
they would see trial.  The same friends and family that had helped them 
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escape capture were not about to sit idly by and let the accused sit in jail, 
when their only crime was to kill an Indian.  Jailbreaks were far from 
unknown, and those involved knew that they could expect scant opposition 
from sympathetic guards and militias.  In one particularly disturbing episode 
Frederick Stump, one of the most notorious backcountry criminals, managed 
to effect an escape.
23
  This was especially troublesome as his crime - killing 
around ten Indians with the aid of a servant - was particularly abhorrent, and 
news of it had travelled through many Indian tribes, where it  had caused a 
great deal of alarm.
24
  The problem of offenders escaping was one that the 
army never managed to solve.  In 1769, after the capture of a man accused 
of killing a Seneca, one official hoped he could be brought to trial, “if he is 
not rescued”.
25
 
Those offenders that the authorities were able to get hold of were 
still all too likely to get away with murder.  The right to a civil trial with a 
jury of their peers made it unlikely that anyone from the frontier would 
receive a conviction for the murder of an Indian.   
Obtaining evidence against such people was nigh on impossible.  
Crimes in the west were usually committed out of sight of posts and 
villages, where the only witnesses would be sympathisers, accomplices or 
Indians.  There was little worry of the first two testifying against the 
accused and no legal possibility of the second, for Native Americans were 
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forbidden to give evidence in colonial courts.
26
  The 1764 plan for Indian 
affairs had proposed changing the law to allow Native Americans, “under 
proper regulations and restrictions,” to give evidence, but the plan was never 
put into action.
27
  This left those attempting to secure justice for Native 
Americans in a very difficult position, as those most likely to witness a 
crime committed against Native Americans were either disinclined or 
disbarred from giving evidence. 
Besides these problems, the obstacle of gathering evidence 
remained.  In one case of an African-American slave accused of raping a 
Native American woman, Gage was anxious that as much evidence as 
possible, as well as any available witnesses, would be available for the trial.  
Gage wrote to the commander at Detroit to ensure that this would happen.
28
  
Unfortunately, as was the norm, little evidence apart from circumstantial 
could be procured.
29
  That the commander-in-chief of America would take 
such an interest in a single case is indicative of his attitude and the 
importance he gave to Native American affairs.  He was anxious to get a 
successful prosecution, as doing so was the only way of ensuring peace on 
the frontier.  
The final problem with sending prisoners up country for their trials 
was that even if there was a guilty verdict and subsequent execution, no 
Native Americans would be around to witness it.  Both Johnson and Gage 
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were aware that this was not ideal.  Even though there was peace, the 
relationship between the empire and the Native Americans of the 
backcountry was strained, and the trust they sought to create was often in 
short supply.   
All of this left those imperial officials entrusted with Native 
American diplomacy in a very difficult position.  If they were to admit that 
there was little they could do to grant Native Americans justice, there would 
be no reason for sachems and headmen to bring their grievances to them.  
The tribal leaders would have had little choice but to turn loose their young 
warriors on the white settlers as the best means of giving them satisfaction 
for the wrongs done to them, a course of action that might very quickly lead 
to all-out war.  This may be in part why older Native Americans continued 
to bring their complaints to Indian agents and army officers, even when it 
was becoming clear that they had little chance of getting satisfaction; the 
sachems and headmen had seen the horrific and brutal nature that came with 
war in the backcountry and did not wish to experience it again. 
If, on the other hand, Indian agents and garrison commanders kept 
making promises that they could not keep, they would lose the respect and 
trust of the tribes with whom they were dealing. They could only continue 
in their role as mediators between the two cultures while both sides trusted 
them.  If they no longer enjoyed the confidence of the Native Americans, 
then they would be unable to perform their role. This could have been 
catastrophic given the already strained nature of contact between Native 
Americans and the imperial establishment.  Johnson was deeply worried by 
the violence on the frontier.  He was afraid that while men who had killed 
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Native Americans remained free, “all my endeavours to bring them [Native 
Americans] to peace, and to remove their suspicions must appear calculated 
to amuse and deceive them, while [they will assume] their ruin is our 
Aim.”
30
  
The great fear of the army and the Indian Department was that after 
repeated insults Native Americans would unite (confederate, as they termed 
it) to attack the British and drive them from the west.  When in 1767 this 
appeared to be happening, both Indian agents and officers were enormously 
concerned.
31
  In a letter to Governor Grant of New York, Gage outlined his 
views on why the Indians were uniting:   
 
“The Behavior of the Inhabitants above Augusta in 
Georgia relative to their destroying the little Indian Village 
at Occoni correspondes with the Behaviour of all the frontier 
people from Pensilvania to Georgia inclusive.  There never 
was such a sett of Banditti in any Country, but those of 
Virginia exceed all the rest.  Since the year 1764 that Peace 
was Concluded with all the Indians, great numbers of them 
have been privately or openly killed and wounded by these 
Villians.  It is proved impossible to bring them to 
Punishment and give the Indians Satisfaction by the 
Ordinary course of Justice and Nobody will use 
extraordinary means.  The Militia will not act because they 
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are concerned, Jurys will not condemn for the same Reason, 
and declare so Publickly.  and it is contrary to laws and the 
Liberty of the Subject to remove Tryals to the Capitals of the 
Provinces, or asks for Military Assistance, or I may say to 
accept of it when offered.. From these laudable Tenets which 
so nobly Maintain and support the Priviledge and Libarty of 
British Subjects we are likely to be involved in an Indian 
War, after repeated promises that they should have 
satisfaction, and as often failing to give it, they have at 
length confederated, and held several private meetings in the 
woods, and have appointed the lower Town of the Shawnese 
for the Place of a general Congress, where the Cheifs of all 
the Confederacys are to be Assembled.  What the Results 
will be we are to learn, but I find all the Indian Folks very 
much alarmed.”
32
 
 
In the end the Indians never managed to form a general confederacy.  
It was only after the withdrawal of the army from the frontier that open 
warfare broke out, with Lord Dunmore’s War. 
Such were the obstacles in bringing Indian murderers to justice that 
in his dispatches to the Secretary of State, Lord Shelburne, Gage claimed 
that by October 1767 Native Americans had been given satisfaction in only 
one such incident.
33
  Such a figure, while not far from the truth, was an 
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exaggeration, which Gage hoped would add weight to his repeated requests 
to make bringing justice to Native Americans easier.  Gage was right to 
worry: Native Americans were not happy with the little satisfaction they had 
received for the wrongs done to them.  In late 1767 Croghan travelled to a 
Delaware village where the Indians complained they could get no justice 
from the British.  The Indian agent tried to persuade them that they were 
doing all they could to bring the people who had wronged them to justice, to 
which a Delaware headman replied, “We thought you had Laws for that 
purpose.”
34
 
Hampered by the law, Gage began to do what he could to change it.  
The solutions he suggested say much about his opinion of backcountry 
settlers.  In one letter to Shelburne, Gage suggested removing the trials of 
the “Banditti” to the capitals of the Colonies.  This would mean “the Jurys 
would be composed of Men more civilized than those of the Frontiers.” 
Gage felt that “The framing new Laws in the Provinces, and inforcing 
Obediance [sic] thereto, for the better Securing the Indians in their Person 
and Properties, seems a most essential Point; without which there can be no 
End to our Quarrells [sic]”.
35
 
Johnson had written to Shelburne a year earlier on exactly the same 
subject.  The Indian Superintendent was apprehensive for the future, and 
could foresee that there would be great difficulty in maintaining peaceful 
relations with the Native Americans on the empire’s border unless the law 
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was changed to grant them “speedy Justice without Dispute or evasion.”  
Johnson did not go so far as to suggest an alternative, merely pointing out 
that the colonial law courts were not designed with the aim of providing 
justice for Native Americans, and that the laws  were not written with 
Native Americans in mind.  If that was not enough to overcome “the Jurys 
being often ignorant … Sometimes prejudiced, as are all the Members of the 
Law on such Trials”.
36
 
Gage knew that his efforts to change the law would take a long time 
to bear fruit, if they succeeded at all.  In the meanwhile something had to be 
done, and the solution to which Gage resorted was shockingly direct.  He 
began urging his officers on the frontier to let Native Americans deal with 
murderers themselves.  In one example, where several Indians had been 
brutally murdered, Gage informed Captain Murray that “it’s to be wished 
that the Indians could apprehend the murtherers [sic]  and put them to death 
without further ceremony,” and that if the Indians did revenge themselves 
on the killers “you are by no means to retaliate upon the Indians.”
37
   
Gage urged turning a blind eye because he had lost faith in the legal 
system.  He hoped his new orders would help the frontier remain peaceful, 
but few officers were prepared to follow his instructions.  In a letter to a 
subordinate Gage explained his reasoning: “it is always best-when they 
[Native Americans] take immediate satisfaction [for murder]: For we must 
expect they will at length be roused by so many repeated murders, for which 
they have never been able to get any satisfaction, or probably ever will.”
38
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  Gage’s urging was in vain. Those Native Americans who lived near 
the posts continued to bring in those whom they believed had wronged 
them.  Perhaps Native Americans who had felt the sting of Amherst’s harsh 
treatment and the fury of the British Army during Pontiac’s War could not 
believe that the army would not move against them if they took their 
revenge on white settlers.  When Fort Pitt was being demolished, one 
witness noted, “The warriors could not conceal their joy at this event.   The 
Fort had been a bridle upon them hitherto, to restrain their murders & 
depredations on the frontiers.”
39
  The officers there had clearly failed to 
transmit Gage’s intentions to Native Americans. 
Gage was disappointed that nobody would follow his instructions. 
“Since the year 1764 that Peace was Concluded with all the Indians, great 
numbers of them have been privately or openly killed and wounded by these 
Villains [frontier settlers].  It is proved impossible to bring them to 
Punishment and give the Indians Satisfaction by the Ordinary course of 
Justice and Nobody will use extraordinary means.”
40
    
In the light of Gage’s other letters the meaning of the phrase 
“extraordinary means” becomes clear.  Gage believed that peace on the 
frontier had to be preserved at all costs, even if that meant Native Americans 
killing a subject of the British Crown without any kind of trial. Race was not 
primarily important to Gage; rather it was keeping the peace and protecting 
the empire. 
It was not just in his orders to subordinate officers that Gage 
promoted the idea that Indians could, within reason, take revenge on white 
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settlers.  When he heard that the Cherokees had killed a total of eighteen 
people from Virginia in revenge for a number of Cherokees who died in the 
colony two years previously, Gage argued that the Cherokees were entitled 
to some measure of revenge because they had never obtained satisfaction 
from the Virginians either in the form of justice for the murderers or 
presents to compensate them for their loss.  Gage’s aim was to ensure that 
Native Americans were left satisfied by their dealings with the Colonies. It 
would be best if this could be done by the performance of condolence 
ceremonies and the giving of presents or by the execution of the criminals in 
question.  In the opinion of the commander-in-chief, if the Colonies would 
not act to satisfy those Native Americans who had been wronged, then those 
Native Americans were entitled to revenge.
41
 
 The revenge, however, had to be proportionate.  In this case 
the Cherokees had gone too far.  Though the “white People who [were 
killed] were no doubt to blame”, since the Cherokee had already obtained 
“sufficient satisfaction”, the latest killings were too much.  Gage instructed 
Stuart to inform the Indians that the British would be expecting satisfaction, 
not for all the murders, but just the latest batch.
42
 
If allowing Native Americans to take their revenge did not work, 
then Gage was certain that the army was not to be involved in another 
Indian war.  As early as 1765 he had instructed Croghan:  
 
                                                           
41
 Gage to Johnson, 5 April 1767, WLCL Gage Papers. 
42
 Gage to Johnson, 5 April 1767, Gage Papers WLCL. Gage goes on to add that the 
Cherokee “seemed to have confined their revenge to the Virginians, which rather more 
consisted with reason  than their general practice of killing without Distinction."    
212 
 
“…if these outrages continue & go unpunished that 
the Indians will break out, and that they will fall upon the 
settlements, should it be impossible to divert this storm, we 
must use our endeavours to point out to them the proper 
objects of their resentment, and to guide them to the 
provinces where these lawless and abandoned crew reside, 
and use all means to prevent their confounding all the 
provinces with two or three, and making a general war of 
it.”
43
  
 
At the start of 1766 Gage told Governor Bull of South Carolina that 
“when they [Native Americans] are prompted to revenge themselves they 
might let their resentment fall upon the guilty only, and prevent the 
provinces being drawn into a cruel and ruinous wars, through the fault of 
some of the most abandoned and lawless of mankind.”
44
  As far as the 
commander-in-chief was concerned, if Native Americans decided to take 
revenge for the attacks upon them, then it was not enough reason for the 
British Army to go to war.  Gage hoped that making this clear to the 
Governor of South Carolina might force that colony, and others, to take 
action against those settlers in the west who were the source of the trouble. 
Gage’s concern for Native American feelings did not mean that they 
would be allowed to abuse soldiers and civilians on the frontier as they 
wanted.  In the commander-in-chief’s opinion, if there was no reason for a 
Native American attack, then passing over the crime was not an option as 
                                                           
43
 Gage to Croghan 21 March 1765, Gage Papers WLCL. 
44
Gage to Bull, 17 January 1766, Gage Papers WLCL.  
213 
 
this would only encourage more violence.  Threats were not the solution. 
The general told his officers that threatening Native Americans was to be 
avoided, as “it is wrong ever to think of frightening by threats of what you 
will do, for they will take it for granted that you will put your threat into 
execution, and begin first, and the only way with them, when they murder, 
is if possible to retaliate immediately and then make maters up.”
45
 
Brutal as it was, immediate retaliation remained Gage’s 
recommendation to his officers throughout his time in command.  After the 
murder of an officer’s gardener in 1767, Gage informed Sir William 
Johnson that “We must talk loudly of this Affair and Demand Satisfaction 
which had better have been taken immediately.”  Demanding satisfaction 
was all very well, but Gage knew that there was a much better chance of 
receiving it if the Native Americans with whom the army was dealing 
trusted the British and felt they had been dealt with fairly.  Unfortunately, 
the army had failed to secure justice for a Native American murdered by a 
bateau man two years previously, and a slave recently accused of killing two 
Native American women was still languishing in jail.
46
  Gage lamented that 
if the slave had been executed, “we might with a better grace insist upon the 
Indian being brought to justice."
47
 
The finale of this case clearly demonstrates that Gage was much 
more concerned with keeping the peace on the frontier than with providing 
justice.  The Chippewa Indians who killed the gardener were captured and 
sent for trial. However, times were tense and Sir William Johnson 
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disapproved of this course of action, which he feared could result in war 
with several Indian tribes.  Gage therefore left Johnson to decide what 
should be done, but did express hope that Johnson would “insist upon 
Satisfaction”.
48
  The matter was brought to a head when, in retaliation for 
their incarceration, relatives of the murderers killed nine Englishmen and 
two Indians in an attack on a trading company’s two bateaux.  Rather than 
retaliate for this Johnson released the accused, for not only were the British 
proving unable to provide justice for Native Americans wronged by white 
men, but, as it turned out, the gardener had a long history of abusing Native 
Americans.
49
 
Previously, during Pontiac’s War, when Native American sentiments 
had mattered less to the British, Gage had not been so reluctant to execute 
Native Americans.  In 1764, when a Native American had been tried and 
executed for killing a man in South Carolina, Gage wrote approvingly to the 
governor, stating that such an example would serve to prevent more 
murders.
50
  Such executions were fine when the British and Native 
Americans were at war, but after 1765, when they carried with them the risk 
of antagonising the then peaceful Native Americans and bringing on another 
conflict, Gage was not so keen on them. 
Immediate retaliation was a better strategy, and Gage made this clear 
in his orders to Captain Turnbull, written in the aftermath of the gardener’s 
murder.  “Assure the Indians of the Difficulty Lt St Clair had, to keep his 
men, from taking their own Revenge upon the Spot and they should be 
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assured that if any of their people dare to be Guilty of such horrid and 
Barbarous Murders for the future that the Soldiers will be no longer 
restrained from taking their own immediate satisfaction."
51
  Gage believed 
that Native Americans would excuse revenge killings made in the heat of 
the moment, but not those done in cold blood.
52
 
Though Gage’s methods were brutal, he stopped short of the lengths 
that some of his subordinates considered necessary.  British officers would 
occasionally have preferred to use more brutal and bloody methods in their 
dealings with Native Americans, but Gage was determined to restrain them 
in order to retain peaceable relations.  For many years the Potawatomis had 
caused severe trouble for the garrisons at Niagara and Detroit, often killing 
soldiers who ventured too far from the fort.  Eventually, Captain Campbell 
decided that it was time for drastic action.  He ordered all trade with the 
nation to be stopped until the murderers were delivered up to him.  When a 
party of Potawatomis travelled to the Fort with a Panne slave to give to 
Campbell in atonement for their crimes, Campbell ordered that they should 
be ambushed.  The Indians discovered the ruse before the ambush could 
take place, and only three were captured.  Of the three, one was an Indian 
woman, and she was subsequently released.  Campbell then proposed 
attacking the Potawatomi village, burning it to the ground and killing 
everyone they could find, “whether men, women or children”.
53
 In reply, 
Gage denied Campbell his attack on the village, only allowing him to make 
a plan of attack in case it was ever needed.
54
 An attack on the village would 
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likely have resulted in war with the Potawatomi tribe, which could easily 
have spread. Whatever he may have felt personally about the case, Gage 
knew that this could not be allowed to happen.  As always, Gage’s priority 
was not justice, or revenge, but ensuring that there was not another Indian 
war. 
This example of leniency was characteristic of Gage, who 
consistently acted to veto the more brutal, violent, and most importantly 
inflammatory, schemes proposed by his men.   In 1768, after they had been 
employed by a Captain Forbes, some white hunters were murdered.  Forbes 
wished to seize the Native Americans who came to atone for the crime. 
Again Gage demurred, fearing that such actions would be “a Breach of 
public Faith”, though he was prepared to bow to Johnson if he disagreed.
55
  
Again, the most important thing for Gage was retaining the trust of the 
Native Americans.  This meant that any retaliation had to be done 
immediately after the crime, as Native Americans would, in Gage's view, 
find this excusable.   
Gage’s orders to allow immediate retaliation did not have the 
deterrent effect that he had hoped for, and Native American attacks 
continued.  In response, the commander-in-chief looked for other methods 
of punishment and deterrence.  After the frequent murders of British traders 
by certain tribes became too much to bear, Gage wished to use what he 
termed “more civilized Nations” like the Iroquois to chastise them.  Gage 
blamed French and Canadian traders for stirring up the Indians to commit 
these murders, and in response he was using an old French technique to end 
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the trouble.  Gage left Sir William Johnson and the Indian Department to 
put this plan into action.
56
  When eventually put into effect, though, the 
results of the scheme were mixed.  Shortly after the Six Nations killed six or 
seven Potawatomis in 1773 and then sent a message threatening the 
Potawatomi with war, the Potawatomi still murdered a trader and his 
servant.  The commander at Detroit was ordered to get satisfaction for the 
affair, which Gage again blamed on a French trader residing at the Indians’ 
village.
57
 
The methods favoured by Gage were unpopular with some of his 
officers.  After the imprisonment of four Seneca at Niagara for the shooting 
of a soldier, traders heard one officer remark “that he wondered how Capt 
Brown Could Confine them, for it was not much to Kill an Englishmen”, 
and that had Johnson been present he would have released the Indians and 
given them presents.
58
  This feeling that the army was pandering to Indians 
may have been in the minds of many officers, but they were wrong if they 
thought it was Johnson alone who was controlling current policy.  Gage had 
made it clear that he was firmly behind the idea of dealing leniently with 
Indians if it would prevent war; if the commander-in-chief was behind it, 
then all his subordinates had better be as well.  Indeed, it is probably the 
knowledge that Gage strongly disagreed with sentiments such as those 
expressed above that prevented them from being aired in official army 
correspondence.  If they were aired, it would be in conversation, of which 
almost no record exists, or in private letters, of which few survive.  
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One of the themes that came to characterise Gage’s writing was that 
while Indians would rarely act unless provoked, the opposite was true of the 
backcountry folk.  His view was that though "We must always expect 
Quarrels between the Indians and the back inhabitants … in general we shall 
find the latter in fault."
59
  Struggling to control the lawless behaviour of 
settlers in the west had clearly soured Gage’s opinion of them.  Rather than 
hatred or indifference of Native Americans dictating the army’s actions, it 
would seem that indifference to the fate of whites in the west characterised 
Gage’s policy. 
Even when Gage’s subordinates were prepared to blame Native 
Americans for their misfortunes, the commander-in-chief was not quick to 
take the bait.  The schooner Victory had been laid up for some time near 
Niagara, and in the winter of 1766-67 it was heavily damaged in a fire.  The 
commander at Niagara responded by closely questioning many of the 
Indians who had come to the fort.
60
  When he was told of this, Gage 
informed the commander that it was as likely to have been careless soldiers 
as malicious Indians who had burnt the boat and that, more importantly, had 
the vessel been guarded properly, the affair would never have happened.
61
 
The army was not in the west to dispense justice, but to keep the 
peace.  This meant the army only got involved with crimes that could 
impact on relations between the Crown and Native Americans.  When 
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colonial settlers restricted the victims of their crimes to other colonists the 
army did not get involved, for such crimes did not affect the chances of 
maintaining peace on the frontier.  Crimes by Native Americans against 
Native Americans were also usually ignored, for the same reason.  In 1772 
an Indian appealed to the commander of Fort Pitt to grant him justice, as the 
murderer of his father, another Native American, was within the fort.  The 
commander refused to interfere, so the Indian took his own satisfaction and 
the army took no action.
62
  The overriding concern whenever the army acted 
in the west while Gage was in charge was to keep the peace, and all actions 
were taken with a view as to whether they would affect relations between 
the Crown and Native Americans. 
The violence in the west was closely connected to another issue that 
threatened to tear apart Gage’s plans for a peaceful frontier.  Illegal 
settlements, made up of squatters living on Native American land to which 
they had no claim or right, were a huge cause of friction between Crown 
officials and Native Americans.   
These squatters moved to the frontier as it was the only place they 
could afford to live.  Most of them simply could not afford to purchase land 
legally, or pay the taxes that would have ensued had they done so.  This 
situation was made much worse by land speculators who bought huge 
parcels of land as investments.  These speculators would often sit on their 
purchases for years at a time, hoping for prices to increase, and as a result 
their activities played a major role in raising land prices throughout the 
Colonies.  So endemic was squatting that when a land owner cleared one 
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family from his land he would inevitably find the land resettled almost 
immediately.  Squatting was so common that a 1772 survey found that in 
Northumberland County, on the north eastern Pennsylvanian frontier, only 
two fifths of households owned the land they were on.
63
  
Most of the squatters were farmers, though a few were criminals on 
the run from the law for various crimes.  Both farmers and fugitives 
managed to cause their own share of trouble on the frontier.    The fugitives 
did not abandon their criminal ways when they moved east, and were happy 
to murder and rob both settlers and Native Americans.  The farmers angered 
Native Americans by clearing the land and driving away game, which 
destroyed hunting grounds.  Many of these settlers were Scots-Irish, who 
even before the Seven Years’ War had little love for Native Americans.  
These Presbyterian settlers regarded Native Americans as heathens who had 
forfeited any claims to the land by leaving it “idle”.  After the frontier raids 
of the Seven Years’ War and Pontiac’s War many frontier settlers felt 
Native Americans had forfeited the right to existence.
64
 
The illegal settlements located at Redstone Creek in Pennsylvania 
and on the Cheat River caused more trouble for the British Army than any 
other squatter towns.
65
   One officer estimated that by 1766 there were 
around 500 families living in the region, all located directly on the route that 
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the northern Indians took when going to war with the Cherokee.
66
  None of 
them were there legally, and predictably there was a great deal of friction 
between these communities and the Native Americans with whom they 
came into contact.
67
 
The army reacted to the problem swiftly, but was limited in what it 
could do.  Without the approval of a civil authority, the army could not 
move directly against civilians.
68
  Redstone Creek and the Cheat River were 
claimed by both Pennsylvania and Virginia, so Gage wrote to the governors 
of both colonies informing them of the problem, and offered Francis 
Fauquier, the Governor of Virginia, the use of troops to remove the 
squatters.
69
  Gage was worried that if there was a skirmish at Redstone and 
blood was shed, there would be a huge outcry from the colonies, unless the 
army had been acting under civil instruction.
70
 
Gage was not the only officer in the army who took this matter 
seriously.  Lieutenant Colonel Wilkins, stationed near Philadelphia, offered 
the services of his troops to augment those stationed at Fort Pitt to help 
remove the settlers from the Indians’ lands.  Furthermore, he also offered to 
remain at Fort Pitt with the troops to prevent any future incursions.
71
  Sadly, 
the governors were much less eager to respond to the crisis.  Governor 
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Fauquier of Virginia issued three proclamations informing the settlers that 
they would not be protected from an Indian attack, but took no other action 
to remove them.
72
  The Governor of Pennsylvania also issued a series of 
proclamations urging those living there illegally to leave, but, like Virginia, 
did nothing to enforce them.  Yet at any time either governor could have 
requested military assistance from the army to move the squatters off the 
land.  Gage, not content with just raising the issue but actually wishing to 
see it resolved, ordered Captain Murray of Fort Pitt to keep a watch on the 
squatters, and to inform him whether or not they obeyed the 
proclamations.
73
 
The proclamations from Virginia and Pennsylvania, despite 
threatening those who remained on Indian land with death, had little effect 
on the settlers.
74
  If the law would not budge them, then the army hoped the 
threat of Indian attacks might.  After a settler on the Cheat River murdered a 
Delaware hunter the commander of Fort Pitt, William Murray, sent the 
settlers an ultimatum to retire or expect Indian reprisals, and if they were 
attacked to expect no help from the garrison.
75
 According to Murray his 
message had the desired result, and he believed that many of the settlers had 
left the area.
76
  Gage approved of Murray’s actions but knew that the settlers 
would soon be back, if they had left at all.  He ordered Murray to ensure that 
no one else settled in the vicinity of the fort, but was worried that “we must 
                                                           
72
Fauqier to Gage, 25 September 1767, Gage Papers WLCL. 
73
 Gage To Murray, 6 October  1766, Gage Papers WLCL. 
74
Gage to Shelburne, 30 January 1768, p. 163, and Gage to Shelburne, 12 March 1768, pp. 
164-163, Gage Correspondence Vol. 1.  
75
 Murray to Gage, 27 Feb 1767, Gage to Johnson, 5 April 1767, Gage Papers WLCL. 
76
 Murray to Gage, 7 April 1767, Gage Papers WLCL. 
223 
 
at last come to force of arms with the settlers at Redstone Creek & Cheat 
River.”
77
 
The point of all these actions was to prove that Native Americans 
could trust the British to uphold their promises, which was necessary to 
maintain the delicate peace that followed Pontiac’s War.  As Gage put it, “If 
we can remove the Settlers from their Encroachments, it will be a 
Manifestation of Our Earnest desire to do them [Native Americans] 
Justice.”
78
  Of course, the efforts to remove squatters were a waste of time if 
local Indians remained unaware of them, and so Gage ordered, “It is 
necessary that some of the Indian Chiefs should be aquainted [sic] with your 
transactions, and success if you meet with any in this business; That they 
may be thoroughly Persuaded of our earnest desire to do them Justice.”
79
 
Gage was desperate to get rid of such illegal settlements, for they 
were a constant source of trouble.  In a typical incident some young Seneca 
warriors stole horses from an illegal settlement, and in retaliation the settlers 
threatened to march on the Seneca village.  Fearing the results of such an 
action, Murray ordered the Seneca to return the horses to him so he could 
pass them on to the settlers.  Gage approved of these actions, but ordered 
Murray to tell both the Seneca and settlers that “if these abandoned settlers 
presume to occasion any other uneasiness, or dare to put their threats into 
Execution, that I will interfere and Order Troops to March to protect them 
from any insults they may offer, and you will likewise, please to make these 
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my intentions know to the Inhabitnats[sic]."
80
  Gage hoped that this news 
would reduce the risk of any further confrontations, and it may have worked 
as the settlers never marched on the village.  This leaves open the question 
of whether Gage would have ordered the troops to march, or whether his 
announcement was just a bluff.  Whether or not the order was a bluff, the 
general had made it clear that in disputes between squatters and Native 
Americans he was firmly on the side of the Native Americans. 
Later, in 1767, after the garrison at Fort Pitt was reinforced, another 
effort was made to remove the settlers from Redstone Creek.  The army, 
accompanied by Indians of the Six Nations, travelled to the squatters’ 
village and told the settlers to leave, warning them that if they remained it 
would be very difficult to prevent the young men of the Indian nations 
attacking them. The soldiers then burned those houses they could find.
81
 
Gage was aware that many of the settlers might return, but believed that by 
bringing Native Americans with the army to Redstone it would at least 
provide headmen with proof of the army’s good intentions.  Consequently, 
even though the army was incapable of forcing the settlers away, the 
headmen would be aware that “it is at least the Inclination of the King and 
His Servants to be at Peace with them and do them all the justice in Our 
Power”.  This would then make it easier to confine the Native Americans’ 
attacks to the Virginia frontier and the illegal settlements on its borders, 
should it come to war.
82
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Gage’s reaction to other squatter settlements further illustrates the 
central importance of maintaining a good relationship with Native 
Americans.  In 1767, when he was informed of some people who had 
illegally settled close to Fort Stanwix, Gage did not order their immediate 
dispersal. Instead, he informed Johnson that only if they “do not behave 
properly or give jealousy to the Indians by an Imprudent Conduct they must 
be drove away.”
83
  The legal status of the settlement was of only secondary 
importance to Gage; the community’s fate would be decided by how the 
area’s Native Americans reacted to it.  The general aim was not to uphold 
the law in the west in the absence of colonial authority, but to build trust 
with Native Americans by removing those things that antagonised them.  If 
a settlement was not a problem for local Native Americans, then it was not a 
problem for Gage. 
As his irritation with the illegal settlers continued, Gage also grew 
increasingly weary of the governors’ inaction.  After Stuart had written to 
Gage, asking him to ensure that the governors obeyed the Proclamation of 
1763, Gage replied:  
 
“I should readily comply with your request in 
recommending to the respective governors within your 
District to comply with the King's Proclamation of 7th of 
October 1763 could it answer any purpose.  If the 
Proclomation itself does not carry sufficient weight to 
enforce an obedience thereto from His Majesty's Servants 
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and the Circular Letters sent therewith by the Kings 
ministers to require a due observance to the Contents of said 
Proclamation: neither your Applications or my 
Recommendations can avail much.”
84
 
 
When Fauquier, the Governor of Virginia, eventually replied to 
Gage’s letter, it was only to claim that he was powerless. “I entirely agree 
with your excellency that nothing but a military force will remove them [the 
settlers]: and in this I can give you no assistance whatever, being fully 
convinced that the Militia which is the only force I have in my hands, would 
stand by these unlawful settlers, rather than act against them."
85
  While the 
governor was probably correct in his assessment of  the loyalty of the 
militia, his refusal even to ask Gage if he could help in the matter would 
seem to imply that the governor was not unaware that he could call upon the 
army for assistance, and that he chose not to do so for reasons he left 
unstated.  Most probably, Fauquier feared the repercussions from his 
assembly if he used troops to remove people from Indian land.
86
  This was 
the view taken by Gage in a letter to Johnson: “I must believe that the 
governors would do all in their power [to stop encroachments on Indian 
land], but that they are not properly supported by the other branches of their 
Legislature.  And it is not improbable I might say very suspicious that some 
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men of interest abet these encrouchments.”
87
  Johnson agreed that 
assemblies would be reluctant to call for troops, although in his letters to 
Gage he put the blame on the traditional British fear of a standing army.
88
 
Gage outlined why he was unwilling to use the regular army with 
colonial assent in a letter to Shelburne: “There would have been no 
Hesitation in ordering a Body of Troops to force these People off the 
Lands”,
89
 were the area in question indubitably outside colonial authority.  
The problem was that Redstone and the Cheat River were disputed between 
Virginia and Pennsylvania.  The Virginians no doubt feared that if they did 
not protest against any exertion of military authority in these lands, such 
silence might be taken to signify that they had given up any claim to the 
area.   So Gage’s hands were tied.  No colony was prepared to authorise 
action, but both Pennsylvania and Virginia claimed jurisdiction, and Gage 
was not prepared to act unilaterally. 
90
 
Competing colonial claims were not the end of the complications 
with which Gage had to deal in the Redstone affair.  It was not simply that 
Native Americans wanted the settlement removed and the British Army 
failed to oblige them.  In reality, some Native Americans desired that some 
settlers might remain there so they could trade with them for corn.  Indeed, 
one of Captain Murray’s first attempts to remove the settlers from Redstone 
was prevented by Native Americans.
91
 This was not the last time that the 
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army found it difficult to secure Native American assistance.  Murray, in 
another of his many attempts to remove the settlers, applied to the Indians 
for representatives to accompany him, but the Shawnee and Delaware 
refused, claiming that the land belonged to the Seneca and Mingo.
92
     
 Native American reaction was similar when Pennsylvania tried to 
solve the problem in 1768 by passing a resolution ordering settlers to 
remove from Indian lands by July of that year or face execution.
93
  When a 
group headed by Reverend John Steel, sent by Pennsylvania to order settlers 
to remove from Indian lands, met with those living at Redstone, the 
inhabitants of Redstone claimed that “the Indians were very peaceable, and 
seemed sorry that they were to be removed, and said they apprehended the 
English intended to make war upon the Indians as they were moving off 
their people from their neighbourhood”.  Hearing that some Mingo would 
be in the area, Steel asked them to attend a conference that he had called 
with the inhabitants of Redstone.  The Mingo agreed, and when they arrived 
they told the people of Redstone that there was soon to be a conference, and 
after that was concluded then they would tell them what to do.  This rather 
reduced the impact of Steel’s order for the settlers to leave or face dire 
consequences.  The inhabitants took the speech to mean that the Indians 
were happy for them to remain there, and so most resolved not to move at 
least till after the conference.  As Steel put it, “The Indians coming to 
Redstone and delivering their speeches, greatly obstructed our design.”
94
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At the promised conference the subject of the settlement at Redstone 
was once again raised, and this time the Native Americans there, mostly Six 
Nations, urged the British to remove the villages.  George Croghan, 
presiding at the conference, tried to find Indians to assist in the removal of 
the squatters, but failed.  Kyushu, a Seneca explained why: 
 
“…all our young men are very unwilling to carry a 
message from us to the white people ordering them to 
remove from our lands.  They say, they would not choose to 
incur the ill will of these people, for if they should now be 
removed, they will hereafter return to their settlements, when 
the English have purchased the country from us, and we 
shall be very unhappy if, by our conduct towards them at the 
time, we should give them reason to dislike us, and treat us 
in an unkind manner, when they again become their 
neighbours.”
95
 
  
The commander-in-chief had appealed to John Penn, Governor of 
Pennsylvania, and Francis Fauquier, Governor of Virginia, many times for 
permission to use troops against those squatting on Indian land.  The 
Pennsylvanian Governor declined his offer and Fauquier simply ignored it.  
Gage knew that he could not allow soldiers to move against civilians 
without a request from a governor or a magistrate as such an action would 
produce a huge outcry in the Colonies, and could result in soldiers being 
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placed on trial or sued. He complained to the government about these 
settlements, but nothing was done, and he was never given the necessary 
power to tackle the problem.
96
     
Frustrated, Gage tried to make the best of a worsening situation.  If 
the presence of settlers on their land was going to result in Native American 
attacks, then the army would do all it could to ensure that the reprisals fell 
only upon the guilty.  If a general war could be avoided by sacrificing the 
lives of the ‘low born rabble’ in the backcountry, it seemed to many officers 
in the army a fair price to pay.  After a group of Seneca Indians returned 
some horses that they had stolen from the inhabitants of Redstone, they 
were told by an officer that the people living there were “not part of us”.
97
 
This line was approved by Gage, who wrote to tell Murray that "if these 
people [the settlers] thro' their obstinacy will bring mischief upon their own 
heads, there is no one will greatly pity them, when they come to suffer for 
it".
98
 
By 1767 Gage knew that he was battling not just the squatters on 
Native American land but powerful groups in the colonies as well.  Gage 
told Johnson that he despaired of Native Americans getting satisfaction, for  
 
“I don't find the provincial Legislature very ready to 
assist in putting an effectual stop to insults or 
encrouchments. I judge only from the answers I get for I 
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must believe that the governors would do all in their power, 
but that they are not properly supported by the other 
branches of their Legislature.  And it is not improbable I 
might say very suspicious that some men of interest abet 
these encrouchments.”
99
 
 
 Furthermore, Gage declared that if “after taking all the pains we 
can, if the Indians do break out, and should confine their hostilities to those 
spots [encroachments onto their lands] only, tho the killing of People must 
be shocking to Humanity.  I could not answer giving any assistance, or to 
begin any Hostilities against the Indians till the whole affair should be laid 
before the King, and I should receive His Majesty's Orders thereupon" . The 
commander-in-chief was saying that he would not go to war to defend the 
Colonies from Native American attack; he would only go to war on the 
orders of the king.
100
 
Gage was not the only imperial servant prepared to sacrifice those 
who had crossed boundary lines if it would preserve the peace.  In 1765 
Stuart promised the Creeks that “if any white people settles beyond them 
[the boundary markers] we will never enquire how they came to be 
killed."
101
  What mattered to these servants of empire was above all 
avoiding another Indian war, and this end, they felt, justified the sacrifice of 
some troublesome backcountry folk.
102
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Gage’s final strategy for keeping the empire out of any new Indian 
wars was simply to step aside and let those tribes who felt aggrieved vent 
their rage in attacks on frontier settlements.  If war was to break out again, 
Gage hoped to confine it to the one or two colonies that he believed were 
most responsible for angering the Native Americans.  The colony most often 
mentioned in such a context was Virginia.
103
  It would not take long for 
Virginia to put Gage’s plan to the test. 
It proved beyond the army’s capabilities to remove the illegal 
settlements which had already been established.  The army failed in this task 
because, as with suppressing frontier violence, the army was given 
responsibility for a problem but not the authority to resolve it.  The army 
could not move against settlers without the approval from colonial officials, 
and this proved impossible to obtain.  It has long been established that the 
army lacked teeth as a restraining force.  In the past, this has been ascribed 
to indifference, at best, to the plight of Native Americans.  Clearly this was 
not true.  Gage was prepared to gainsay even his own officers and Indian 
agents if he thought their actions would anger Native Americans.  In the end 
he was reduced to hoping that Native Americans’ attacks would remove the 
problem of illegal settlements. 
The army’s frustration in bringing justice to the frontier highlights 
the huge significance that the correct (or in this case incorrect) framing of 
legislation can have on whether it achieves its intended goal.  The Mutiny 
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Act, which prohibited the army from doing anything to criminals other than 
transporting them back to the Colonies, was not intended to give settlers free 
rein to victimise Native Americans on the frontier, but this is what it ended 
up doing.  It did not matter that the government wanted peace on the 
frontier; by preventing the army or the Indian Department from effectively 
punishing those who annoyed Native Americans the Mutiny Act actually 
moved the frontier closer to war, the opposite of its stated goal.  
Even operating under the government’s tight restrictions the army 
clearly achieved something in its time on the frontier, despite its lack of 
success in providing justice for Native Americans.  Its most important 
function may have been providing an alternative to more personal revenge.  
Chiefs and sachems could not maintain support in their communities if they 
appeared to be allowing the British literally to get away with murder.  
Sachems only operated with the consent of their community, and if their 
people felt that the British could not be trusted, it would not matter what the 
sachems wanted; they would not be allowed to do business with the British.  
By taking their cases to Indian agents and army officers, it allowed them to 
take action, and if that action failed, the blame could be shifted onto the 
British. 
That Native American leaders continued to bring their complaints 
about those who had wronged them to British officers suggests that some 
officers performed their role of cultural mediators competently.  It is hard to 
imagine that Amerindians would have continued to do so had British 
officers met their concerns with the dismissive and hateful attitude toward 
Native Americans that they are traditionally depicted as having.  Indeed, the 
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lengths to which some officers went in order to placate Native Americans, 
whether it was repeatedly visiting squatter communities to order them to 
move or hunting for elusive murder witnesses in the backcountry, proves 
that there were officers who took such matters seriously.  Of course they did 
this because they wished to avoid another war, but the actions of British 
officers clearly indicated that there were those for whom a desire for 
domination was not the overwhelming motivation.  
The issue of land during the years immediately before the War of 
Independence provides a clear illustration of just how far Crown and 
Colonies were diverging.  The British Government no longer wished for 
uncontrolled expansion, regarding it as undesirable, possibly unprofitable 
and dangerous.  For the Americans there could never be enough land, both 
for individuals and colonies.  This conflict was played out in the 
backcountry, where the agents of the Crown (the army and the Indian 
Department) found it impossible to secure the assistance of the Colonies.  
Clearly Crown and Colonies were heading for a confrontation, but before 
then Gage would have to face the situation he feared most: a new war 
between Virginia and Native Americans on the frontier. 
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Chapter Eight 
 The Final Act 
 
Whether or not the army’s efforts to police the frontier were 
successful, they still cost the government a great deal of money.  The 
rejection of the Stamp Act by the Colonies pushed the government into a 
new and hurried search for revenue.  When import duties failed, the British 
Government had no choice but to reduce its expenditure in the Colonies.  
Their chosen method was to hand control of the frontier and the fur trade to 
the Colonies, while abandoning the majority of the army’s backcountry 
posts.  The government hoped that by withdrawing the army, the Colonies 
would be awakened to the threat posed by Native American anger and so 
take the necessary steps to neutralise it.  While this may seem a sudden shift 
in policy it was in fact following in the footsteps of the army, for Gage had 
already decided that if the Colonies could not control their settlers, then they 
should not be sheltered from any resulting violence.  Sadly, this plan was a 
failure; the Colonies refused to take responsibility for the frontier or the fur 
trade, with the end result being Dunmore’s War.   
Disgusted by the Colonies’ inability to preserve peace on the frontier 
and terrified by the prospect of a general Indian war, the government 
decided once again to take control of the frontier themselves.  The tool that 
they used to do this was the Quebec Act.  The Quebec Act would place the 
north-eastern frontier under the control of the province of Quebec, which 
had no elected assembly and a Crown-appointed governor, and so give the 
British Government much more direct control of the region.  These changes 
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not only highlight the shifting priorities of the British Empire away from 
Protestant colonists, but also underline the role played by the army in the 
formation of policy.  Many of the measures incorporated in the Quebec Act 
had been previously suggested by Gage, and he was in England while the 
Act was being drawn up.  An army that had been sent to the Colonies to 
fight the French and their Native American allies had ended up promoting 
laws to protect them. 
After the repeal of the Stamp Act, the government was again forced 
to begin the search for a replacement source of revenue to cover its colonial 
expenses.
1
  Still unwilling to increase their own share of the tax burden, 
British Parliamentarians decided to make another attempt to tax the 
Colonies, a task that fell to Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles Townsend.  
In June 1767 he introduced a number of duties on items imported into 
America, most famously tea, with the express intent of raising money for 
the army and civil administration in America.  The British Government now 
conceded that colonial Americans were unwilling to pay internal taxes 
imposed by Parliament, but hoped that they would acquiesce to new import 
duties.  Colonists already paid duties on some goods without protest, which 
the government took as proof that the Colonies would not object to the 
imposition of further duties.  This theory was soon proved to lack any basis 
in reality.  Many colonists were furious that the British were once again 
seeking to impose new taxes.  The colonists took some time to get 
organised, but once they did they were quickly able to make their disgust for 
the new duties felt on both sides of the Atlantic.  Soldiers were sent to 
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Boston in the hope that their presence would maintain order, but in reality 
this only provoked more trouble.  With the colonists unwilling to pay and 
the government as yet unwilling to force them, the British had little room 
for manoeuvre, and save for the duty on tea the levies were withdrawn in 
April 1770.
2
 
With the finances of the empire in turmoil, the need for economy 
once again became the main driving force of policy.  In April 1768 the 
government informed Gage that a new plan for Indian affairs had been 
approved: the troops would be withdrawn from most of the frontier posts 
and the Colonies would be expected to police the fur trade. The primary 
motivation for these changes was financial; the British were spending 
thousands of pounds on the frontier, and this expenditure was no longer 
sustainable.  The Colonies’ rejection of British taxation forced the 
government to cut its costs drastically in the Colonies.  By withdrawing 
from the forts vast sums would be saved, as the cost of carrying food and 
other supplies to the distant and inaccessible posts was enormous.  By 
ending the need for Crown commissaries to oversee the fur trade, the 
government would make saving not only on their wages but also on the 
hugely expensive Indian gifts that the commissaries purchased to distribute.  
This, Hillsborough hoped, would “relieve this Kingdom from the enormous 
expense she at present groans under”.
3
     
Withdrawal from the frontier also served another purpose.  By 
removing troops from the frontier Gage was able to concentrate them near 
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the coast where they could respond to potential civil unrest.  The colonial 
response to the British Government’s ever more desperate attempts to tax 
the colonies was strident, and protest was often accompanied by violence.  
In response to the Stamp Act in 1765 there had been riots and protest from 
New England to South Carolina.  Royal officials had been the subject of 
attacks and intimidation in order to prevent them putting the act into effect.  
In June 1768 Hillsborough ordered troops and warships to Boston to aid 
customs officials in their attempts to enforce the Townsend Duties.  This 
deployment of troops amongst an angry and resentful population inevitably 
ended in violence, with the event that would subsequently become known as 
the Boston Massacre.  On March 5 1770, after heavy provocation, a group 
of soldiers opened fire on an unarmed mob, resulting in a total of five 
deaths.   Sharing a feeling that the coastal towns were in danger of erupting 
into violence almost without warning, both Gage and the government agreed 
that moving troops out of scattered frontier posts and closer to the seaboard 
represented a sensible precaution.
4
 
The British attempt to restrict the fur trade to British forts had been 
undertaken to allow commissaries to oversee the trade, but it was an attempt 
that had proved futile.  Native Americans resented being made to travel 
many hundreds of miles in order to barter their skins, and so did all they 
could to persuade traders to relocate to their villages, with many traders only 
too happy to oblige.  Those traders prepared to flout the law and relocate 
had a massive advantage in acquiring the skins over those few who 
remained at the posts under the scrutiny of the commissaries. Even when 
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traders did remain at the posts, it was impossible to make them act 
according to the law. The authority and jurisdiction of the Indian 
Department and army were too weak and ill-defined, as Gage had realised, 
and as a result, whenever British officers or Indian agents tried to take 
traders to task for cheating Native Americans, they faced legal challenges in 
colonial courts.  Frustrated by this, Gage had informed the Board of Trade 
that “That they [the traders] must be restrained by law, and a judicial Power 
Invested in the Officers Commanding at the Posts, to See such Law put in 
force.  And without this, Regulations may be made, but they will never be 
observed."
5
  At the beginning of 1768 Gage informed London that “The 
framing new Laws in the Provinces, and enforcing Obedience thereto, for 
the better Securing the Indians in their Persons and Properties, seems a most 
essential Point”.
6
   
When they examined the fur trade, the Lords of Trade came to the 
same conclusion as Gage: that it was impossible for it to “be properly and 
effectually controlled by Officers having no other authority, that what they 
derive from your Majestys Commission”.  Like the general, the Lords of 
Trade believed that regulations required the “authority of law to carry them 
into execution”.
7
  It was hoped by the government that giving control of the 
fur trade to the Colonies would encourage them to regulate it properly 
themselves.  The government and Gage also felt that there was more chance 
of traders obeying colonial laws than British ones.  In his letter informing 
colonial governors of the new plan, Lord Hillsborough was at pains to 
                                                           
5
 Gage to Johnson, 25 January 1767, Gage Papers WLCL and Gage to Shelburne, 11 
November 1766, Gage Correspondence, p. 112. 
6
 Gage to Shelburne, 22 January 1768, Gage Correspondence, p. 157. 
7
Representations of the Lords of Trade on the State of Indian Affairs, 7 March 1768,  
NYCD Vol. 8 p. 24. 
240 
 
remind them of the necessity of laws “for the control and punishment of 
those atrocious Frauds and Abuses which have been practiced by the 
Traders and have been one principal Cause of the disaffection of the 
Savages”.
8
 
Hillsborough explained to Gage that though this disaffection had led 
to conflict in the past, it was only the presence of British Army posts on the 
frontier that had compelled the Crown to become involved in these 
conflicts.  Therefore, “entrusting the Management of the Trade with Indians 
to the Colonies ... Depend[s] in great Measure upon a reduction of such 
Posts in the interior Country, as are, by their Situation, exposed to the 
Resentment of the Savages.”  To withdraw the army from the frontier would 
“diminish the Necessity of carrying on an Indian War at the Expence[sic] of 
the Kingdom”. As far as the government was concerned, if the Colonies 
brought about another conflict they would have to face the consequences 
alone.  In order that expenses could be kept to a minimum and Britain’s new 
American Empire preserved, the government was prepared to sacrifice 
colonial ambitions and lives.  For Hillsborough, if any future war against 
Native Americans resulted in “the temporary Abandonment of a few 
straggling Settlements upon the Frontiers”, it would be no great loss.
9
  
As well as saving the British from the further expense of a future 
frontier war, it was hoped that the realisation that they could not rely on the 
redcoats to fight Amerindians would focus colonial attention on the 
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importance of keeping Native Americans satisfied.  To make sure that the 
message got through, Hillsborough warned the governors of the Colonies 
that under the new plan it was only by “giving that Satisfaction and content 
to Savages …[that] the Colonies can hope to derive either immediate Profit 
or lasting Peace”.
10
 
With the Colonies now in charge of the fur trade, there was no 
longer any need for the army to pay for forts to act as marketplaces where 
traders and Native Americans could meet under the watchful eye of the 
Indian Department.  As a result, the cost of supporting the army in America 
went from a peak of £424, 609 in 1771 to £340, 457 by 1773.
11
  Gage was 
instructed by the ministers to prepare a list of all unnecessary posts, which 
he was to submit to them for final approval before abandoning them.  
Previously Gage had only been allowed to abandon the smaller posts; now 
even the largest posts were to be dispensed with.  Gage felt that forts 
Chartres and Pitt were good prospects for evacuation.
12
  Fort Chartres was 
expensive to maintain, and Gage felt it did not bring much advantage to the 
British.  The general held that goods from the country around Fort Chartres 
would always flow downstream towards New Orleans, which rendered the 
trade at Fort Chartres minimal.  At the same time Fort Chartres was costly to 
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provision and keep up, being 1500 miles from any supply depot and about 
to fall into the river as a result of erosion undermining the fort’s 
foundations.  Once Chartres was evacuated, Gage believed that Fort Pitt 
could be left too, as the general considered its only use was as a staging post 
for supplying the fort on the Mississippi.
13
  Gage had told Johnson as far 
back as 1766 that were it not necessary for communication with the Illinois 
Country, then Fort Pitt would be abandoned.
14
    The government accepted 
Gage’s recommendations, but moved slowly, so it was not until the end of 
1771 that Hillsborough finally gave Gage permission to abandon Fort 
Chartres and Fort Pitt.
15
   
This new plan was a marked change in government policy: no longer 
were British troops at the disposal of colonial governors to pacify Native 
Americans as they had been in the Cherokee War and Pontiac’s War.  The 
Colonies would no longer be treated as brothers in arms by the British, but 
like unruly teenagers they would be given the responsibility they craved, on 
the understanding that they would have to clean up any mess they made.  
The British would no longer protect colonists from Amerindians, but simply 
try and limit the scale of any new wars.  The rationale for this was mainly 
economic.   
Yet this huge change in government policy was in some ways only 
catching up with what was already happening in reality.  In response to 
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repeated violations of the boundary line by Virginian settlers, Gage had 
already resolved not to come to their aid if they were attacked by Native 
Americans.  With the new plan for the frontier, government policy and army 
practice were finally marching in step, with both agreed that it was best to 
sacrifice the frontier settlers if it meant avoiding a wider war.
16
   
The 1768 plan so closely followed decisions taken by Gage because 
it was heavily influenced by ministers’ correspondence with the 
commander-in-chief.  Gage had already begun to remove troops from the 
frontier, but this was accelerated under the plan.  He had decided that if the 
Colonies provoked another Indian war, they would be left to fight it on their 
own; this too was made government policy under the plan. He had argued 
that the Colonies should pass laws to regulate the fur trade better, and the 
government now hoped that the new plan would prompt them to do so.  The 
transfer of power to the Colonies under the plan of 1768 clearly represents a 
break with the past, but it should not be allowed to overshadow the many 
elements of continuity linking government policy to army practice. 
The plan of 1768 was not only a dramatic shift in government 
policy, it was also an almost complete failure.  In 1770, two years after they 
had been given the task of managing the Indian trade, the Colonies had yet 
to take any action.  Only the province of West Florida had set out 
regulations for trading with Indians.
17
  James Stevenson, the commander at 
Detroit, noted that “The Provinces are very dilatory in arranging the Indian 
affairs, indeed is it absurd to think they will ever form a rational plan for 
that purpose, their interest is too divided, nor do they appear from their 
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proceedings to know anything about the matter”.
18
  Gage, as ever motivated 
by a desire to avoid war, did what he could to push the Colonies into taking 
action, and in spring 1769 he wrote to those colonial governors whose 
colonies were involved in the fur trade, recommending that they supply 
“Commissarys, Interpreters and Smiths” to keep Native Americans 
content.
19
  The Earl of Hillsborough also sent letters to all the governors in 
North America urging them to do something to regulate the Indian trade and 
the violence on the frontier.
20
  When it became clear that the Colonies were 
not going to do anything, Gage ordered his men to pay for the blacksmiths 
and interpreters at the posts, so that their services could be retained without 
their wages showing up in the accounts of the Indian Department.
21
   
The new unregulated fur trade was a disaster and caused a great deal 
of anger amongst Native Americans.  Following the introduction of the 
1768 plan, trade with Native Americans had greatly decreased.  This was in 
part a result of the Colonies’ inaction, but the fur trade had also been hit by 
the non-importation agreements that some colonies had enacted in order to 
protest the attempts by the British Government to tax the Colonies, as the 
majority of the goods that Native Americans desired were imported from 
Britain.
22
 Furthermore, the unregulated traders were disrupting Native 
Americans’ hunting by wandering the forests, disturbing the game and 
selling rum to Native Americans while they were hunting, who would then 
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return empty-handed to their desperate families, having already drunkenly 
bartered away all their skins.
23
  In addition, Native Americans were still 
frequently robbed and murdered by frontier inhabitants, causing yet more 
anger.
24
   
Native Americans might have been able to overlook these affronts if 
the British had been able to lay to rest their fears for the future of their 
hunting grounds.  The British hoped this could be achieved by the 
negotiation of a boundary line between Native American lands and the 
northern colonies.
25
  This new boundary was not planned to extend the 
limits of the Colonies, but instead intended to clear up any ambiguities as to 
where exactly the line lay, which, it was hoped, would prevent squabbles 
with Native Americans.  The new boundary was not an attempt by the 
government to grab more land; this was precisely what the British wanted to 
avoid and what it was afraid would happen if the Colonies were in charge of 
the negotiations.  Rather, the boundary line was an attempt to settle Native 
American grievances, and prevent further land-grabs, by erecting a barrier 
that could only be changed by negotiation between the Crown and Native 
Americans. The Lords of Trade felt that the new boundary was “essentially 
necessary to the gaining Their [Native American] good will and affection, 
and to preserving the tranquility of the Colonies”.
26
 
This new, precisely defined boundary would replace the vague line 
drawn up by the Proclamation of 1763, and it would not be policed by the 
British Army but by the Colonies.  The plan of 1768 called for colonial 
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legislatures to give Native American lands full legal protection.  
Hillsborough instructed the Colonies that they were “to provide by the most 
effectual laws for preventing any settlements being made beyond the line 
that shall be agreed upon with the Indians”.
27
  Once again, where Crown 
authority had failed, the Colonies were being given a chance to take 
responsibility.  Now it would be their task to restrain the settlers who daily 
streamed west in ever greater numbers. 
The task of negotiating this boundary line was given to the Indian 
Department.  Despite the fact that they had lost control of the fur trade in the 
plan of 1768, the Indian Department was maintained as the medium through 
which the king and his Parliament (as opposed to the Colonies) would 
negotiate with Native Americans.  Only the Indian Department, assumed by 
the British Government to be “independent of … connection with any 
particular Colony”, could be trusted with the vital task of ensuring friendly 
relations and a lasting peace between empire and Native Americans.
28
 
This assumption was tragically flawed, and would end up entirely 
subverting the government’s hope that the new boundary could facilitate 
good relations with Native Americans.  The belief held by those in 
government that Sir William Johnson would put imperial goals first when 
negotiating with Native Americans turned out to be hopelessly naive.  The 
new northern boundary line was decided at a meeting between William 
Johnson and the Six Nations, Shawnee, Delaware and Seneca at Fort 
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Stanwix in October and November 1768.  Before the meeting, Gage had 
instructed Johnson that “All Nations who have Pretensions should certainly 
be consulted, and treated with on this Occasion.  Which may prevent 
disputes with any of the Nations in time to come.”
29
  Johnson deliberately 
ignored this advice, for his goal was to secure as much land as possible for 
himself and his friends, and to do this he was going to abuse the tradition of 
the covenant chain.  Rather than discuss the terms of the treaty with all the 
nations, Johnson let the Iroquois lead the deliberations, in accordance with 
the traditions of the covenant chain.  By adhering to the outdated custom of 
the covenant chain, Johnson forced the western nations to let the Iroquois 
speak for them, even though the Western Nations were the ones occupying 
most of the land under discussion.  By deliberately sidelining those Native 
Americans who occupied the lands, Johnson managed to delineate a new 
boundary line, which added large amounts of land to both Virginia and 
Pennsylvania. The treaty of Fort Stanwix also specified that some land be 
set aside for George Croghan and the “suffering traders”, as compensation 
for money that they claimed to have lost due to the recent wars on the 
frontier.
30
 
  In acquiring this land for the Colonies and Croghan, Johnson was 
directly disobeying his orders, which had been to settle a boundary line in 
order to satisfy Native American worries, not his cronies’ greed. Johnson 
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had used his influence and the traditions of the covenant chain to cheat the 
Shawnee and other tribes out of their land in order to help his friends in 
Virginia and Pennsylvania and his deputy Croghan, all of whom stood to 
make a lot of money from this newly-acquired land.
31
  Not only had the 
Iroquois bargained away land occupied by other nations, but they received 
the vast majority of the gifts handed out at the conference.  Rather than 
reducing tensions between Native Americans and the Colonies through the 
actions of Johnson, the Fort Stanwix Treaty increased them.
32
 
When news reached London of what had happened, Conway and 
Hillsborough were furious.  They felt Johnson had gone too far, obtained 
too much land, and should never have allowed land grants to private 
individuals such as Croghan to be part of the treaty.  Johnson had been 
instructed that all the land ceded should go to the Crown.  The government 
had not wanted settlers moved so far inland, where there would be no way 
to control them.
33
  The government were aghast that despite there being no 
Cherokee at the treaty discussions, Johnson had moved west the boundary 
line already negotiated between John Stuart, the Indian Superintendent for 
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the South, and the Cherokee.
34
  Hillsborough ordered Johnson to renegotiate 
the line and return as much of the land as he could”.
35
   
Johnson was not about to hand back the land and the money-making 
opportunity it represented, so rather than attempt to alter the treaty he 
launched a correspondence counter-attack, barraging ministers with letters 
in defence of his actions.  Johnson argued that, by making the cession as 
extensive as possible, he had given people room to settle and prevented 
future disputes.  He also claimed the grants for Croghan and the suffering 
traders were merely confirmations of old deeds.
36
 Johnson continued to 
deny that the treaty was a problem into the 1770s.
37
  Without any way to 
impose their will upon Johnson the government gradually caved in.  In May 
1769 Hillsborough instructed Johnson that it would ratify the boundary line, 
as agreed at Stanwix, with the proviso that the grants to Croghan and the 
suffering traders would not be confirmed.
38
  Johnson did make a half- 
hearted attempt to alter the boundary line in July 1770 by telling the Six 
Nations that the king did not want the land to the south, claimed by the 
Cherokee, “if it was of the least inconvenience to his Children”.  The Six 
Nations quickly rejected any such notion, and replied that their title to the 
land was “Indisputable”, and confirmed the cession of the land.
39
 
The debacle of the Fort Stanwix Treaty combined with the Colonies’ 
neglect of the fur trade left many Native American peoples feeling betrayed.  
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Even before the meeting at Fort Stanwix had ended, the Shawnee had begun 
working to create a confederacy capable of taking on the British.  They 
quickly persuaded several nations including the Miami and Illinois to join 
them.  In 1770 all the nations involved in the new confederacy met at 
Chillicothe to discuss their response to the Fort Stanwix Treaty, and they 
agreed to try and make peace with the Creeks and Cherokee in order to 
better resist British power.
40
  Working through the Huron, and exploiting 
fear of war with the Iroquois, Johnson managed to frustrate Shawnee efforts 
to mobilise more tribes against the British and the uneasy peace continued, 
but the Crown’s servants remained deeply concerned that if the area’s 
Amerindians were given sufficient provocation, they might unite and move 
against the Colonies.
41
  So when in 1774 Virginia appeared to be preparing 
for all-out war with the Shawnee, the British Government was more than a 
little concerned.  
Virginia’s war against the Shawnee, which would become known as 
Dunmore’s War, was born from the insatiable land hunger that pervaded 
that colony’s society from top to bottom.  At the lower end of the social 
scale people moved westward in their thousands, simply grabbing land 
where they could, little caring which Native Americans they were 
angering.
42
   
Not content to leave the land grabbing to the lower orders, the rulers 
of Virginia did all that they could to further the colony’s claims to any 
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suitable contested territory in the west.  These efforts were concentrated on 
the areas around the former Fort Pitt, the ownership of which was claimed 
by Pennsylvania, Virginia and George Croghan.  The new Governor of 
Virginia, Dunmore, offered to patent 200,000 acres for veterans of the 
Seven Years’ War, and sent out men to conduct surveys in 1772 and 1773.  
The surveyors went to work on lands around Pittsburgh and near a Shawnee 
settlement at Scioto.
43
 
In 1774 Virginia finally seized Fort Pitt and claimed the forks of the 
Ohio and the surrounding lands; they also rebuilt the now dilapidated fort, 
abandoned two years previously by the British, and renamed it Fort 
Dunmore.  Rumours of a coming conflict between Native Americans and 
Virginians began to circulate.  Squatters on the frontier either fled or formed 
themselves into militias, and constructed forts for their defence.  At the 
same time, Virginians continued aggressively to survey and explore the 
frontier, a deeply provocative act for Native Americans already worried that 
they were about to lose their hunting grounds.  Tensions were further 
increased when farmer and merchant Michael Cresap sparked a series of tit- 
for-tat killings by murdering two men, a Shawnee and a Delaware, who had 
been employed by a trader.
44
 
Dunmore decided that in the face of competing claims from 
Pennsylvania the best way to secure Virginia’s claim to the lands that he 
coveted would be to fight the Shawnee, the Native American group who 
were objecting most strongly to their actions.  In response to Virginia’s 
alarming behaviour, the Shawnee had sent a delegation to Pittsburgh to 
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protest the Virginians’ surveys around Scioto and complained to the Indian 
agent at the site of the former Fort Pitt, but remained peaceful.
 45
  In the 
summer of 1774 Dunmore began recruiting a militia and eventually 
assembled a force of 2,400 men to lead against the Shawnee.  Their aim was 
to secure the land that Virginia claimed from both Native Americans and 
Pennsylvania.  On 27 April the Virginians attacked two groups of Iroquois 
and Shawnee, beginning what would become known as Dunmore’s War.  
The war had but one battle, which occurred at Point Pleasant (the 
confluence of the Kanawha and Ohio rivers) where a force of frontier militia 
bested the Shawnee.  The conflict ended with the Treaty of Camp Charlotte 
at which Virginia’s claim to Kentucky was recognised by a faction of the 
Shawnee.
 46
 
If the origin of Dunmore’s war lay in lust for land, its shape was 
determined by British policy.  There was now no possibility of British 
troops marching to further colonial interests at the expense of Native 
Americans.  The Virginians would be allowed their war, but they would also 
have to deal with the consequences.  The British hoped that a bloody 
reversal on the frontier might teach the Virginians to take Native American 
concerns seriously. 
  Gage’s greatest fear was that Dunmore’s War would result in a 
general conflict between Native Americans and colonists, which would 
force the British Army to become involved.  Rather than make threats or 
take military action, Gage pinned his hopes on diplomacy, conducted 
through the Six Nations, to prevent an alliance of Native Americans 
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forming.  Gage was convinced that the influence of the Six Nations would 
be key in preventing the other Native American tribes from uniting and 
starting a general war with the Colonies.  He instructed the Indian 
Department to do all they could to keep the Six Nations onside with the 
British.
47
  
Gage was right to be worried, for in response to Virginian 
aggression the Shawnee tried to assemble a confederacy of Native 
Americans to fight back.  They sent feelers to many tribes including the 
Seneca, and Guy Johnson believed that they had contacted the Great Lakes 
Indians, using the name of the Six Nations, to request assistance.
48
  With the 
prospect looming of a general war between the Colonies and Native 
Americans, the government’s plan to limit such conflicts rather than prevent 
them was about to be severely tested. 
With connections between the Crown and Native Americans more 
important than ever, they were nearly severed by an accident of fate when 
on July 11 1774 Sir William Johnson died.  He had been holding a 
conference with the Six Nations.  The consequences were potentially 
catastrophic. The link that Johnson had provided between Native Americans 
and the British depended to a huge extent on the fact that he was known and 
respected by those Native Americans with whom he dealt.  If his 
replacement was unknown then he would never be trusted or respected by 
those Native Americans with whom he would have to negotiate, no matter 
what titles or honours he was granted by the British.   The death of Johnson 
produced a great deal of “confusion & doubt” amongst those Native 
                                                           
47
Gage to Guy Johnson, 18 September 1774, WJP Vol. 13 pp. 679-680 and Gage to Guy 
Johnson, 14 November 1774, William Johnson Papers Vol. 13 p. 693. 
48
Guy Johnson to Gage, 11 August 1774, WJP Vol. 13, pp. 666-670.  
254 
 
Americans who were at the meeting.  These feelings were shared by many 
Native Americans in the north. Johnson had been their conduit to the king, 
and, they believed, their only chance of having their complaints heard and 
their grievances addressed.  Johnson’s worsening state of health had been 
visible for some time, and had greatly concerned many of the Native 
Americans with whom he had met.  When the Native Americans realised 
that Johnson would not survive much longer they requested “that all affairs 
with them should be conducted by an Agent belonging to His Majesty as the 
most regular & best channel, and that which was most agreable [sic] to them 
... and that they had reason to fear that in case of my Death their affairs 
might fall into some of those channel Is[sic] which gave them their first 
prejudice against the English”.
 49
  Now that he was dead, they worried that 
the king and the British would abandon them completely, and leave them to 
the tender mercies of the Colonies.
50
 
Such fears were not eased by rumours circulating amongst Native 
Americans that the Crown was to “reject them and their Affairs”.  These 
fears were based on the withdrawal of commissaries from their posts and the 
Colonies’ refusal to manage the fur trade, and served as a mark of the 
importance and fragility of the link between them and the Crown.
51
   
Fortunately for the British, there was a suitable candidate available 
to ease such worries.  Guy Johnson had been both Johnson’s deputy and his 
secretary; indeed, much of the correspondence between William Johnson 
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and Gage was written by Guy Johnson.
 52
  As a result, he had a lot of 
experience in meeting with Native Americans and was well known to them; 
he was also Johnson’s recommendation as his successor.  Guy made the 
decision to step into the breach and to take on Johnson’s role until a 
permanent replacement was appointed. This decision was approved by 
Gage, although he lacked the power to make the appointment permanent.
53
   
Guy’s decision was also approved by the Six Nations, and when he 
told them that he would assume Johnson’s role, at least until a successor 
was named, it did a lot to calm their fears.
54
  When Guy Johnson met with 
the Six Nations he reassured them that reports that the Crown was to 
abandon them were nonsense, which gave them “much satisfaction”.
55
  In 
September Guy was given a little security by his appointment as William’s 
successor “until the state of the Indian Department can be further 
considered”.
56
  While his future looked uncertain, Guy did his best to secure 
his position by proving he was suitable for the job.  Many Native Americans 
were worried by the implications of Johnson’s death.  A Seneca headman, 
meeting Guy Johnson for the first time after his father-in-law’s death, asked 
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whether he would “take him by the Hand on the Terms that Sir William had 
done”.  It was only because Native Americans had dealt with Guy Johnson 
in the past in his role as William’s deputy that they trusted him to take on 
his father-in-law’s mantle.  He was known to them, and they felt he could be 
counted on to voice their concerns to the British.
57
  This is what the role of 
superintendent depended on.  Had the British Government chosen to 
parachute someone unknown to the Native Americans of the northern 
department into the role, it would have been a disaster, for it did not matter 
how highly any Indian agent was regarded by the British if he did not have 
the trust of Native Americans.  As it was, Guy Johnson’s appointment 
seems to have calmed the fears of most Native Americans, and so prevented 
a catastrophic breakdown in communications which might have followed 
William Johnson’s death.
58
  
Guy did not have much time to grow accustomed to his new role 
before he was hard at work.  Upon the outbreak of Dunmore’s War, Gage 
told Guy Johnson that the allies of the Shawnee must be advised “that this is 
no general War against the Indians, that the King’s Troops in the Posts are 
peaceable inclined, and give them always a good Reception, that the 
Provinces of New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland have taken no part in 
the present disputes, and that it is merely a Contest betwixt the Virginians 
and Shawnese”.  As per Gage’s order, the redcoats took no part in the war.
59
   
Guy Johnson quickly arranged to meet with headmen from the Six 
Nations and persuaded them to dispatch deputies with wampum belts, in the 
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hope that they could prevent any other tribes from joining the Shawnee, and 
Guy Johnson held councils with many tribes to the same end.  The views of 
Guy Johnson and Gage were in unison, and when meeting with the Chiefs 
and deputies of the Six Nations Guy informed Gage that 
 
“In public as well as several private Conferences I 
took much pains to Explain matters by showing that the 
difference was merely between some persons in Virginia & 
one Indian Nations that had long neglected the Councils of 
the Confederacy, and deserved to Suffer, Notwithstanding 
which, so great was His Majesty’s Clemency that he had sent 
Orders to restrain them, and that neither the General, the 
Troops, or the other Colonies approved of, or had any 
designs against them.”
60
  
 
In contrast, the Shawnee were doing all they could to bring other 
tribes into the war.  In an attempt to secure more support, those Shawnee in 
favour of war spread the rumour that Virginia’s attack was just a prelude to 
an attack by all the Colonies upon the Native Americans on their borders.
61
  
These attempts failed. Guy’s diplomacy and the government’s new plan 
seem to have worked, for Dunmore’s War, despite all of Gage’s anxieties, 
never developed into a general war between Native Americans and the army 
or the Colonies, and the conflict remained confined to the Virginians and 
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Shawnee.
62
  The war was ended with the Treaty of Camp Charlotte, in 
which the Shawnee gave up their claims to the land south of the Ohio.
63
 
The Colonies had been offered the chance to take responsibility for 
maintaining a peaceful frontier, and as far the British Government was 
concerned they had refused it.  Rather than control settlement, they had done 
nothing to stop people moving west, destroying the British Government’s 
hopes for controlled expansion in co-operation with Native Americans.  
Despite pleading to be allowed to control the fur trade, the Colonies had 
done nothing to regulate it when given the chance, causing many Native 
Americans a great deal of upset and anger. Dunmore’s War was the final 
straw. The British Government decided that it could no longer risk the 
future of its American possessions being placed in jeopardy by colonial 
irresponsibility.   
In 1774 the Quebec Act was passed, which redefined the boundaries 
of the province of Quebec to include all the land not currently included in 
other colonies up to the Mississippi River in the west and the Ohio River in 
the south.
64
  The Quebec Act was not one of the so-called coercive acts; its 
genesis had begun long before news of the Boston Tea Party reached 
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Britain.
65
  Neither was the Act a bribe to ensure the loyalty of the region’s 
French colonists.  Rather, the Act had initially been aimed at solving the 
problem of how to fit a French Roman Catholic colony into the legal 
framework of the British Empire.
66
  This was a problem that had been 
accidentally increased in scope by the Proclamation of 1763, which had left 
the small French communities in the interior of the continent without any 
form of government.
67
 
While initially intended to provide these scattered French villages 
with the rule of law, the extension of Quebec province into the interior 
quickly came to be seen as a way of controlling the masses migrating west.  
Many British politicians were already concerned about the potential 
difficulties of controlling settlers as they moved inland, when reports of the 
Boston Tea Party reached London.  This event seemed to many 
Parliamentarians a fearful portent of what would happen if the Colonies 
were allowed to expand inland.  As a result, the extension of the boundaries 
of Quebec Province began to be seen not only as a way of providing French 
villages on the Illinois with the rule of law, but additionally as a powerful 
disincentive to Protestant settlers looking to move westward.  British 
politicians, including Dartmouth and Solicitor General Wedderburn, felt that 
few Anglo-Saxon colonists would willingly subject themselves to the 
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vagaries of French law, even if that meant giving up on the promise of a 
new start in the west.
68
 
The new Act placed Governor Carleton in charge of the west, and 
was a last attempt by the British Government to take control of Indian 
diplomacy once again.  Unlike the colonies of British origin Quebec lacked 
a troublesome legislative assembly, and once the Act was passed it would be 
controlled by a Crown-appointed governor and council.  So, by placing all 
the frontier north of the Ohio River under the jurisdiction of Quebec, the 
Crown was taking control of the area directly.  The Colonies, and their 
unco-operative assemblies, would no longer have a say in the future of the 
frontier.  The law furthermore required all furs “from the region to go 
through Montreal or Quebec”.
 69
  The instructions issued to Carleton 
specified that commissaries, interpreters and smiths would be provided for 
all tribes in both the Northern and Southern districts.  All the colonial laws 
relevant to the Indian trade were once again repealed.  All the Indian agents 
were to be made Justices of the Peace, with the power to commit offenders 
to trial, and Indian evidence was to be allowed at trials.  The army would be 
completely removed from any involvement in Indian affairs.
 70
  For the 
British Government, the Quebec Act was one more attempt to bring order to 
the ever unruly frontier. 
The British Government’s decision to hand jurisdiction over the 
northern frontier to Quebec was symptomatic of wider changes within the 
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empire.  No longer would the needs of the Colonies be placed ahead of the 
other groups within the empire simply because they shared their origins with 
Britain’s rulers.  The British Government wanted stability and security, even 
if it came at the expense of colonial ambition.  The past ten years had 
proved to the British that the Colonies could not be trusted to put the long- 
term interests of the empire as a whole ahead of their own short-term 
desires.  As a result, the British reasoned that they had forfeited their right to 
claim pre-eminence amongst the peoples of colonial America.  In the late 
eighteenth century, Britain’s rulers clearly felt that the pragmatic concerns 
of finance and security trumped considerations of religion and ethnicity 
when managing the British Empire. 
As the Colonies’ status declined, Native Americans’ status rose.  
Commissaries chosen by the Crown and with the powers of a justice of the 
peace would reside in Native American communities to provide immediate 
access to the law, and hopefully a more sympathetic hearing than colonial 
magistrates, who owed their position to their fellow frontier settlers. Native 
Americans were not subjects, but no longer would the British Government 
allow them to be denied justice by biased colonial institutions.  To increase 
the chances of those who wronged Native Americans receiving justice, 
Amerindian evidence would be admissible in court.  In the final years of 
Britain’s American Empire, racial difference did not preclude access to the 
law, at least if that racial group was believed powerful enough to place the 
future of Britain’s colonies in jeopardy.   
Many elements of these seemingly radical changes had either been 
anticipated or called for by Gage.  For years Gage had been lobbying for 
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Native Americans to be given better access to justice.  He felt it was 
important that Native Americans received the full protection of the law.  
Army officers had sent him numerous first-hand accounts of how Native 
Americans were abused and taken advantage of by unscrupulous traders, 
and how much anger this caused.  If giving legal protection to Native 
Americans was the only way to stop this, Gage felt that it should be done.  
The general proposed that commissaries should be given legal powers, or 
made Justices of the Peace, not to impose British law on Indians but to 
regulate traders better.
 71
    
 Indeed, the cornerstone of the army’s withdrawal from the frontier 
after Pontiac’s War had been the replacement of forts with commissaries 
living in Native American communities, and this was now government 
policy.  Gage had argued that these agents should all be made Justices of the 
Peace, and again, this was now government policy. The army had also 
called for an end to colonial management of the fur trade: this was now 
policy.  In fact, most of the elements of the Quebec Act that were concerned 
with Native Americans had either been requested or put into action by the 
army in the years preceding its publication.  The only exception was the 
enlarging of Quebec to include the northern frontier.  Far from persecuting 
Native Americans, the British army under Gage had been at the forefront of 
moves to protect them. 
Gage had been particularly vocal in his calls for Indian agents posted 
in Native American communities to replace fortified garrisons.  He had long 
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ago acknowledged that army officers were “doing no more than ...skilful 
Indian officers posted judiciously amongst the nations”.
72
  This was when 
the officers were intelligent and well-informed, yet in most cases Gage and 
William Johnson agreed that commanders at the posts were not competent 
to judge whether Native Americans should get presents, never mind make 
more complex judgment calls.  Instead of posts, Gage believed that 
commissaries or Indian agents living amongst Native Americans could do a 
much better job as messengers and diplomats than officers in posts that 
Native Americans resented.
73
  In 1768 Gage had felt that the best solution to 
the “frequent Depredations of the Chactaw Indians” was to send a 
commissary, experienced in dealing with them, to live among them.  Gage 
reckoned that a knowledgeable commissary would have a much greater 
chance of success than the threat of military force in quieting troublesome 
Native Americans.
74
  Gage envisioned the role of such commissaries as both 
a diplomat and an arbiter.  As a diplomat, the commissary would act as the 
Crown’s representative amongst the Indian Nations, and in turn would 
report Native American concerns to the Indian Department.  As an arbiter, 
the commissary would oversee the fur trade, ensuring it was conducted 
honestly, and mediate upon some matters such as the selection of new 
headmen.  The commander-in-chief was convinced that this system would 
be both cheaper and more effective than stationing Indian agents at army 
posts.  In 1771 Gage recommended to Hillsborough that a commissary be 
sent to the Chickasaws, and one to the other nations on the Mississippi, as 
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the best way of keeping them in the British interest.
75
  In March 1772, when 
Fort Chartres was to be evacuated, he extended this policy to the north and 
recommended placing an Indian agent with presents upon the Wabash, as he 
thought that this system had worked very well on the Mississippi.  Finally, 
when the army did evacuate Fort Pitt, Gage offered “the best of the 
Buildings” to Croghan as an inducement to stay, and also gave Alexander 
Mckee a house at the fort.
76
  The scheme to place men within Amerindian 
communities met with the approval of some Native Americans. Those 
Native Americans attending the Fort Stanwix Treaty talks specifically 
requested “that we may have proper persons in our Countrys to manage 
affairs”.
77
 
The Quebec Act and Governor Carleton’s instructions strongly bear 
the hallmark of Gage’s thinking, and this is not surprising, for he had been 
in England just as ministers began to discuss these matters in earnest.  On 
June 8 1773 Gage left the Colonies for England after finally receiving the 
permission for leave that he had first requested in October 1772.  After his 
arrival in Portsmouth on July 6, Gage met with Barrington and had an 
audience with the king.  No doubt their conversations covered many aspects 
of Britain’s colonial policy, including Quebec and the west.   These topics 
were certainly the primary talking point when Gage met Lord North and 
Lord Dartmouth in September 1774 in a conversation that was vital in 
bringing about the Quebec Act.
78
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The British Army had been sent to America to remove the threat to 
the British Empire posed by the French and their Native American allies.  
By the end of their time occupying the frontier their commander-in-chief 
was pushing a policy that would give Native Americans great rights as part 
of that empire.  In 1774 the threat, at least as seen from Whitehall, was no 
longer external aggression but uncontrolled colonial expansion.  The British 
were terrified that rapid expansion westward would inevitably lead to loss of 
control of the Colonies.  The measures adopted after 1768 were framed in 
such a way as to make Native Americans the answer to this problem.  The 
British hoped that once the Colonies realised that they would be left to face 
any Native American reprisals on their own, they would take the necessary 
steps to conciliate them.   
This was a major miscalculation by the British.  The Colonies 
viewed the prospect of war with the Native Americans of the frontier as an 
opportunity, not as a catastrophe.  In Virginia it was assumed that any such 
conflict would enable the colony to expand and consolidate its frontier 
territories, and they were not the only colony to think so.   Dunmore’s War 
was a direct result of these colonial assumptions, combined with Britain’s 
policy of leaving the Colonies to fight their own battles. 
Yet the British hope that they could rely on Native Americans to 
check colonial expansion quickly proved untenable.  When the Shawnee 
attempted to form a general confederacy in response to Virginian 
aggression, the British realised that they might soon find themselves in the 
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middle of conflict between Virginia and most of the Native American 
nations of the north-east.  It would be almost impossible to stop such a 
struggle from spreading or to bring it to an end, and the army and the Indian 
Department knew it.  To prevent this nightmare, the Indian Department 
mounted an all-out diplomatic offensive to keep the Shawnee isolated.  The 
result was that when the Shawnee and Virginians finally went to war things 
went much better for the Virginians, who faced only limited opposition.  Far 
from the colony experiencing an unambiguous reversal, many in Virginia 
regarded the outcome of the conflict as a victory.  The British were trapped 
by a dilemma of their own making.  They wanted Native American 
resistance to check colonial growth, but they were afraid to let Native 
Americans gather the strength to do so. 
With their frontier policy in tatters, the government moved to 
reassert control of the region via the Quebec Act.  The Act demonstrated 
just how far apart colonial and imperial aims had drifted.  In order to 
prevent westward expansion the British were placing the Ohio Valley under 
the jurisdiction of the province of Quebec, and to keep peace on the frontier 
the British were prepared to give greater legal rights to Native Americans, 
all as part of an Act that had been heavily influenced by the commander-in-
chief of the army in America.  An army that had been dispatched to America 
in order to end the threat that the French and their Native American allies 
posed to the Colonies was now promoting the rights of these groups to 
counter the threat posed to Britain’s empire by their own colonies. 
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Conclusion 
 
The policies that were chosen by Amherst clearly reflect several 
themes that were common in eighteenth-century thinking on race.  Amherst 
believed Europeans to be superior to Native Americans both morally and 
militarily, and he also believed in the power of trade to transform the Native 
American character.  In addition, it is clear that Amherst hated Native 
Americans. He hoped the threat of destruction would keep them subservient 
during peacetime, and once Pontiac’s War had begun he did everything he 
could to make that threat of destruction into a reality. 
Yet the way Amherst’s senior officers reacted to his orders makes it 
clear that not everyone in the British Army shared his assumptions.  Those 
senior officers who insisted on disobeying Amherst’s orders to end the 
practice of gift-giving clearly felt that there was a need to do what they 
could to keep Native Americans happy. Unlike Amherst, they did not trust 
the reputation or reality of British military power to keep them safe from 
Native American anger. 
Despite their protests, Amherst refused to listen to those of his 
officers who wanted to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Native 
Americans.  Amherst believed Native Americans could never be a threat to 
the British and so saw no reason to court their favour.  This decision helped 
precipitate Pontiac’s War, which Amherst viewed as an opportunity finally 
to destroy Native American society.  As this study shows, once Gage 
replaced Amherst he pursued a different strategy.  Gage knew that it was 
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beyond the British Army to destroy the Native Americans’ ability to wage 
war; rather, his strategy was to convince Native Americans that war with the 
British was not in their interest.  This he did by pushing two columns of 
troops into their territory where he forced them to negotiate a harsh peace.  
As the research shows, Gage did this because, unlike Amherst, he believed 
Native Americans to be rational, and as a result he felt it was possible to 
persuade them to live in peace with the British.  
This thesis has shown that the British Army’s policy towards Native 
Americans changed greatly as a result of Pontiac’s War.  The policy pursued 
by Gage of winning Native American hearts and minds is clearly very 
different to Amherst’s attempt to force Native Americans to accept British 
domination.  This change in policy came about not because Pontiac’s War 
transformed how the British Army thought about Native Americans, but 
because it precipitated the removal of Amherst and his subsequent 
replacement with Gage, who held radically different assumptions about 
Native Americans. 
Amherst assumed Native Americans presented no threat to the army, 
and so assumed there was no risk in trying to change their behaviour with 
harsh treatment. Gage assumed that Native Americans were a threat to both 
the army and empire, and that as rational beings they could be persuaded to 
accept the army’s presence on the frontier.  The only way we can explain 
the vastly different policies pursued by the two men is if we accept that they 
held vastly different ideas about Native Americans. 
Gage’s attempt to deal with Native American grievances was the 
foundation of his policy of winning Native American hearts and minds.  As 
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Gage saw it, Native Americans’ major grievances were: squatters moving 
on to their land, frontier violence and the poorly regulated fur trade.  This 
thesis has established that the army failed to remedy these issues because of 
the problems they faced in trying to do so, and not as a result of indifference 
to Native Americans’ concerns. 
This study has shown that the changes Gage made to frontier policy 
were an attempt to overcome these obstacles.  Unlike Amherst, Gage took 
the threat of war with Native Americans seriously.  In order to prevent the 
outbreak of such a conflict Gage felt that it was sometimes acceptable to let 
Native Americans murder frontier settlers.  While some may argue that such 
a strategy is at odds with Gage’s mission to protect the Colonies, research 
shows that Gage believed that the sacrifice of a few frontier communities 
was worth it if it would ensure the safety of the Colonies as a whole.  Such a 
course of action seems a clear indication that the reality of the situation on 
the frontier played a far larger role in guiding Gage’s thinking than 
preconceived notions of race.  
That the policy of refusing to come to the aid of those who 
antagonised Native Americans was later adopted by the British Government 
is a clear indication of the influence that Gage had on policy.  The extent of 
this influence is confirmed by the Quebec Act, which put into practice 
several ideas Gage had long supported, such as placing Indian agents in 
Native American communities.  The policies enacted by Gage and later 
incorporated into the Quebec Act clearly signal the changing nature of the 
British Empire at this time.  Victory in the Seven Years’ War had forced 
British politicians and officials to consider what place French Canadians 
270 
 
and Native Americans would take in the British Empire.  For Gage, at least, 
it was clear that the army had to take Native Americans’ needs seriously as 
long as they continued to pose a military threat to the Colonies, even if this 
meant bringing the army into conflict with Protestant colonists. 
The differing goals of the army, Native Americans and colonists 
were brought into sharp relief by Dunmore’s War, and as this thesis has 
shown, Dunmore’s War only took the form that it did because of the 
policies that Gage had decided to adopt.  Gage had declared that the 
colonists would have to fight their own battles against Native Americans 
and, in Dunmore’s War, this is precisely what he left Virginia to do.  Gage 
did this in the hope that the colonists would receive a reversal in the conflict 
rather than a victory, but his failure to predict this does not alter the motives 
for his actions. 
In terms of further research several questions present themselves.  
Was Gage an anomaly, or were his efforts to win over Native Americans 
carried on by his successors in North America?  It is also worth asking 
whether the anger Gage felt at frontier settlers fed into a general resentment 
towards colonists, and if this influenced his actions in the run-up to the 
revolution.  Gage’s actions certainly had an effect on the British 
Government, who adopted many of his policies, and it would seem worth 
investigating if this happened in any other parts of the British Empire.   
To conclude, Amherst and Gage pursued vastly different policies 
with respect to Native Americans during their time in the Colonies.  For 
Amherst, his prejudice was paramount in his decision-making; for Gage it 
was the reality of the situation on the frontier that guided his choices.  When 
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Gage went on to change his policies it was as a result of the growing crisis 
on the frontier and the changing nature of the British Empire.  Examining 
the changes Gage made, it is clear that the actions of the army while on the 
frontier can only be successfully explained if we take into account both their 
prejudices and the situation they found themselves in. 
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